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In 1948, when awareness of the Holocaust, 
the systematic destruction by the Nazis of 
the Jews of Europe, began to penetrate the 
literary world, Lionell Trilling predicted 
that no work of literature could possibly 
fathom the enormity of the crime perpet­
rated and the suffering endured. "Before 
what we now know," he wrote, "the mind 
stops; the great psychological fact of our 
time which we all observe with baffled 
wonder and shame is that there is no possi­
ble way of responding to Belsen and 
Buchenwald." 
Trilling was writing shortly after the end 
of the Second World War, and however true 
his denial of the possibility of responding to 
the fact of genocide was at that time, it no 
longer seems an accurate description of our 
situation with respect to the Holocaust. For 
after a prolonged silence on the subject, a 
substantial body of literature has come into 
being: novels, poems, memoirs, histories, 
diaries, and biographies. But what Trilling 
really meant to say, of course, was not that 
there is no possible way, but that there is no 
adequate way, of responding to the murder 
of millions of people for the sole "crime" of 
having been born — to the spectacle, 
enacted in full view of much of the world, of 
a genocidal campaign that taxed the human 
and material resources of the German 
people for over six years, until its murder­
ous work was completed or interrupted by 
invading armies. 
In The Resonance of Dust, Edward Alex­
ander proposes that the touchstone of ade­
quacy in literature on the Holocaust should 
be the recognition that the tragedy of the 
Jewish people is something more than a 
"theme" for poems and stories, a peg on 
which to hang reflections on the capacity of 
(Continued on back flap) 
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Preface 
Lionel Trilling once suggested that a primary reason for the 
apparent decline of the novel as a form of art was the fact 
that ever since Hitler's destruction of European Jewry the 
task of revealing and articulating man's depravity, an 
activity that had been a chief occupation of the human 
mind for four hundred years, had been rendered un­
necessary: 
Society's resistance to the discovery of depravity has ceased;
now everyone knows that Thackeray was wrong, Swift right.
The world and the soul have split open of themselves and are all
agape for our revolted inspection. The simple eye of the camera
shows us, at Belsen and Buchenwald, horrors that quite 
surpass Swift's powers, a vision of life turned back to its 
corrupted elements more literal and fantastic than that which
Montaigne ascribed to organized society. A characteristic 
activity of mind is therefore no longer needed. Indeed, before
what we now know the mind stops; the great psychological fact 
of our time which we all observe with baffled wonder and shame 
is that there is no possible way of responding to Belsen and
Buchenwald. The activity of mind fails before the incom­
municability of man's suffering.1 
Trilling was writing in 1948, shortly after the war; and 
however true his denial of the possibility of responding to 
the fact of genocide was at that time, it no longer seems an 
accurate description of our situation with respect to the 
Holocaust. After a lengthy silence on the subject, a 
substantial body of literature dealing with the Holocaust 
has come into being: novels, poems, memoirs, histories, 
diaries, biographies. 
Not all of these responses, to be sure, are admirable or 
even worthy of the label "activity of mind." Many of them, 
including one or two used in this volume for purposes of 
xi 
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illustration and comparison, even make one wish that the 
famous doctrine of "silence" regarding the Holocaust had 
been observed rather than written about so abundantly. 
Some of our historians and biographers have so taken to 
heart Oscar Wilde's doctrine that "the one duty we owe to 
history is to re-write it"2 that they have created what 
amounts to a Hitler hagiography.3 In fact, this enterprise 
has become a kind of right-wing equivalent to the left-wing 
historians' "revisionist" view of Stalin as a gruff but kindly 
fellow driven to excesses by the intransigence of Harry Tru­
man. At the present time, Europe is being swept by a 
"Hitler-welle," a tidal wave of literature, subliterature, and 
films devoted not merely to de-demonizing Hitler but to 
making him into an object of hero worship. Indeed, to mini­
mize or altogether to deny the Holocaust has now become, 
along with "anti-Zionism," the main business of those who 
wallow in the filth of antisemitism.4 
But of course what Trilling really meant to say was not 
that there is no possible, but that there is no adequate, way 
of responding to the spectacle, enacted in full view of much 
of the world, of a genocidal campaign that had engaged the 
human and material resources of the German people for 
over six years, until its murderous work had been completed 
or else interrupted by invading armies. When Matthew 
Arnold, whose great modern disciple Trilling was, demand­
ed "adequacy" of literature in his Oxford University lecture 
of 1857 "On the Modern Element in Literature"5 he wanted 
a literature that could give to his contemporaries an 
intellectual deliverance from their doubts and confusions 
by providing them with the complete intelligence of their 
historical situation. For Arnold modern experience seemed 
so disordered and intractable that he doubted the ability of 
the literary imagination to assimilate it and give it 
coherence. 
But our experience and our historical situation are not 
Arnold's; neither perhaps are our aspirations for literature. 
Even if one could have a literature that appeared adequate­
ly to represent and adequately to comprehend the spectacle 
of the concentration camps and death factories, would one 
Preface XIII 
be satisfied with it? I doubt it. When you wrestle with an 
angel, it is probably better to lose than to win; and this is 
more especially the case when you wrestle with the angel of 
death who visited the Jews of Europe. We are, in other 
words, dealing here with one of those problematic human 
enterprises in which some degree of failure or inadequacy is 
almost a precondition of success, in which we can expect no 
more than a shattered majesty and a noble imperfection. To 
say this is not to make of the Holocaust a license for literary 
nuttiness and "absurdity" or a rare and splendid occasion 
for demonstrating the infinite elasticity of the literary 
image. Rather, it is to acknowledge that literary works (like 
many of those dealt with in this book) that are characterized 
by uncertainty, paralysis, and ambivalence may provide a 
more adequate response to the Holocaust than works 
controlled by a tangible voice committed to the traditional 
transmutation of suffering into beauty and chaos into 
tragic significance. 
What Trilling called "the incommunicability of man's 
suffering" during the Holocaust seems at first but an 
extreme version of a problem that has always troubled 
writers: how authoritative can the imagined life of a 
fictional creation be about historical events? This problem 
was troubling Wordsworth when in Preface to Lyrical 
Ballads (1800) he said that the poet, in order to overcome the 
"slavish and mechanical" situation of those who only 
imitate what others act and suffer, was compelled "for short 
spaces of time perhaps, to let himself slip into an entire 
delusion, and even confound and identify his own feelings 
with theirs. . . .  " Dickens was addressing the same 
dilemma when he claimed, in his preface to A Tale of Two 
Cities (1859), a novel describing the butchers and the 
butchered of the Reign of Terror, that "I have so far verified 
what is done and suffered in these pages, as that I have 
certainly done and suffered it all myself." 
Fewer than half of the writers dealt with in this book had 
actual experience of the ghettos, death camps, and outdoor 
killing centers of the Holocaust. If some readers are 
unwilling to grant to those writers who were neither victims 
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nor eyewitnesses of the great destruction the authority that 
they readily allow Dickens to derive from a suffering he did 
not himself experience, this is because they sense that what 
happened to the Jews of Europe is so different from 
anything else in human history that it cannot be merely 
imagined. Terrence Des Près, in his profoundly humane 
and intelligent work The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in 
the Death Camps, deliberately stays as close as he can to 
the testimony of survivors because "radical suffering 
transcends relativity."6 Nothing is more common in the 
accounts by survivors of their experiences than the remark 
that they had been not merely in a strange place but on 
another planet altogether. Generalizing from such ac­
counts, Hannah Arendt remarked: "There are no parallels 
to life in the concentration camps. Its horror can never be 
fully embraced by the imagination for the very reason that 
it stands outside of life and death."7 But many of the 
survivors have also admitted that they have very little 
confidence in the substantial relation between their own 
reports and the actuality of the camps, precisely because, 
once having returned to this planet and the world of the 
living, they can hardly believe in their own past ex­
periences. Even Elie Wiesel, who is to the general public 
perhaps the best-known reporter of personal experience and 
loss in the Holocaust, has said, "The event seems unreal, as 
if it occurred on a different planet. . . . Did it really 
happen? I often wonder."8 We need not deny a certain 
advantage to the novelist or poet who works from ex­
perience and observation; but we must remember that the 
greatest imaginative writers have not been directed 
exclusively or even primarily by observation. No matter 
how much they were "protected" from experience, little of 
experience was protected from them. 
With few exceptions, the writers discussed in this book 
were moved to composition by extraliterary motives. What 
the Yiddish critic S. Niger said of the postwar Yiddish poets 
is true also of many who have written of the Holocaust in 
other languages: "Insofar as [they] are conscientious—and 
they are—they no longer want to be reckoned with as artists 
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or 'mere' artists. It is as if they feel guilty that their people's 
and their own tragedy has become no more than a 'theme' 
for their poems and stories."9 It should be readily apparent 
to all, and will be objectionable to some, readers of this book 
that I share the view of these writers that in the aftermath of 
the Holocaust the historical situation of the Jewish people is 
so desperate that an evaluation of Holocaust literature in 
merely literary terms is an unaffordable luxury.10 I have 
tried at all times to keep in mind T. S. Eliot's dictum that 
"the 'greatness' of literature cannot be determined solely by 
literary standards; though we must remember that whether 
it is literature or not can be determined only by literary 
standards."11 
Since the Holocaust, in which one-third of the world 
Jewish population and the spiritual center of Jewry were 
destroyed, it is the merest commonplace to say that the very 
fate of the Jewish people is in question. The oldest Jewish 
communities of forty years ago—in Germany, in Poland, in 
Yemen, in Iraq (where Jews had lived for 2,500 years)— 
today are no more. Unless there is an abrupt reversal both of 
the laws of probability and of the character of world politics, 
the last remaining coherent center of the historic Jewish 
civilization, the State of Israel, may not long survive. If, as 
Irving Howe has said, "the central premise of Jewish 
survival is a defiance of history,"12 that spirit of defiance 
will have to overcome nearly insuperable difficulties if the 
miracle of Jewish survival is to be perpetuated. 
From the time that Hitler launched his genocidal 
campaign against them up until the present moment, the 
Jews, a tiny and in most ways insignificant people, have 
been at the storm center of world history, apparently unable 
to extricate themselves from the front of the stage. This 
simple yet incredible fact has been uppermost in my mind 
as I considered the literature that came out of the Holocaust, 
which let loose against the Jews a primordial energy of 
destructiveness that has by no means spent itself. The more 
I read of the novels, poems, memoirs, and diaries discussed 
in the essays that comprise this book, the more I felt that I 
was reading not of a past finished and dead but of one 
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continuous (though not, of course, identical) with the total 
form of our present life. "There is," says the philosopher 
Joseph Dan, "no reason whatsoever to expect that the 
twentieth century will treat Jews any better in its con­
cluding quarter than it did during its second and third 
quarters."13 
The "simple yet incredible" fact just referred to is but one 
of many that confront us when studying the Holocaust. If 
there is a recurrent theme of the essays in this volume, it is 
the danger to the Jewish people of incredulity, an in­
credulity that has been induced by that congeries of ideas 
we call by the names of liberalism or modernism or 
worldliness. "Worldliness," says Cynthia Ozick, is "the 
gullibility that disbelieves everything."14 The Jews, once a 
holy people defined and disciplined by a belief that they had 
been chosen by God for a special destiny, have since the 
Enlightenment become by and large a worldly people, 
which is to say a people that denies its own transcendent 
reason for being, its own life-principle. The several critiques 
of the Enlightenment and its varied offspring that appear 
in this book contend that their historical situation now 
requires the Jews to choose between their attachment to 
liberalism, modernism, the seductions of commonsensical 
knowingness, and their survival as a people. 
The fact that most of the writers dealt with in this book 
view the Holocaust from the point of view of Jewish religion 
or Jewish historical destiny may give to readers unfamiliar 
with the Holocaust as a historical phenomenon two 
misleading impressions. One is that the Germ an criminals, 
who in many of the works here treated are disembodied and 
shadowy figures, were merely fulfilling a * le previously 
assigned to them by Jewish history. The ot er is that the 
Jews brought their terrible fate upon themselves and even 
abetted the Germans in their murderous work. 
To guard against the first misconception, one must 
remember the difference between the metaphysical and the 
historical realm. To view the German perpetrators of the 
Holocaust, as some Jewish writers do, as the modern 
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continuators of Pharaoh, Haman, and Titus is to view them 
under the aspect of sacred history, as an instrument of the 
divine will in His tragic struggle with the chosen but 
refractory people. It is not to exonerate them of full 
responsibility for the crimes they committed as active 
agents in secular history. The standards of literature, 
moreover, are not those of a court of justice. Even if they 
were, it is hard to see why the literary transformation of 
Hitler into Satan, of Mengele and Eichmann into devils, 
should exculpate them for their monstrous crimes. (They 
themselves, to be sure, anticipated that the unprecedented, 
the "inhuman," scale of their crimes would itself render all 
existing forms of legal punishment absurd and therefore 
inapplicable.) 
Strong as is the modern liberal instinct to exculpate the 
criminal, the modern liberal tendency to inculpate not only 
society but the victim himself is yet stronger. The poet Abba 
Kovner refers to this tendency when he writes acidly of 
those who betrayed Jews to their German executioners: 
"Perhaps they were not guilty— / there is always someone 
more guilty: / (the victim) / (the victim)." It is for this 
reason that I offer my second caution in the form of a 
disclaimer. Especially in the first essay in this book, and to 
a lesser extent elsewhere, criticism of Jewish gullibility is 
leveled not only at "modern" Jews in general but at some of 
the victims of the Holocaust in particular. This criticism, 
which is usually made by the authors I have been trying to 
interpret, but sometimes also by the interpreter himself, is 
not intended to blame the victims for being victimized or to 
accuse them of significantly cooperating in their own 
destruction. Distinctions between those who believed in the 
stated intentions of the Germans and those who did not are 
important and must be made. The Jewish religious 
tradition that makes of all Hitler's Jewish victims martyrs 
who died for Kiddush Hashem (sanctification of the [divine] 
name) cannot obliterate the knowledge that they were 
fallible human beings or remove the subject of their state of 
mind from critical discussion. But we must keep in mind 
always the distinction between the killers and their victims, 
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the fact that it was a central intention of the killers to turn 
their victims into helpless sheep before slaughtering them, 
and the fact that other groups and nations (all of whom had 
more arms and experience of armed conflict than the Jews) 
failed equally with the Jews to offer substantial physical 
resistance to the German death machine. 
This book makes no claim to being a comprehensive and 
exhaustive treatment of the literature of the Holocaust. I 
have included for discussion mainly those writers who 
seemed to me primarily concerned with the relationship 
between the Holocaust and the course of Jewish history, the 
fate of the Jewish people. I have, for the most part, excluded 
those writers for whom the destruction of European Jewry 
affords primarily a stunning example and ultimate revela­
tion of man's inhumanity to man, or the occasion for 
apocalyptic excursions in thought or in literary mode. I 
have also been forced to exclude writers—such as Uri Zvi 
Greenberg, Aharon Appelfeld, and Abraham Sutzkever— 
who, although immediate to my concerns in this book, are 
not readily available to English readers in translation. 
Even so, I have been obliged at times to be more expository 
and less allusive than criticism requires in presenting some 
relatively unknown writers who are included here. 
In the first two chapters of the book, writers have been 
grouped according to theme. In chapters three and four, 
they have been grouped according to nationality, not 
merely for classificatory purposes, but in order to compare 
the rival claims of Israeli and American Jewry to the 
inheritance of the historical Jewish culture destroyed in 
Europe. The fifth and sixth chapters concentrate on two 
contemporary Jewish voices, I. B. Singer and Saul Bellow, 
whose power and distinctiveness cannot be subsumed 
under thematic or national categories, even though their 
work touches on much that is broached in the earlier essays. 
The two final chapters treat the theological dimensions of 
the Holocaust. The seventh chapter discusses the impact of 
the Holocaust upon the covenantal structure of Jewish 
religion. The eighth and concluding chapter analyzes a 
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little-known Yiddish novella by Chaim Grade that sums up 
and brings forth with startling lucidity and intellectual 
power most of the quandaries that the Holocaust has 
created in the imagination of the Jewish writer and for the 
future of the Jewish people. 
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The Resonance of Dust 
That they could all be murdered, the Jews of Vilna, Kovno, 
Bialystok, Warsaw, the millions with their wives and 
children—hardly a single one wanted to believe that. What 
was the meaning of this? Was it just blindness?—Abba 
Kovner 
There is a great temptation to explain away the intrinsi­
cally incredible by means of liberal rationalizations. In 
each one of us, there lurks such a liberal, wheedling us with 
the voice of common sense.—Hannah Arendt 
chapter 1 
The Incredibility of the Holocaust 
In 1951 the incredibility of the Holocaust and the un­
imaginativeness of normal people were made themes of 
Hannah Arendt's classic study The Origins of Total­
itarianism. In that book, she stressed the extent to which 
the Nazis relied on the likelihood that the wild improbabili­
ty of the scale of their crimes, their very immensity, would 
guarantee that, should they lose the war, they and their 
preposterous lies would be believed, whereas their victims 
would be derided as fantasists. "The Nazis did not even 
consider it necessary to keep this discovery to themselves. 
Hitler circulated millions of copies of his book in which he 
stated that to be successful, a lie must be enormous—which 
did not prevent people from believing him as, similarly, the 
Nazis' proclamations, repeated ad nauseam, that the Jews 
would be exterminated like bedbugs (i.e., with poison gas) 
prevented anybody from not believing them."1 
Critical studies of the Holocaust and its literature since 
1951 have often repeated Hannah Arendt's observation but 
rarely modified or amplified it. My primary purpose in this 
essay is to raise the question of whether the undeniable 
phenomenon of general refusal to credit the intrinsically 
incredible horror of the Holocaust2 can be usefully dis­
cussed or fully understood without concentrating attention 
on the Jewish identity of the victims. In other words, I want 
to suggest that the inability of the victims themselves to 
credit the threat and then the actuality of destruction was a 
function not only of human psychology and the mad 
inventiveness of the Germans but of Jewish history and 
Jewish sensibility. My secondary purpose is too polemical 
to be stated explicitly at the outset of a scholarly essay with­
out creating the effect of Stendhal's proverbial pistol shot at 
a concert, but will, I hope, make itself felt as I proceed. 
4 The Resonance of Dust 
I would like to begin with a few examples of pre-Holocaust 
Jewish literature that impute to the Jewish people a deep-
seated unwillingness to credit the fact that they have 
enemies, and that these enemies are capable of murder; a 
deep-seated unwillingness, ultimately, to credit the ex­
istence of evil. It has been said that the Holocaust casts its 
black shadow not only over everything that has followed it 
but also over much that preceded it, especially in modern 
Jewish history and literature.3 There can therefore be no 
such thing as a "pure" and unbiased reading of pre-
Holocaust Jewish literature by any of us who live in the 
post-Holocaust epoch, no dispassionate observation of the 
literary and social fact. I can only ask that each reader test 
my "subjective" reaction to these stories by returning to the 
texts themselves, which always retain their integrity and 
wholeness. 
The fictional capital of folly in the Jewish imagination of 
the nineteenth century was the city of Chelm. Many Chelm 
folktales are directed against the folly and innocence of 
Jewish intellectualism when faced with actual and prac­
tical problems. But whereas the folktales about Chelm 
gave exaggerated and apparently incredible examples of 
blindness to actuality, I. L. Peretz made his Chelmites 
exemplary of very recognizable Jewish traits drawn out 
into extreme or radical form. 
A good example of this technique is the story "The 
Shabbes-Goy," a consciously literary tale based upon the 
Chelm folk materials. The story is about a Chelm rabbi who 
specializes in explaining away the brutality of the Shabbes­
goy (a non-Jew hired to do small chores forbidden to Jews 
on the Sabbath) toward a Jew named Yankele. Each time 
Yankele reports to the rabbi that he has been beaten by this 
"murderer," the rabbi responds not by blaming the goy but 
by discovering in Yankele's actions or appearance some 
provocation to the violence. All his ire is directed against 
Yankele for maligning "one of God's creatures" as a 
murderer. " 'Murderer . .  . is not necessarily the proper 
word. I explained that to you once before, if it were so, the 
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world would not be permitted to exist. There are no 
murderers!' " When Yankele returns to report a third 
beating, the rabbi " 'can't possibly believe that the 
Shabbes-goy . . . should, just like that, without a reason, 
be a murderer. The concept lacks reality.' " Finally, when 
Yankele is beaten a fourth time, the rabbi's intellectual 
ingenuity is exhausted and he must confess that the mere 
existence of the Jew, his desire to live and not to die, is a 
provocation to murder. At last, therefore, he proposes 
practical action. And what is that practical action? Nothing 
else than to appease the criminal by buying him off. Faced 
with the prospect of imminent violence against the whole 
Jewish community of Chelm, the rabbi proposes: " 'Now, in 
order to appease his resentment, and with the object of 
redeeming the entire community from dire peril, let us give 
the Shabbes-goy a raise: a larger portion of the Sabbath loaf 
and two drinks of brandy instead of one. . . . Perhaps he'll 
have compassion!' " 
From Chelm it is geographically and chronologically a 
long way to the unnamed capital city of Kafka's story "An 
Old Manuscript"; but in another sense, it is no distance at 
all. The inhabitants of this town, who have never concerned 
themselves with problems of self-defense, awake one 
morning tofind themselves surrounded by nomadic soldiers 
"from the North." These ferocious nomads are totally alien 
to the city's inhabitants. Speech with them is impossible; 
and "our way of living and our institutions they neither 
understand nor care to understand." The nomads are 
savage brutes who take what they need from the local 
merchants without making payment. But the narrator, who 
is one of these merchants, performs intellectual calisthenics 
in order to deny the enormity of the threat. "They do it 
because it is their nature to do it. . .  . You cannot call it 
taking by force." True, he is being robbed, but when he sees 
how much worse the butcher across the street is treated, he 
"cannot complain." The narrator and his fellow merchants, 
like the Chelm rabbi, hit upon a solution to this threat from 
barbarian invaders. They agree to contribute money to the 
butcher so that he can keep the savages amply supplied 
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with meat. "The butcher is nervous and does not dare to stop 
his deliveries of meat. We understand that, however, and 
subscribe money to keep him going. If the nomads got no 
meat, who knows what they might think of doing. . . .  " 
Robert Alter remarks of this passage that nothing could be 
more characteristically "Jewish" than that the tradesmen 
in this community "should answer the terrible challenge 
only by pooling resources to subsidize the principal victim 
of the invaders."4 
By another Kafka story, "The Great Wall of China," we 
are brought still closer to the phenomenon of Jewish denial 
of empirical reality, especially when it takes the form of an 
organized political threat to Jewish existence. Kafka's story 
tells of a tribe in south China that lives in physical and 
spiritual isolation from its neighbors and from contem­
porary life. It is faithful to an emperor who lives at an 
infinite remove, and whose precepts, though eternally true, 
remain shrouded in fog. Its people pay homage to the 
distant city of Pekin, which is "far stranger to the people in 
our village than the next world." They lead a life "that is 
subject to no contemporary law, and attend only to the 
exhortations and warnings which come to us from olden 
times." 
In order to obliterate the present, these south Chinese will 
go to extraordinary lengths. On one occasion, a beggar 
interrupts the celebration of a feast day by bringing news of 
a violent revolt in a neighboring province. The villagers 
react to this distressing news first by laughing at it, then by 
destroying the beggar's written evidence of the revolt, and 
finally by driving the beggar out with blows. "And 
though . . . the gruesomeness of the living present was 
irrefutably conveyed by the beggar's words, we laughed and 
shook our heads and refused to listen any longer." 
What makes this story of Kafka, in which Jews are never 
mentioned, a Jewish story? More than anything else, I 
believe, it is the stress on the villagers' refusal to credit 
tangible evidence that disaster is about to befall them, and 
their seeking refuge in "ancient history told long ago, old 
sorrows long since healed." They beat the bearer of bad 
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tidings not only because of the ostrich impulse to shield 
themselves from knowledge of unpleasant truth but also 
because of a feeling, given them by awareness of their long 
history of survival, that they are superior to politics. They 
have survived until now because they were a people who 
attended only to the exhortations and warnings that came 
from olden times, and who did not allow present exigencies 
to weaken their loyalty to the ancient faith and the distant 
city. Why should they interrupt a feast day they were 
ordered to observe by that "high command" which "has 
existed from all eternity" in deference to a messenger 
bringing news of horrors such as they have experienced and 
survived a thousand times? 
If Kafka's south Chinese are not exactly to be identified as 
Jews, at least they act in ways that Sholom Aleichem, for 
one, thought characteristic of the Jews of Eastern Europe. 
In his story "Dreyfus in Kasrilevke," Sholom Aleichem 
describes the unwillingness of the Jews of Kasrilevke to 
credit the report of the Dreyfus trial, which is not merely a 
miscarriage ofthat equal justice upon which France, above 
all European nations, prided herself but a denial of the 
divine promise. When Zaidle, the town's only newspaper 
subscriber, reads them the bad news of Dreyfus's convic­
tion, they express outrage—"not against the judge who had 
judged so badly . . . not against the generals who had 
sworn so falsely nor against the Frenchmen who had 
covered themselves with so much shame"—but against 
Zaidle, the bearer of bad tidings. For them the empirical 
evidence collected in a newspaper is as nothing compared 
with the divine promise that "the truth must always come 
out on top, just as oil comes to the top of water!" The more 
credible the divine promise, the less credible (to them) is the 
evidence that denies it. The Kasrilevkites, like Kafka's 
south Chinese, lay claim to a supernal knowledge that 
makes them superior to all merely political considerations. 
Hence they too seek refuge from the historical present by 
declaring it (and its newspaper reflection) incredible: 
" 'Paper!' cried Kasrilevke. Taper! And if you stood here 
with one foot in heaven and one foot on earth we still 
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wouldn't believe you. Such things cannot be! No, this 
cannot be! It cannot be! It cannot be!' " 
Sholom Aleichem concludes the story on an ironic note 
that expresses sympathy more than criticism. In effect, he 
endorses the shtetl's invincible faith in divine justice by 
asking, "Well, and who was right?" Ruth Wisse has 
remarked that the story "contains a double irony. The ideal 
pits itself against reality but is finally vindicated by that 
same reality. Were Dreyfus not finally acquitted in the 
human courts of law, the schlemiel insistence on God's 
justice would have been less convincing."5 
But just how convincing is this insistence? At the time 
Sholom Aleichem wrote the story (1902), Dreyfus had 
gained pardon rather than acquittal. Yet if Sholom 
Aleichem derived any satisfaction from the apparent 
resolution of the "affair," he was involving himself in as 
grave an indulgence of Jewish political innocence as any he 
imputed to his schlemiels. For Hannah Arendt has 
demonstrated that the willed Jewish innocence of the 
political character of the Dreyfus Affair foreshadowed yet 
more spectacular denials of a grim actuality. 
French Jews—despite the fact that their countrymen had 
everywhere taken up the cry "Death to the Jews"—could not 
believe that anything more was at stake in the Dreyfus 
Affair than their social status. Sophisticated French Jews, 
who had none of Kasrilevke's faith in divine justice and 
who in fact traveled in those circles "in which," according to 
Proust, "one's intelligence was understood to increase with 
the strength of one's disbelief in everything,"6 interpreted 
hostility toward themselves as resentment of their un­
assimilated brethren from the East (from, so to speak, 
Kasrilevke). These "emancipated" Jews refused to 
cooperate with French political figures who wanted to wage 
a political struggle against antisemitism precisely because, 
according to Arendt, they "failed to see that what was 
involved was an organized fight against them on a political 
front." They maintained their proud and innocent 
superiority to political considerations in the face of "a huge 
dress-rehearsal for a performance that had to be put off for 
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more than three decades," a dress-rehearsal, that is, for the 
Nazi movement. Only one small group of Jews broke from 
the ranks of the politically innocent and incredulous: these 
were the Zionists. The only visible result of the "affair," she 
concludes, "was that it gave birth to the Zionist 
movement—the only political answer Jews have ever found 
to antisemitism and the only ideology in which they have 
ever taken seriously a hostility that would place them in the 
center of world events."7 
If indeed the Jews in general did not at this time take 
seriously the threat that antisemitism, in the form of a pan-
European campaign against them, posed to their survival, 
what was their reasoning? Among the assimilated, belief in 
liberalism approached so nearly the condition of religious 
faith that any departure from the ideals of the open society 
and equal justice in Western liberal democracies could seem 
no more than an aberration, a temporary digression from 
the inevitable movement toward liberty, equality, and 
fraternity. The religious, for their part, knew that despite 
the terrible massacres inflicted upon the Jews for thousands 
of years, despite the destruction of a large part of European 
Jewry during the Chmielnicki massacres, the most 
widespread and terrible of European history, the Jewish 
people had always survived—and survived not through 
political action but through accommodation and waiting. 
The religious, at least as indifferent to a political struggle on 
behalf of the Jews as their assimilated brethren were, 
received endless reminders from their prayers that they 
were indestructible as a people. The Jebusites, the 
Girgashites, the Perizzites—all were gone; but the Jewish 
people remained. 
Scholarly opinion varies on the question of whether the 
plan to destroy the Jews of Europe (and not only of Europe) 
was uniquely a product of "modern" antisemitism or a 
logical culmination of the age-old phenomenon of Jew-
hatred deeply embedded in the culture of Christian Europe. 
There is at least ample documentation of the advocacy of 
genocide of the Jews in the century previous to Hitler, both 
in the predictable German and Austrian sources as well as 
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in the (to some) less predictable French sources, like 
Proudhon.8 But the very fact that Jews themselves were 
(and are) so numerous among Proudhon's admirers shows 
how little seriousness was attached to the utterance of this 
allegedly unthinkable thought. 
When they launched their campaign of genocide against 
the Jewish people, the Germans relied not only on the 
indifference of the nations of the world to the fate of the 
Jews but on the inability of most people to credit reports of 
genocide, and to believe that in the midst of the twentieth 
century the most cultivated nation of Europe would devote 
all its energies and much of its resources to the production of 
Jewish corpses.9 Thus, on 18 June 1943, the Reichskom­
missar for the Ostland wrote to the Reichsminister for the 
occupied Eastern Territories about the mass killing 
operations then in progress against the Jews: "Just 
imagine that these events were to become known to the 
enemy and were being exploited by them! In all probability 
such propaganda would be ineffective simply because those 
hearing and reading it would not be prepared to believe 
it."10 This was the expected bonus for committing crimes on 
a scale beyond what the ordinary human imagination could 
conceive. The unexpected bonus was that the victims 
themselves were "not prepared" to believe what was 
happening to them. 
For some of these victims were spiritual descendants of 
Peretz's rabbi of Chelm and of Kafka's beleaguered 
tradesmen, who thought to forestall calamity by bribing its 
agents. If anyone doubts that a shared body of themes 
unites modern Jewish writers of the most diverse 
backgrounds, let him compare "The Shabbes-Goy" and "An 
Old Manuscript" with the entry in Chaim Kaplan's Warsaw 
Diary that tells how the Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto 
interpreted the Nazi decree of forced labor as "some hint for 
an enormous financial contribution instead." The Jews, 
whom Kaplan prefers to call "the People of Hope," "did not 
believe that the decree of forced labor for Jews would be put 
into effect." Moreover, Kaplan himself, like the Chelm 
rabbi, at first took the reports coming from Lublin less as 
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warnings of the wrath to come than as slanders against 
human nature. "What they reported was so horrifying that 
we began to wonder if they too were exaggerating, for surely 
human beings created in the image of God would be 
incapable of such evil deeds." To move from Peretz and 
Kafka to accounts of the Warsaw Ghetto is to return from 
shadows to that which casts them, and to recognize, as 
Kaplan soon did, that "reality surpassed imagination by 
far."11 
One of the most sustained attempts to analyze and 
evaluate the Jews' unpreparedness for believing in the 
reality of the horror directed against them is Alexander 
Donat's memoir of Warsaw, Treblinka, Radom, and 
Auschwitz: The Holocaust Kingdom. The central premise of 
Donat's analysis of the destruction of Polish Jewry is that it 
was not only hunger and disease, terror and treachery that 
achieved the Germans' monstrous aim: Jews had also 
increased their vulnerability by hallucinating moderation 
in their enemies. Hitler's victims, like the rabbi of Chelm, 
did not believe in evil: "What defeated us, was Jewry's 
unconquerable optimism, our eternal faith in the goodness 
of man." The inhabitants of the Warsaw Ghetto witness 
roundups of 6,000 to 10,000 people a day who are shipped to 
Treblinka. Some of these escape from the trains or from the 
death camp itself and return to the Ghetto to tell their story. 
But the Jews of Warsaw, although bombarded by 
eyewitness reports about the boxcars, the unloadings, the 
selections, the gas chambers disguised as showers, are just 
as incredulous as the "Chinese" in Kafka's story or the 
Kasrilevkites of Sholom Aleichem's. "Those eyewitness 
reports were hard for us to believe. Surely the Germans, 
even the Nazis, were not capable of such utter inhumani­
ty?" Despite his criticism of them, Donat does not sharply 
distinguish himself from the majority of Jews who refused 
to believe in empirical evidence. He admits that it was only 
after 300,000 people had been deported to Treblinka and he 
had heard the story from an escapee whom he knew 
personally that he recognized "the incredible was a matter 
of fact. . . . The nation of Kant and Goethe was deliberate­
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ly and systematically murdering defenseless men, women, 
and children in its gas chambers."12 
Donat's repeated references in The Holocaust Kingdom to 
the demigods of Western culture leave the reader with the 
strong impression that the faith that was shattered in the 
Holocaust was not Judaism but various surrogates for it 
that have attracted Jews ever since the Enlightenment. 
When, for example, in a passage filled with anger toward 
himself, Donat bemoans the fact that "we were . . . 
stripped of all we had held sacred," he enumerates among 
the articles of exploded faith Polish nationalism, two thou­
sand years of Christianity, "silent in the face of Nazism," 
and devotion to modern Western civilization. Judaism, 
however, is not mentioned. 
When Donat deplores the opposition of the Jews to 
physical resistance, however, he blames their psychological 
paralysis on both secular humanism and traditional 
Judaism. The emancipated Jews had for generations 
"looked to Berlin as the symbol of law, order, and culture." 
"We fell victim," he admits, "to our faith in man­
kind. . . . "13 But those who had never placed their 
faith in mankind—a notion of whose blasphemy Donat 
does not seem fully aware—but in God were also, in his 
view, to blame for the failure to act. The religious believed in 
Kiddush Hashem, sanctifying God's name by a martyr's 
death. Their policy, therefore, was to counsel against 
resistance and violence as descrating the purity of martyr­
dom: " 'For two thousand years we have served mankind 
with the Word, with the Book. Are we now to try to convince 
mankind that we are warriors?' " Those who did eventually 
undertake armed resistance were the ones who were 
emptied of all hope of whatever kind, secular or religious. 
"There is no precedent for the eventual uprising of the 
Warsaw Ghetto because it was undertaken . . . without 
the slightest hope of victory in life."14 Only when, in mid­
1943, Donat and his friends came to believe in the genocidal 
intentions of the enemy could they believe in the possibility 
of Jewish armed resistance. "In this Dantesque atmosphere 
nothing seemed impossible, for nothing was more fantastic 
than reality."15 
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But Maidanek went beyond anything Dante imagined, or 
could imagine. It gave proof that although modern secular 
man can do without a heaven, he must have a hell, even if 
self-created. "Maidanek was hell. Not the naive inferno of 
Dante, but a twentieth-century hell where the art of cruelty 
was refined to perfection and every facility of modern 
technology and psychology was combined to destroy me 
physically and spiritually." Donat, who had been a 
journalist, now feels it his primary duty to survive in order 
to tell about the murder of the Jewish people, for who but a 
survivor could convey the unimaginable reality of a factory 
whose purpose was "the destruction of the greatest number 
of prisoners in the shortest time at the lowest cost."16 
In Maidanek, Donat talks frequently with an inmate 
named Dr. Ignacy Schipper, who disputes his view that the 
resistance was the most important fact in the destruction of 
Warsaw and a turning point in Jewish history. Schipper, a 
historian, denies that the present events mean the destruc­
tion of the Jewish people. They are, of course, terrible, but 
from the historian's point of view still comparable to other 
disasters in Jewish history. Yet even he worries most about 
whether future generations will believe the story of 
Maidanek. If the murderers are victorious, they will write 
the history books and either celebrate their achievement or 
else wipe out the memory of the Jews as thoroughly as they 
had wiped out their lives. " 'But if we write the history of 
this period of blood and tears—and Ifirmly believe we will— 
who will believe us? Nobody will want to believe us, because 
our disaster is the disaster of the entire civilized world. 
. . . We'll have the thankless job of proving to a reluc­
tant world that we are Abel, the murdered brother. . . .' "17 
For Schipper, the problem is not that the Holocaust is 
intrinsically incredible but that the world, a sizable por­
tion of which believes itself to be hewn from the Jewish 
rock, has a vested interest in not believing it. It will be 
too frightened to accept the implications of the fact that 
a member of the family of nations has been removed from 
its midst. 
In the final section of his narrative, Donat describes 
internment at Auschwitz, the march of Jewish slaves to 
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Dachau, and finally the liberation by Patton's Third Army. 
He deplores the inability of the newly liberated Jews to take 
revenge upon their German masters through an act of 
collective punishment. "We had the souls of slaves, of 
cowards; we were crippled by two thousand years of 
pogroms and ghettos, two thousand years of the Sixth 
Commandment had tamed and blunted in us that natural 
virile impulse of revenge. The sublime words, 'Thou shalt 
not kill,' which had been our shield against murder and 
persecution became the shield and protector of a nation of 
murderers and our alibi for our own cowardice and 
weakness."18 This element of bitterness toward Jewish 
religion comes as something of a surprise in a book that 
records the author's disillusionment not with Jewish 
religion but with the various idolatrous substitutes for it 
that Jews have embraced ever since the Enlightenment. 
But it sounds the note that has now, over a decade later, 
become dominant in Donat's utterances about the 
Holocaust. 
In a long paper entitled "The Voice of the Ashes," which 
he delivered in 1975 to the New York Conference on the 
Holocaust sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary 
Jewry, Donat lays upon Jewish religion all blame for the 
Jews' inability to respond effectively to the threat of 
destruction. Announcing—perhaps to the considerable 
surprise of those who know him only as he reveals himself 
in The Holocaust Kingdom—that he is "Jewish to the tips of 
my fingers," Donat defiantly declares that "because I am 
Jewish, I reject God." Jewish religion in general and 
Hasidism in particular, he charges, blinded the Jewish 
people to the real existence of both evil and suffering. His 
own memoir of the Warsaw Ghetto explicitly blamed the 
failure to offer physical resistance to the Germans on 
Jewish history in the Diaspora, on physical circumstances 
and on "our faith in mankind," as well as on religious 
quietism. But now Donat appears not only to accept the 
cruel and stupid image of the Jewish population going as 
sheep to the slaughter but to say that the faith that 
paralyzed the Jews into inaction was not at all the secular 
faith in man but Torah itself: "Due to the moral dis­
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armament and quietist conditioning of the orthodox and 
Hasidic teachings the religious Jewish masses were 
passive. . . ."19 
It is possible that some of the disparity between The 
Holocaust Kingdom and "The Voice of the Ashes" is 
attributable to the inevitable difference between a memoir 
and a lecture. We assume the first—especially in Donat's 
case, where it probably bears some relation to a lost diary— 
to have greater subjective honesty and less polemical 
manipulativeness than an ideological lecture. Yet ultimate­
ly the disparity lies in Donat's own hesitation in deciding 
whether the Jews' failure to turn into knowledge the 
fact of the destruction process was due to their belief in man 
or in God. At one point in his 1975 lecture, he includes as 
part of his lengthy indictment of the rabbinic power for self-
deception in the face of Jewish suffering the stories of rabbis 
who prior to entering the gas chambers of Auschwitz and 
Treblinka expressed joy at their imminent ascent to God 
and urged other Jews to express this joy by singing, even as 
they were being led to death, "Ani Maamin," (I believe).20 
But later in the same lecture he denies the very thing for 
which he blames them: "I was two steps away from the gas 
chamber of Maidanek and looked death many times in the 
face. Never have I heard anyone intone Ani maamin (one of 
the postwar legends)."21 
Although Donat now believes that the centrality of God 
for the Jewish people has been replaced by the centrality of 
the State of Israel, he does not believe that this transforma­
tion will in any way lessen the hatred of the nations for the 
Jews. "The holocaust is not yet history. . . . We are alone 
in our historical struggle, and we can count only on 
ourselves." Having disparaged religious faith as both 
partly responsible for, and incredible after, the Holocaust, 
Donat finds himself in the position of affirming a willed 
belief in the permanence of what for him is a man-made 
entity: "We must believe that Israel is a guarantee against 
another Holocaust."22 
If the Holocaust was the supremely incredible experience 
for the Jews, and their reaction to it the most fatal 
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indulgence of their traditional political innocence, then the 
destruction of the Hungarian Jewish community and the 
acquiescence of the Hungarian Jews in their own destruc­
tion provided the single most incredible episode of the Holo­
caust. Raul Hilberg, in his book The Destruction of the 
European Jews, lays great stress upon the fact that the 
Jews of Hungary had survived until mid-1944, so that 
Hungary was the only country in which the Jews had full 
warning and full knowledge of what was to come while their 
community was still unharmed. Dr. Rudolf Kastner later 
testified that "at the moment of the occupation of Hungary, 
the number of dead Jews amounted to over five million. We 
knew very well about the work of the Einsatzgruppen. We 
knew more than it was necessary about Auschwitz. . . . 
We had, as early as 1942, a complete picture of what had 
been happening in the East with the Jews deported to 
Auschwitz and the other extermination camps."23 
But apparently the Hungarian Jews would not or could 
not credit what they knew. Eichmann, the man who 
arranged deportation to the death camps, no sooner arrived 
than, in the words of the historian Levai, "he virtually 
hypnotized the Jewish Council and through that body, the 
whole of Hungarian Jewry."24 Offered the "opportunity" to 
establish a Judenrat that would publish all German orders 
to the Jews, and assured that they had nothing to fear 
if they cooperated, the Jews repressed the empirical 
knowledge they had about the five million already dead and 
acquiesced in the process leading to their own destruction. 
They did their best to ignore all evidence of danger and to 
resist all intimations of impending death. The question of 
whether they were deceived or self-deceived must inevitably 
be uppermost in our thoughts when we read accounts of the 
experience of Hungarian Jewry. 
One such account is the posthumously published Diary of 
Eva Heyman. Eva Heyman came from a family in which 
assimilation was not merely a device but a principle. 
Although not a remarkably perceptive child, she recognized 
with clarity that her parents really wanted to be Aryans. 
Once she heard one of her relatives say that although Eva 
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was still pretty, her "racial character" was bound to show 
when she grew up.25 The meaninglessness of her suffering— 
for she would not have hesitated a moment to escape into 
conversion if that could have helped her—was not an added 
burden to her; for despite her entire lack of Jewish identity, 
she never was troubled by the question "Why me?" 
Only one person in the whole family understood and 
referred to the "final solution." This was Uncle Lusztig, the 
most disliked person in the group. He did not know the full 
story of the destruction process, but he did know about the 
deportations to Poland, and about the horrible conditions in 
the cattle cars. To Eva's mother he said that "I, Soma 
Lusztig, [am] the man whom you all consider to be a nasty 
old pessimist, but all I am is a very old man and I do not bury 
my head in the sand the way all of you do."26 But Eva's 
mother was convinced that since the Germans already 
knew the war to be lost they were hardly likely to expend 
their flagging energies and meager transport on the 
destruction of Jews. 
Eventually Eva's mother and stepfather saved them­
selves with forged papers validating their Christian-Aryan 
identity. But Eva herself was left behind in the comforts of 
home and the care of her governess Juszti. As a result, the 
thirteen-year-old girl was deported to Auschwitz on 6 June, 
the day of the Allied landing in Europe, and killed after the 
very last "selection" carried out by Dr. Mengele, who 
personally shoved her onto the truck going to the 
crematorium (the intervening "mercy" of gas chambers 
having by this point in the war been dispensed with for 
children). 
The most remarkable document in this book is not the 
diary itself but the appended letter by the Christian 
governess Juszti to the mother Agi in 1945, after the war. It 
is a letter of accusation and of self-accusation. She blames 
Eva's mother for "having lulled yourself with excuses that 
looked real . . . and for not having fought to have Eva 
with you, even in more modest circumstances." If the 
mother had not been so adept in deceiving herself with the 
belief that Eva's danger was not so great that she needed to 
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be uprooted from her ordinary life in order to be rescued, the 
girl would still be alive. Agi had indulged herself with the 
comforting notion that it would be more "practical" to keep 
the girl in the beautiful, spacious apartment than to subject 
her to the terrors and uncertainties of flight. "That," says 
Juszti, "was reality, but unfortunately it was not the truth." 
If the Christian governess's accusation, which may have 
been a contributing factor in Eva's mother's suicide in 1949, 
seems harsh, then it is at least not so harsh as what she says 
of herself. Her own failure, she says, lay in adhering to 
conventional bourgeois morality, in failing to imagine that 
for which her own experience supplied no precedent. Why 
did she herself not disobey her employers, abandon 
everything and go off into hiding with Eva? Forged papers 
could have been obtained with money. But "the problem 
wasn't money, but my lack of imagination. . . . And here, 
dear Agike, is where I failed. This is a greater failure than 
yours! . . . because I was a petty petite bourgeoise, an old 
ass, an early-morning churchgoer."27 This untutored 
woman recognized, belatedly to be sure, that the failure to 
rescue Eva Heyman was, above all, a failure to imagine the 
fantastic quality of actuality itself. 
The classic presentation of this phantasmagoric reality, 
and the most famous account both of Jewish suffering 
during the destruction process generally and of the 
destruction of Hungarian Jews in particular, is Elie 
Wiesel's nonfictional novel Night. This small book 
demonstrates how what we complacently call "reality" has 
now become more incredible than anything previously 
dreamt of by the most imaginative writer of fiction. It merits 
a place in literary history if only for rendering a final verdict 
on the ancient debate over the nature of "reality" in literary 
characters and situations. It has, or certainly ought to have, 
taught a generation of literature teachers that the actual 
world is so fantastic, especially in its capacity for evil, that 
no literary work can be so resistant to reason and "common 
sense" as the actuality it purports to describe, and that 
books by even the most wildly fantasizing writers will fall 
short of breath in the effort to keep pace with reality. In this 
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connection Des Près has commented on "the oddly 'literary' 
character of experience in extremity . .  . as if amid the 
smoke of burning bodies the great metaphors of world 
literature were being 'acted out' in terrible fact."28 Rolf 
Hochhuth speaks for those writers who have learned at 
least the literary lesson of the Holocaust when he insists 
that "anyone in this day and age who . . . does not'openly 
and honestly declare war on naturalism in art,' must 
capitulate in the face of every newsreel. . . . "29 
It is precisely the inability of the mature, rational, 
worldly, and commonsensical characters in Night to en­
compass the phantasmagoric quality of reality itself that 
delivers them to their doom. Their failure is one of imagina­
tion. When Eliezer laments the fact that his parents "had 
lacked the courage to wind up their affairs and emigrate [to 
Palestine] while there was still time," the courage referred 
to is of the sort required to imagine disaster and contem­
plate extreme action. The very first character introduced in 
Night is Moche the beadle, who initiates Eliezer, Wiesel's 
alter ego, into the mysteries of the Cabbala. As early as 
1942, the barefoot Moche, a foreigner in Hungary, is de­
ported along with other foreign Jews from the town of 
Sighet. At the end of the year, he returns, talking no longer 
of God or of Cabbala but wanting only to tell his story and 
plead with everyone to "prepare yourself while there [is] 
still time." But people refuse not only to believe his stories 
of mass executions by shooting but even to listen to them. 
"I did not," confesses the narrator, "believe him myself."30 
Rather, the boy occupied himself with Talmud and Cabbala 
and took it for granted that better days would not be long in 
coming. Moche, like the beggar in Kafka's story or Zaidle in 
Sholom Aleichem's tale, is taken for a madman. 
The people of Sighet fail to imagine what is, in fact, 
required to grasp the actuality of their situation. The 
situation Wiesel describes illustrates perfectly Hannah 
Arendt's assertion, quoted earlier, that the Nazis' 
proclamations that the Jews would be exterminated like 
bedbugs did not prevent anybody from not believing them. 
Certainly it did not prevent the Jews of Sighet from seeking 
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refuge in incredulity. "Yes, we . . . doubted that he wanted 
to exterminate us. Was he going to wipe out a whole 
people?"31 It is not fantasy but reality that overwhelms the 
power of imagination. Illusion thus continues its absolute 
rule over Sighet, until the Jews find themselves in 
hermetically sealed cattle wagons leaving Hungary. 
Having failed to listen to Moche, whose "madness" 
outraged their realism and incurable optimism, the Jews 
now find themselves harangued by still another "mad" 
person, Mme Schachter, who screams: " 'Jews, listen to me! 
I can see a fire! There are huge flames! It is a furnace!' " By 
way of response, the young men tie her up and gag her. 
When this fails to silence her, "they struck her several times 
on the head—blows that might have killed her." Kill the 
bearer of bad tidings! Mme Schachter has no empirical 
foundation for her vision, but her nightmare is borne out in 
actuality: "In front of us flames. In the air that smell of 
burning flesh. . . . We had arrived—at Birkenau, reception 
center for Auschwitz."32 The Jews of Sighet had called 
Moche mad, and Mme Schachter (apparently with more 
justification) as well. They had denied the witness both of 
the messenger who had already seen as well as of the one 
who foresaw. The insidious and "knowing" voice of 
common sense blinds them to actuality, so that only those 
who are"mad" can credit the existence of a world in which 
madness has become the normal condition. 
At Auschwitz, Eliezer sees and experiences for himself 
what had once been thought the visionary fancies of great 
imaginative poets. He learns that it is not only in the Book 
of Daniel (3:12-30) that men are thrown into furnaces; and 
not only in King Lear that men are brutally forced to 
acknowledge that "unaccommodated man" is no more than 
a poor, bare, forked animal: "For us, this was the true 
equality: nakedness. Shivering with the cold." Not alone in 
Brueghel's paintings does the last judgment of religious 
tradition become an obscene, degrading travesty: as Dr. 
Mengele made his selections, "all the prisoners in the block 
stood naked between the beds. This must be how one stands 
at the last judgment." Nor, finally, is it only in a Dante's 
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Inferno that babies are thrown alive into a burning ditch. 
The Holocaust remains incredible and unimaginable even 
to those who see it with their own eyes: 
I pinched my face. Was I still alive? Was I awake? I could not
believe it. How could it be possible for them to burn people,
children, and for the world to keep silent? No, none of this could 
be true. It was a nightmare. . . . Soon I should wake with a
start, my heart pounding, and find myself back in the bedroom
of my childhood, among my books. . . . 33 
"Among my books"—that is to say, back in the comforting 
realm of credible fiction rather than the horrific one of 
incredible reality. 
It must be stressed that Wiesel's own intention in 
depicting the incredibility of the destruction of the Jews is 
not to criticize the Jews for imaginative failure, or for taking 
refuge in religious belief or for assuming the mask of 
political sophistication or for clinging to the subterfuge 
afforded by "common sense." Rather, he believes that the 
Holocaust, having no precedents or analogues in history, 
was irrational, unique, intrinsically incredible, and re­
mains so today, even to those, like himself, who experienced 
it. "The event seems unreal, as if it occurred on a different 
planet. . . . The Holocaust defies parallels. Did it really 
happen? Maybe not. I often wonder."34 Even after he had 
published a very substantial number of books dramatizing 
and interpreting his Holocaust experience through fictional 
characters, Wiesel could express skepticism about whether 
the writings of survivors and witnesses had any "substan­
tial relationship with what they have seen and lived 
through."35 
Although he never tried to blur the fact that the Holocaust 
experience is primarily a Jewish experience, Wiesel often 
denied that there lay in it some lesson for the Jews that 
should cause them to alter their accustomed ways of doing 
things. "I do not believe the Holocaust teaches us anything 
in our daily life or in our political and practical attitudes. I 
do not believe that another Holocaust is possible. Not for the 
Jews." Wiesel made this rash statement in March 1967, 
about seven weeks before Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran 
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in order to strangle the Jewish state and a host of Arab 
armies moved toward the borders of Israel while their 
leaders loudly announced their intention to turn the 
Mediterranean red with Jewish blood. In the aftermath of 
the ensuing Six-Day War, Wiesel was forced to acknowledge 
that he, the keen analyst of the Jewish unwillingness to 
credit explicit threats to destroy the Jewish people, had 
himself fallen pray to that traditional blindness. Nasser of 
Egypt, rather like the Shabbes-goy of Peretz's story, had 
often declared that "Israel's existence is itself an aggres­
sion," but sophisticates knew better than to believe him. 
"During the Six-Day War we witnessed a repetition in 
history. Only the setting had changed, the mechanism had 
remained the same. The shadow of Auschwitz finally 
enveloped Jerusalem."36 
The Six-Day War seems to have demonstrated to Wiesel 
that the Holocaust was, is, and will continue to be, an event 
of Jewish history. To say this is to call into question one of 
the pieties of Holocaust scholarship: namely, the "revela­
tion" that all things are now possible, that the genocide 
successfully carried out against the Jews may now be 
directed against other peoples. Piotr Rawicz ironically 
comments on this tendency to transfer Jewish moral capital 
to others in a novel that insists relentlessly on that sign of 
the Covenant indelibly inscribed on every Jewish male. 
Rawicz concludes Blood from the Sky by declaring: "This 
book is not a historical record. If the notion of chance (like 
most other notions) did not strike the author as absurd, he 
would gladly say that any reference to a particular period, 
territory, or race is purely coincidental."37 
But the convergence of probabilities that we name the 
Holocaust was not coincidental. To "universalize" it by 
saying that it shows all things are now possible is to evade 
the shocking and incredible particularity of Jewish ex­
perience in the way that universalism always does.38 "We 
have, " insists Cynthia Ozick, "to think of the Holocaust as 
an organism, not as a snowflake. . .  . It cannot be said 
that a snowflake has a 'history.' But the Holocaust, though 
what it births is death, nevertheless is like a biological 
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birth: it produces itself, it renews itself, out of a similar 
ancestry"™ (italics mine). The horror renews itself not 
precisely because antisemitism is eternal or inevitable. 
Nevertheless it seems futile to explain this renewal merely 
by social and political causes, the thousand accidental 
configurations of world politics producing, over the span of 
centuries, the identical effects. We would be guilty of that 
"prohibition of questioning" which Eric Voegelin imputes 
to Marxism and naturalism40 if we did not consider at least 
the possibility that the desire to remove the Jewish people 
from the world, a desire that today finds ready expression in 
the U.N. as well as in the U.S.S.R., is in some way connected 
with the reason why the Jewish people was called into 
existence in the first place. The Jews believe themselves to 
be a covenanted people called into being thousands of years 
ago for the purpose of redeeming a corrupted world; why, 
then, should they find it so difficult to believe that so long as 
the world is unredeemed the Jewish idea and the Jewish 
people will provoke this murderous hate? 
If, as is sometimes charged, the Jews who were caught in 
Hitler's trap clung to the delusions of disbelief in order to 
salvage whatever comfort lay in false hope, what moved the 
Jews who lived in relative safety to deny credence to the 
reports of horror flooding in upon them at least as early as 
August 1942? Professor Yehuda Bauer has pointed out that 
the "Bund," the Jewish Socialist Party of Poland, trans­
mitted to London in May 1942 a detailed report showing 
that the Germans had "embarked on the physical exter­
mination of the Jewish population on Polish soil." The 
report was taken very seriously by the Polish National 
Council in London, which included two Jewish represen­
tatives, Szmul Zygielbojm and Ignacy Schwarzbart. But, 
despite considerable publicity in the London Daily Tele­
graph and the Jewish press in England, neither the Allies 
nor the Jewish leadership could be roused from disbelief 
and complacency. Thus the Polish Government in Exile's 
Bulletin for Home Affairs remarked that "if the Polish 
reports from the Homeland do not find credence with 
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the Anglo-Saxon nations and are considered to be un­
trustworthy, they surely must believe the reports from 
Jewish sources." The crucial fact was that, according to 
Bauer, "the Jews themselves either did not believe the 
reports or did not want to believe them"41 
Marie Syrkin has acknowledged that the Bund report 
reached the desk of the Jewish Frontier, of whose editorial 
board she was a member, in August 1942. "After reading 
this detailed account of the functioning of the extermina­
tion centers we rejected it as the macabre phantasy of a 
lunatic sadist." But they did not wholly reject it. Something 
in them was skeptical of skepticism itself. Therefore they hit 
upon a solution that cannot but remind us of the way in 
which the Jews of Chelm and Kasrilevke and south China 
responded to reports of monstrous evil: "We decided to print 
a portion of the report in small type in the back of the 
issue. . . . Our notion was that the atrocity tale, surely 
untrue, should not be emphatically publicized; that is why 
we chose small type."42 
Eight months later, with the fall of the Warsaw Ghetto in 
April 1943, the extermination of virtually the whole of 
Poland's three and a half million Jews had been completed. 
In London, Zygelbojm, in despair over his inability to rouse 
either the Allies or the Jewish leadership from the seductive 
comforts of skeptical "common sense," "published" his 
report in the largest type available to him: he killed himself. 
He made of his death, in his suicide note, "an energetic cry 
of protest against the indifference of the world which 
witnesses the extermination of the Jewish people without 
taking any steps to prevent it."43 It is as if the messenger of 
bad tidings, after repeatedly being spurned as a fabricator 
of atrocities, has no alternative to futility but to feel upon 
his own pulses the suffering endured by those in eastern 
Europe. Only so can he declare his identity with those who 
suffer the atrocities rather than with the rest, among whom 
he dwells, who disbelieve them. His death, Zygelbojm 
believed, would more eloquently testify to his belief in the 
"incredible" reports than anything he had ever said or 
written. 
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Some have seen in the historic inability of the Jews to 
credit the enormity of the horrors planned and unleashed 
against them a proof of Jewish moral superiority to the 
nations of the world. Yitzhak Katznelson insisted that 
every Jew in the Warsaw Ghetto knew for a certaintly that 
he was destined to be transported to a place from which he 
would never return. "Young and old knew that they would 
be murdered." Yet they somehow could not believe what 
they knew, or should have known, from evidence. Hence 
they "actually began to believe that they were travelling to 
some labour camp." But this willed self-deception, this re­
fusal to believe that the Germans were carrying out the 
systematic slaughter of the whole Jewish people, was, in 
Katznelson's view, a proof that the Jews retained their 
spark of divinity and therefore also their humanity. 
"Blessed are we," he wrote in his Vittel Diary, "that could 
not believe it! We could not believe it because of the Image of 
God that is in us. Only a heart tainted with villainy could 
comprehend or imagine the possibility of such an abomina­
tion! We did not believe it could happen because we are 
human beings."44 
But is it really true that naïveté and incurable optimism 
are proof of moral superiority? Is the belief that one is 
entitled to a morally better existence than is available to 
those who enter the mire of political life anything other 
than arrogance parading as purity? Today, the Jewish 
people still—"incredibly"—finds itself at the storm center of 
world politics, besieged from without by Amalek and Edom 
and Ishmael, and weakened from within by those who rest 
their claim to superior wisdom upon their inability to credit 
the sincerity of the nations that "have consulted together 
with one consent" and said: "Come, and let us cut them off 
from being a nation; / That the name of Israel may be no 
more in remembrance" (Psalm 83). Those who believe that 
Jewish chosenness must be validated by a living reality as 
well as by the memory of innocent martyrdom will find a 
"lesson" in the phenomenon of Jewish disbelief in the 
Holocaust. They will recognize that the warfare between 
brutal actuality and self-deluding hope is today as real and 
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living as ever it was for the Jewish people. They will recall 
with clarity that the first Jew who organized armed 
resistance to the Nazis was a man who was distinguished 
from his fellow Jews not by his physical courage or by his 
political acumen, but by his willingness to believe the 
incredible: "In November 1941 a young girl crawled up over 
the thousands of bodies in the pits at Ponar and made her 
way twenty miles through a frozen forest back to the Vilna 
ghetto. No one could believe her story, forty thousand Jews 
dead in a ditch. But Abba Kovner listened and believed. He 
was twenty-two years old. He wrote the first Jewish call to 
arms in the Vilna ghetto. . . . "45 
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Far more than the Zionists have done to provide the Shield 
of David with the sanctity of a genuine symbol has been 
done by those who made it for millions into a mark of shame 
and degradation. The yellow Jewish star, as a sign of 
exclusion and ultimately of annihilation, has accompanied 
the Jews on their path of humiliation and horror, of battle 
and heroic resistance. Under this sign they were murdered; 
under this sign they came to Israel. If there is a fertile soil of 
historical experience from which symbols draw their 
meaning, it would seem to be given here. Some have been of 
the opinion that the sign which marked the way to 
annihilation and to the gas chambers should be replaced by 
a sign of life. But it is possible to think quite the opposite: the 
sign which in our own days has been sanctified by suffering 
and dread has become worthy of illuminating the path to 
life and reconstruction. Before ascending, the path led down 
into the abyss; there the symbol received its ultimate 
humiliation and there it won its greatness.—Gershom 
Scholem, "The Star of David: History of a Symbol" 
chapter 2 
Holocaust and Rebirth:

Moshe Flinker, Nelly Sachs, and Abba Kovner

My subject is the link between the Holocaust and the rebirth 
of Israel in the imaginative and spiritual life of the Jewish 
people, insofar as that life has been conveyed to us in 
modern literature. That these two events are the most 
important in modern Jewish history is unquestionable. It is 
likewise unquestionable that there is a causative link 
between them, and that, as Yehuda Bauer has written, "the 
Holocaust is the central factor not only in Jewish history in 
the twentieth century in general, but also . . . in the period 
of the struggle for a Jewish state in particular."1 Yet it is 
noteworthy that in the 1973 Yad Vashem symposium on 
Holocaust and Rebirth, in which Professor Bauer's state­
ment appeared, there was no sustained attempt to deal with 
the superhistorical connection between Holocaust and 
Rebirth. The sole exception was J. L. Talmon, who, in his 
lecture "European History as the Seedbed of the Holo­
caust" expressed his horror at those who profess to see the 
Holocaust as the price exacted by the God of history for 
Jewish redemption; if there is "some terrible majesty and 
magnificence to the Holocaust," he argued, it is in its 
dramatic symbolization of the conflict between the two 
permanently opposed world views of morality and 
paganism.2 
Yet the sense of an intimate and mystical connection 
between holocaust and rebirth is deeply embedded in 
Jewish sacred literature and in Jewish historical con­
sciousness. In the book of Ezekiel, the prospect that God will 
make "a full end of the remnant of Israel" is inseparable 
from the promise that "I will even gather you from the 
peoples, and assemble you out of the countries where ye 
have been scattered, and I will give you the land of Israel." 
(Ezekiel 11:13,16). The legend that the Messiah was born on 
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the very day that the Temple was destroyed is deeply 
embedded in Jewish tradition, as is the Talmudic notion 
that the Messiah will come only in a generation totally 
innocent or wholly guilty. 
That the relation between the religious idea of redemption 
through catastrophe and actual historical events may take 
grotesque forms is well known. Long before 1492, Kab­
balistic writers proclaimed that year as the one in which 
catastrophe would bring the redemption of the Jews; the 
catastrophe came, but where was the redemption? The 
attachment of a large part of the Jewish world to the false 
messiah Sabbatai Zevi in the seventeenth century arose 
from the desire to fathom the catastrophe of Chmielnicki's 
massacre of a very large part of the Jewish population of 
Poland in relation to the tradition of catastrophic 
apocalypse. But this plunge into mysticism led to a Jewish 
catastrophe as horrendous, in its own way, as the one it 
attempted to explain. The facile and even cruel "ex­
planations" of the Holocaust, which have come from rabbis 
as well as priests, as God's punishment of Jews for 
deserting true religion, should serve to remind us that 
religion, like all other things that are potentially good (and 
perhaps more than most), is capable of being distorted to 
malignant usages. But they should not prevent us from 
listening to those whose imaginations have led them
 to ask, 
if not to answer, the question of whether there is a 
transcendent meaning in the relation between the destruc­
tion of the Jews of Europe and the establishment of a 
Jewish state in Palestine. 
In 1938, Gershom Scholem, in the last of his famous series 
of lectures "Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism," spoke of 
"the mystical course which, in the great cataclysm now 
stirring the Jewish people more deeply than in the entire 
history of Exile, destiny may still have in store for 
us. . .  . "3 At the time, Hitler's war against the Jews was 
well under way, but the "Final Solution," i.e., the plan to 
remove the Jews of Europe from the face of the earth, had 
not yet been conceived, much less implemented. I propose, 
in the following essay, to examine three of the writers who 
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have entered the dangerous area of imagining what this 
mystical course has been. My aim is not to define this 
mystical course, for this, as Scholem said in the same 
lecture, "is the task of prophets, not of professors."4 But I 
hope to show that a rich vein of literary speculation has 
been opened into the relation between those tremendous 
events which have involved the entire world in the fate of 
the Jews. 
Moshe Flinker 
My first text expresses more passionately than any I shall 
touch the conviction that the rebirth of Israel from the ashes 
of the Holocaust represents a divine scheme of redemption. 
But it was written in 1942-43 by a sixteen-year-old Dutch 
boy who was murdered in Auschwitz in 1944, four years 
before the state was created. The diary of young Moshe 
Flinker,5 written in Hebrew and first published in 1958 at 
the recommendation of S. Y. Agnon, is perhaps the most 
intensely inward and spiritual of all the diaries written by 
victims of the Holocaust. Although Moshe was in hiding in 
Belgium with his parents, five sisters, and a brother, we 
learn very little indeed (barely the names) of the other 
members of the family and get little circumstantial detail 
about their lives or those of the Jews of Brussels. In the 
mind of this extraordinary boy, grief could not be merely 
personal or familial, but extended to the whole of the Jewish 
people. In his diary, therefore, we witness the internaliza­
tion of the awful drama of the Holocaust in the form of a 
struggle of the religious will to keep alive the idea of a just 
and benevolent God in the face of a terrible evil. 
Moshe felt that by his determination to find a divine 
meaning in the cataclysm that was befalling his people, he 
had so isolated himself from his family that he could 
express his thoughts only to his diary. The inability to 
speak of his quandary to those around him aggravated his 
sense of frustrating paralysis and inaction. He began the 
diary precisely because he hated "being idle." Yet the diary 
is more than an anodyne; it is a spiritual diary, an account 
of the state of his soul. "The truth is that yesterday I hadn't 
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the cheek to report to myself what I had done during the 
day, because I did nothing. By that I mean that I did 
nothing to better my soul or to elevate my spirit." It is a 
measure of how far Moshe falls in spirit during the nine 
months of keeping the diary that by its end he is assailed by 
the suspicion that spiritual action is no action at all. 
The diary's most constant impulse is the passion for 
redemption. Moshe desires two things above all others: that 
he may, by imaginative sympathy and by killing all joy in 
his own heart, share in the sufferings of the Jewish people 
who have already been shipped to the East; and that 
messianic redemption may at last not only end the age-old 
suffering of the Jews but prove that the suffering had some 
meaning. Throughout the diary Moshe asks, sometimes 
explicitly, sometimes implicitly: "If not now, when wilt 
Thou help Thy chosen people, O Lord?" " . .  . What can 
God intend by all these calamities that are happening to us 
in this terrible period?" He senses, with a shrewdness that 
few adult Jews in Europe (or elsewhere) possessed in 1942, 
that the present calamity of the Jewish people is not merely 
the latest in the long series of afflictions of the Exile but has 
its unique enormity, universality, and finality: "I find it 
very hard to believe that what we are going through today is 
only a mere link in a long chain of suffering . . . today it is 
quite possible to destroy the entire people of Israel." 
Although Moshe never for a moment doubts God's existence 
or the chosenness of the Jewish people, he is disturbed and 
infected by those around him who say that there is no God 
because, if He existed, he would not have allowed such 
calamities to befall His people. 
Moshe's answer to the question of God's purpose in the 
unprecedented suffering of the Jews comes a few days later, 
in the form of a terrifying paradox that is one of the 
diary's distinguishing characteristics. Moshe decides that 
messianic redemption, which assuredly is long overdue, is 
now being retarded only by the desire of the Jews and the 
Allies for a victory over the German scourge. If the war 
against the Jews marks the end of Jewish Exile, and it does, 
then the war and the horrible sufferings it brings are none 
other than the "birthpangs" of the Messiah. Salvation, 
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then, cannot possibly come from a victory by the Allies, 
which would merely preempt and delay the triumph of the 
Messiah. Those Jews, including Moshe's family, whose 
highest hope is to return to the life they knew before Nazism 
naturally desire the victory of the Allies. Such Jews thereby 
prove to Moshe that what they seek is not salvation but 
merely a return to the Exile, from the Land and from God. 
Such Jews do not understand that the extremity of their 
physical plight represents also the extremity of their 
spiritual hope—for it is unthinkable that the Jews will ever 
be visited with a greater evil than that of Nazism. Their 
suffering has been so fearfully prolonged and horrible 
because "the prophet foretold that we would not return [to 
Eretz Israel] because of our righteousness but as a result of 
the evildoing of our enemies and our agony at their 
hands. . . . " The evil force of the world has not yet burned 
itself out, but for Moshe it is not conceivable that the force of 
evil or the magnitude of Jewish suffering will ever be 
greater than they are in Hitler's Europe. 
Moshe can never be easy with his paradoxical solution to 
the question of why the principle of evil is in the ascendancy 
in the world or with the practical consequence of his 
solution, which aligns him with the author of his people's 
suffering in the war raging through Europe. But the 
possibility that God has no part in what is happening is to 
Moshe even more horrible than the possibility that He does. 
With that spiritual modesty which is one of the diary's most 
poignant features, Moshe admits: "Obviously my outlook is 
a religious one. I hope to be excused for this, for had I not 
religion, I would never find any answer at all to the 
problems that confront me." His explanation of the 
Holocaust is apocalyptic and cataclysmic in a distinctly 
religious way. But he does not attempt to hide the 
undercurrent of skepticism that always threatens this 
paradoxical faith. Thus he looks forward to Hanukkah as a 
likely occasion for redemption, yet on the eve of the holiday 
confesses, "I have the feeling that this Hanukkah will pass, 
as have so many others, without a miracle or anything 
resembling one." 
Moshe's longing for redemption, for the end of the world 
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as we have known it, coexists in the diary with an ambition 
that is both a function of this hope and yet in conflict with it. 
This is his decision, "after much deliberation," to prepare 
himself for a career as a Jewish statesman in the Land of 
Israel. "Even though it would take a miracle to free us now, 
the rest of my idea—living in our land—isn't so far-fetched." 
Although we may be tempted to smile condescendingly at 
Moshe's belief that the success of the messianic era will be 
contingent on Jewish statesmanship in the New Jerusalem, 
it is also true that because normative Judaism never 
separated celestial from earthly Jerusalem, it made of 
Jerusalem a unique symbol of orderly civilized life.6 
Moshe's choice of career is also influenced by some practical 
concerns, such as the unavailability of books. "States­
manship," he remarks with his usual combination of 
innocence and perspicacity, "as opposed to science, does not 
demand systematic study, an activity which is impossible 
for me these days." 
Having chosen to prepare for the career of a Jewish 
statesman, Moshe undertakes to prove to himself the 
seriousness of his intentions by plunging into the study of 
Arabic, for the very good reason—one that had not occurred 
to all potential Palestinian statesmen in 1942—that "a 
large part of the inhabitants of the land of Israel and the 
surrounding countries speak it." Moshe's decision to study 
Arabic is one of many examples of the mysterious 
combination of the wildly messianic and the shrewdly 
practical in the character of this sixteen-year-old boy. 
Belgian Jews of a "practical" strain of mind believe that 
their salvation will come with an Allied victory, but Moshe 
sees with a lucidity that is wholly unempirical that the 
slogan of Allied propaganda—when the Allies decided not 
to extend help to the Jews of Europe—of "rescue through 
victory,"7 was a fraud. Thus, despite the apparent perversi­
ty of Moshe's desire that the Germans win every battle short 
of absolute victory because only such an extremity would 
ignite redemption, he was entirely right in his expectation 
that the Jews of Europe were doomed unless rescue came 
from a source other than the Allies for whose victory they 
yearned. 
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The diary's turning point comes on 22 December 1942, 
when Moshe learns from his father that 100,000 Jews have 
already been murdered in the East. Hearing this, he wishes 
to join his brothers in death, and finds that the Bible, which 
formerly had soothed and consoled him, can offer 
sustenance only through the Book of Lamentations, that is, 
through evocations of Jewish agony, not Jewish glory. In 
spite of his deeply felt belief in cataclysm as the necessary 
antecedent to redemption, Moshe feels a rising anger 
toward God and a diminishing ability to draw nourishment 
from His word. "I have done what I said I would do—study 
the Bible each day—but I have found nothing in it." 
As the sufferings of his people multiply and the tarrying 
of the Messiah entails ever more destruction, Moshe 
undergoes a spiritual agony whose causes are at once 
national and personal. It is not only that the God of history 
has abandoned His people but that the God of the heart has 
abandoned young Moshe. "During recent days an emp­
tiness has formed inside me. Nothing motivates me to do 
anything or write anything, and no new ideas enter my 
mind; everything is as if asleep. . . . When I pray I feel as if 
I am praying to the wall and am not heard at all, and there is 
a voice inside me that says: 'What are you praying for? The 
Lord does not hear you.' . .  . I think that the holy spark 
which I always felt within me has been taken from me, and 
here I am, without spirit, without thought, without 
anything, and all I have is my miserable body." This deeply 
felt sense of God's withdrawal from the soul into a region so 
distant that from it He can neither hear nor be heard has 
afflicted many religious people in the last century. But 
Moshe stands forth as the symbol of the hundreds of 
thousands, perhaps the millions, who during the Holocaust 
suffered the double affliction of the absenteeism or 
withdrawal of the God of history and the God of the heart, 
each withdrawal reenforcing the other to overwhelm the 
individual afflicted by both. For such people, Moshe thinks, 
"their spiritual anguish . . . may well be greater than their 
physical pain." 
The intensity of Moshe's messianic longing is constantly 
threatened by the enormity of the afflictions of the Jews. 
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How much more pain, how many more victims, must be 
expended before redemption comes? The birth pangs of the 
Messiah have magnified to an "extent that I would almost 
say that the cure is worse than the disease." But throughout 
his agony, he doggedly and assiduously pursues his study 
of Arabic. He encounters enormous difficulties in obtaining 
books, which are anyhow in German, a language he does 
not know well. He reports to his diary his advancement to 
the "maza" verbs despite the fact that his efforts to obtain 
the requisite textbook—in French—have failed. Although 
he belittles his Arabic study as "merely an expression of 
idleness, " it is clear that it is actually a token of his faith 
that he and the Jewish people both have a future, and that 
this future will have meaning only if it is a distinct break 
with the past. 
Yet despite his study of Arabic in order to become a 
Jewish statesman in the land of Israel, Moshe's messianic 
longing is not, at first, translated into Zionism. In fact, in 
this very entry where he reports his progress in Arabic, he 
declares that "for me Zionism cannot now remedy our 
weakness. Only through the troubles that are now ap­
proaching can we attain complete salvation and redemp­
tion." But a few months later, when he feels that "the 
emptiness has spread within me and now fills me complete­
ly," he receives something like a revelation, a letter from 
God. This letter is in the form of a Palestine school almanac 
that he finds in a Hebrew library. Although he had read the 
book once before, in a less barren period of his life, it had 
made little impression on him. But now, in the depths of his 
loneliness and isolation "from all my brothers, from 
everything nationally Jewish," the almanac appears to him 
in a wholly different light. "It now seemed like a letter to me, 
as a sign of life of the rest of my people. I love it so much that 
I can hardly bring myself to return it to the library. The 
name of the almanac is 'My Homeland.' How many times 
have I not said this word to myself in the last week, and each 
time it comes into my mind I am filled with yearning for it, 
and my soul longs for my country that I have loved—and 
still love—so much." 
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This moving entry carries implications for the spiritual 
life of the Jewish people (and for the political life of the 
modern world) that are not adequately conveyed by the old 
quip that when a man is no longer capable of being a Jew, he 
becomes a Zionist. For it shows how, at the deepest level of 
Jewish religious experience, the will to create meaning out 
of the terror of history leads or is led to the idea of a national 
home that will end the Exile of the Jewish people, not only 
from the promised land but from God. It is not merely that 
Moshe feels, under the pressure of the genocidal campaign 
against the Jews, "how much we need a country in which we 
could live in peace as every people lives in its country." Such 
a passion, deriving from such a religious crisis, could hardly 
be satisfied by the Zionist ideal of "normalization." The 
Jewish homeland, as he conceives it, must redeem the 
terrible burden of Jewish history, of which Moshe has the 
fullest imaginative grasp. He sees the Holocaust as (what it 
is called in Yiddish) the khurbn, the culminating final event 
in "the chain linking the destruction of the Temple with the 
present day; I see the rivers of blood shed in the name of the 
sanctification of our holy faith. . . .  " 
The way in which the land of Israel is to represent an end 
to Jewish history as it has existed for two thousand years is 
not purely "spiritual." In Moshe's vision, the actual Jewish 
yishuv in Palestine is an integral part of the redemptive 
process. This comes out most clearly in the contrast that it 
poses in Moshe's mind to the Jews of Europe. Moshe, we 
recall, had begun his diary in order to overcome his sense of 
helpless inaction through spiritual means. But as the diary 
approaches its end, Moshe increasingly feels that purely 
spiritual action—prayers, beseechings, diaries—"cannot 
reestablish our continually violated honor. Action alone is 
of any use." He comments bitterly on the paradox of 
chosenness that the Jewish people has been chosen 
indeed—to be persecuted. "Is it a nation of soldiers or 
farmers? No—it is a nation of victims, and a people well 
suited to being victims. . . .  " The powerlessness and 
inaction of the Jews of Europe threaten even Moshe's 
writing, for like them he feels "hemmed in on all sides, like a 
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bird in a cage," and wonders "What use is thought without 
action. . .  . ?" His thirst for action can be quenched only 
by the sole counter-example to the passive suffering of 
Europe's Jews: namely, the Jews of Palestine. He learns 
from the papers how they, "when they suffer . . . will die 
as Jews who have defended themselves, as free Jews—and 
not like those of my brothers who are now suffering under 
the atrocious Germans, who lead them like sheep to be 
slaughtered." 
Moshe wrote these words on 3 September 1943. The very 
next words in the diary, written on 6 September, announce 
his intention "of emigrating to the Holy Land to help my 
brothers in their struggle." In this, the last dated entry of 
the diary, Moshe expresses an unwonted confidence, not so 
much in his own future as in that of the Jewish people: for he 
is "absolutely sure that all the sufferings that we have 
undergone have given us certain rights, and by the general 
spiritual elevation of our people we have managed to raise 
the question of the Jews to the status of a problem for all 
mankind." Thus what was to have been the first notebook of 
Moshe's diary ends with an upsurge of national feeling, 
confirmed by the new will of the Jewish people to end its 
victimization and make its own destiny. 
This feeling of confidence is not wrought into consistency 
with Moshe's previously expressed feeling that it is not 
through human action that Jewish deliverance will come. 
Perhaps, if he had lived, Moshe would have seen in these 
human actions not denial of faith in the promise of 
deliverance but man's acting out of the redemptive process. 
For the final (albeit undated) entries in the diary express 
simultaneously the belief that the Jewish disaster has 
attained a cosmic dimension, and that passionate desire to 
give at least a human meaning to this suffering by 
returning, with the remnant of his people, to rebuild the 
homeland. 
As he contemplates (from afar, he thinks) the suffering of 
his people, Moshe envisions two ways in which this 
suffering may be related to something beyond itself and so 
given meaning. He sees from his window a blood-red sky, 
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and becomes convinced that these "bleeding clouds" are the 
cosmic reflection of the Jewish sea of blood in the European 
inferno. Presently, this sky is a reproach to him for having 
"forgotten" his people and their tragedy; but its future 
destiny is to intercede, for the very last time, with the Ruler 
of the Universe to redeem His people. 
In a gigantic pathetic fallacy, Moshe imagines the blood-
red clouds ascending to the throne of heaven and posing the 
accusatory questions that dominate his own mind: "How 
long will He vent his wrath upon the people He chose, who 
have been suffering for Him for two thousand years? . . . 
Two thousand years have we been persecuted. Two thou­
sand years have we brought into this world children who 
are doomed to suffer. Lord our God is this still not enough?" 
But the very final note of the diary is one not of accusation 
of God but of self-accusation. His anguished desire to join 
his fellow Jews as a victim or to go to Palestine as their 
avenger ("—the return of our beloved people to their 
homeland. That will be the greatest revenge that could ever 
happen.") is thwarted. He therefore berates himself for 
withdrawing from his people and concludes the diary with 
an expression of a paralysis that feels to him like death 
itself. 
Moshe's agony of separation from his tortured brethren 
was soon to end, with his capture by the Gestapo and 
ultimate execution in Auschwitz. We may be sure the irony 
of his being arrested on the eve of Passover (7 April 1944) 
was not lost on Moshe Flinker. Would the loathsome 
Germans prove, after all, through the alchemy of tragedy, to 
be the instrument for realizing the promise of redemption 
celebrated on the holiday? Would he and his people indeed 
find themselves, as a result of this monstrous paradox, 
"next year in Jerusalem"? Who can doubt that Moshe asked 
himself these questions, perhaps continued to ask them 
throughout his deepest degradation and suffering. 
Moshe Flinker's is the purest example of the natural 
connection between the Jewish religious quandary caused 
by the Holocaust and the resolution offered by the 
establishment of a Jewish state. Passionately religious, 
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wholly innocent of politics and contemptuous of human 
action to bring redemption, Moshe was irresistibly driven 
by the plight of his people, whose terrible fate he was to 
share, to seek hope and meaning in Zion. In the passion 
with which he storms the heavens themselves, in his 
intense imaginative desire to break through the bonds of 
this world to a new one, Moshe stands forth as a figure of 
tragic intensity and dimension. He forces us to ask, as he 
himself did, whether such suffering, magnified six million 
times, can conceivably have been inflicted and endured 
without leaving its permanent mark in heaven and on 
earth. 
Nelly Sachs 
One of the most ambitious attempts to answer this 
question, and in a language that would have seemed 
perfectly natural to Moshe Flinker, is the poetry of Nelly 
Sachs. Her sense of the intimate relation between Exile and 
Return, degradation and exaltation, suffering and redemp­
tion, national destruction and national rebirth, is 
remarkably like Moshe's. She too imagines the sufferings of 
the Jewish people to have been "constellated" in the 
heavens themselves. If Moshe sees the very sun turning "as 
red as blood" because it has been wounded with Jewish 
suffering, then Nelly Sachs says to the crying Job, symbol 
of the Jewish people, that "one day the constellation of your 
blood / shall make all rising suns blanch." The final vision 
of Moshe's diary, that of a blood-red sun about to set, is the 
vision that reigns at the outset of the imaginative drama 
that is enacted in Nelly Sachs's poetry, when she sees the 
Germans marching across a red carpet that is "the setting 
sun of Sinai's people." 
Although Nelly Sachs's physical situation when she 
wrote her poems—that is to say, safely out of her native 
Germany and the inferno of Europe and looking back on the 
wreckage and carnage—was far different from Moshe's, 
they were alike in their desperate quest to place themselves 
imaginatively within the suffering of their people. By the 
time Nelly Sachs came to compose her massive threnody, 
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Moshe was himself among those "dead brothers and 
sisters" to whom she dedicated all of her work. 
The poetry of Nelly Sachs is one of the most elaborate 
and sustained attempts to assimilate the Holocaust into the 
poetic imagination and into Jewish history. Between 1946, 
when her first volume of poems—In the Habitations of 
Death—appeared, and her death in 1970, she published 
volume after volume in the attempt to penetrate what she 
called "a mystery that begins with night." She has been 
taken to task by some for illuminating this mystery too well 
and by others for illuminating it too feebly or not at all. On 
the one hand, it is charged that the themes and symbols of 
her poems so thoroughly integrate the Holocaust into the 
long history of the Jewish people that they "diminish the 
uniqueness of the horror and . . . turn the murderers into 
impersonal and abstract forces."8 On the other, she is 
faulted for never saying with adequate specificity what the 
mystery is or where, exactly, the resurrection toward which 
her heart and verse surge and strain is to be realized. 
The first charge would be legitimate if, indeed, it had been 
Nelly Sachs's primary intention to convey, with the 
immediacy of an eyewitness or the concrete particularity of 
the novelist, the phenomenal reality of the destruction of 
European Jewry. But she assumes from the outset that this 
greatest of crimes has so disoriented the universe, of which 
the poet's vision is one part—she speaks of writing with one 
eye ripped out—that realistic description is the least likely 
way to capture its reality, which is, in truth, even beyond 
fantasy. Images of physical dismemberment, as in the 
poem "Ebb and Flood Strike a Chord," are as rife in her 
poetry as in Picasso's paintings; they are an aspect of that 
starting point in night which challenges the integrating 
power of her imagination. If, in her work, the German 
murderers are disembodied and without personal identity, 
it is because that is, in metaphysical (but not legal) justice, 
their due for turning millions of Jewish victims into smoke. 
The second charge—that for all her stress on rebirth, the 
kind of resurrection she envisions is not fully articulated— 
seems to ignore an axiom of Holocaust literature: namely, 
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that in the aftermath of the most terrible event of modern, if 
not all, history, we must live and act without certainties. In 
seeking meaning in the Holocaust, especially in seeking, as 
Nelly Sachs does, a divine meaning, one is prohibited from 
confusing one's own certainty with absolute certainty. 
Browning's paradox—that in art perfect realization means 
spiritual stagnation—applies more forcefully here than 
anywhere else. A tentative resolution of theological doubts 
is the only resolution men will tolerate.9 
I believe that in the imaginative universe that Nelly 
Sachs created the rebirth of the Jewish people in their 
ancient homeland played a crucial role, even if it never 
provided her with a conclusive answer to questions 
intrinsically unanswerable. In every volume, she wrestles 
with the paradoxical link between the destruction of the 
Jewish people in Europe and their rebirth, especially 
(though not exclusively) in Israel. This link never becomes 
an article of faith, but it is the sole recurring concrete 
expression of her faith in the possibility of resurrection. 
The theme of resurrection—of flesh as well as spirit—is 
sounded in the very first poem of the first volume, but 
sounded with irony and bitterness. In "O the Chimneys" 
the poet collapses the massive physicality of millions of 
Jewish corpses into a collective image of "Israel's body" 
drifting as smoke through the air, to be welcomed in heaven 
by a star turned black because it is now "a chimney sweep." 
"Or," asks the poet, "was it a ray of sun?" The chimneys of 
the death factories, through which the smoke that was all 
that was left of the Jewish people escaped, may from some 
transcendent point of view be seen as "Freedomway for 
Jeremiah and Job's dust." But the image (strikingly similar 
to images in the poetry of Glatstein and Zeitlin and Kovner) 
seems too spiritualized and etherealized to represent the 
calamity that is the poem's subject. Even more upsetting is 
the question "Who devised you and laid stone upon 
stone / The road for refugees of smoke?" The skeptical 
reader is inclined to answer, "the Germans, of course." But 
the poet does not answer. Here it would seem that the very 
attempt to place the Holocaust within the framework of 
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Jewish history leads to thoughts that frighten the poet 
herself, who ends with an exclamation, a cry of pain. The 
implied question of whether the physical resurrection of the 
flesh described in her epitaph from Job is possible to these 
"refugees of smoke" also remains unanswered in the con­
cluding lament: "O you chimneys, / O you fingers / And 
Israel's body as smoke through the air!" 
The next poem, "To you that build the new house," offers 
more concrete, material images of rebirth. It exhorts the 
survivors, in putting up their walls, not to "hang your tears 
for those who departed, / Who will not live with you then." 
Memory will make not only building but sleep impossible. 
The poem's many imperatives are summed up and 
generalized in its final one: 
Build, when the hourglass trickles,
But do not weep away the minutes
Together with the dust
That obscures the light. 
If read literally, this poem can seem an insensitive 
injunction to forget the victims lest that memory paralyze 
efforts of rebuilding and obscure the light that still exists 
behind the dust (an obsessive image in Nelly Sachs's poems 
for the Jewish dead). The skeptical reader we imagined for 
"0 the Chimneys" might also be tempted to remark about 
this injunction to the surviving Jews to ignore their stricken 
brethren that it is urging people to do more abundantly that 
which they already do excessively. But in fact, the poem is 
addressed by Nelly Sachs to herself and to all those 
burdened by their own inescapable immersion in the 
Holocaust. For her and for them, there is no question of 
forgetting; what they seek is the most useful expedient for 
keeping the dead alive and for rescuing an ancient people 
before "the hourglass trickles." This expedient is not 
weeping but building. This is the true memorial because, as 
Rabbi Nachman said (in the epigraph to the poem): "There 
are stones like souls." 
To speak of stones, in such a context, is to think of 
Jerusalem, especially if we keep in mind that for Nelly 
Sachs stones are like "a satchel full of lived life." But 
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historical Eretz Israel first appears in the poetry in the 
image of the sand of Sinai. This sand, originating in the 
distant past, has been carried by the Jewish people 
throughout its long history of transformations, has 
"Mingled with throats of nightingales, / Mingled with 
wings of butterflies," and was in the "deathly shoes" taken 
from the victims of Auschwitz. These victims were 
themselves turned to dust, which also will become sand, just 
as the murderers who turned them into dust "will be 
dust / In the shoes of those to come." 
Such a poem as "But who emptied your shoes of sand?" 
illustrates the impregnation of Nelly Sachs's poetic 
imagery with the physicality of Eretz Israel. These images 
suggestively rather than discursively demonstrate that the 
Diaspora was not a mere rupture in Jewish historical 
continuity and that the Jews in Exile were still "Sinai's 
people," whose inherited memories of their homeland 
became an integral part of their life. The mystery of 
suffering attendant on the transformation of Jewish "dust" 
back into Sinai sand is as great as that by which the 
suffering of Philomela was transformed into the beautiful 
song of the nightingale referred to in the poem. 
The Holy Land, endowed with a voice by Nelly Sachs, 
contemplates the fate of her children among the nations. 
The vessels of her holiness were squandered abroad, where 
Death "Painted Israel red on all the walls of the world." 
Now the Holy Land, much diminished in majesty, asks 
only: 
What shall be the end of the little holiness 
Which still dwells in my sand? 
She receives from the voices of the dead the injunction not to 
seek revenge. But, unsatisfied with this merely negative 
counsel, she repeats her question. This time she is answered 
by the action of a single child, "murdered in sleep," who 
rises from the dead, "bends down the tree of ages / And 
pins the white breathing star / That was once called Israel 
to its topmost bough." By this act she retrieves from its 
depths of degradation the "badge of shame" that the Nazis 
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affixed to her in the ghetto, forcing the ancient tree of life to 
stoop to the realms of death so that it may renew itself 
through the grafting of this old-new branch called Israel. 
"Spring upright again, says the child, / To where tears 
mean eternity." 
But it is one thing to observe the paradoxical relationship 
between degradation and exaltation, another to assert their 
necessary and causal link. To say that the end of the world 
of European Jewry brought about the rebirth of the Jewish 
people in Israel is not necessarily to assert that a higher 
power than man willingly presided over the death of 
European Jewry for the purpose of resurrecting the Jewish 
people in their homeland. Yet sometimes Nelly Sachs seems 
to assert precisely this. As the epigraph to one poem in this 
volume, she cites the statement from the Zohar that "the 
sinking occurs for the sake of the rising." In another she 
urges her audience to learn again "how to listen" so that "on 
the day of destruction" they will be able to hear "how in 
death / Life begins." 
Ordinarily, to assert that life arises only from death (as 
when childbirth causes a mother's death) is to assert a 
gloomy view of existence. Our uneasiness with this 
conjunction in Nelly Sachs, however, arises from the fear 
that it is too sanguine. If we have forced ourselves to see the 
Holocaust in its full horror, we cannot blink the fact that for 
the Jews of Europe this calamity was indeed—as Hannah 
Arendt says—"the end of the world."10 The great, perhaps 
insuperable, challenge that Nelly Sachs took upon herself 
was to join a full recognition of this fact to a celebration, 
however hedged and tentative, of the birth she believed to 
have been caused by this death. In many ways, this was a 
more formidable task than that of the elegist who 
traditionally undertook to triumph over death through the 
power of language, perception, and poetic tradition; such 
triumphs cannot be gainsaid by historical events. What is 
so daring in Nelly Sachs's poems relating Holocaust to 
rebirth is that her elegiac response to the death of a people 
keeps straining toward a historical validation and will not 
rest content with the easy resolutions of what Irving Howe 
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calls "Geistesgeschichte: the encapsulation of an extremely 
complex group of historical events by a theory so nebulous­
ly inclusive that it leaves no possibility for refutation."11 
In some poems, the breakthrough to the new world of 
rebirth seems to depend not merely on catastrophe but on 
the extent of the catastrophe: had fewer been killed, 
"Chorus of the Wanderers" appears to imply, the enormous 
distance between Exile and Return could never have been 
encompassed. The homeless wanderers, "clad in the rags of 
the land / In which we rested," trod the dust of Exile until it 
began "to stir our grandsons' blood." Then, by their death, 
they build a path to the new world: "Like measuring rods 
our bodies lie on the earth / And measure out the hori­
zon—." The wanderers died in the wilderness, but their 
corpses laid the road to the promised land: "Our death will 
lie like a threshold / Before your tight-shut doors." 
Eclipse of the Stars, published in 1949, a year after the 
establishment of the State of Israel, is the most explicitly 
"Zionist" of Nelly Sachs's volumes. Here the hopes so 
tentatively set forth in the first volume are allowed to 
flourish, and the generalized theme of rebirth is vivified and 
particularized by the nourishment of a living reality. 
The volume takes as a given the inability of the nations to 
accept the People Israel in their midst: "Why the black 
answer of hate to your existence, Israel?" This people, 
which always in the family of nations "sang / one note 
lower / or one note higher," has, despite the unique 
blessing it brought to the world as "the source of the living 
God," at last been abandoned by angels and mortals. The 
European survivors of this people, those who have not been 
"turned to ashes," can never return to their former dwelling 
places. The nations who ask where the survivors plan to go 
do not see that "they are always going to their graves." 
Terror creates a homelessness for which "all ways wither 
like cut flowers—." 
But, paradoxically, just because we inhabit an era when 
chaos and darkness have reestablished their empire more 
firmly than ever, "Time roars with our longing for home." 
Exile is not eternal—that, after all, had been the definitive 
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prophecy of Jesus regarding the Jewish people—and there 
is still a way homeward that has not withered. In a 
recurring image, the sand of the hourglass has nearly run 
out for the Jewish people. But the sand actually runs not 
into the bottom of the hourglass but ultimately back to the 
desert from whence it came, and from whence the people of 
Israel came as well. In the astonishing metaphysical image 
that holds the meaning of "Women and girls of Israel," the 
sand of the desert, accumulating through the centuries 
since Jewish expulsion, is also the sand of the hourglass 
that measures the little remaining time of the Jewish 
people. Paradoxically, this process of dissipation both 
resulted in, and was halted by, the blooming of the desert: 
the desert, the great bend in the road to eternity,
which had already begun to fill with its sand
the hourglass of lunar time, 
breathes above the filled-in footsteps
of those who go to God, and its parched veined springs
fill with fertility— 
The transformation of Jewish existence in the Diaspora 
into Jewish existence in Israel is symbolized by the 
transformation of the "hourglass of dust" in which exiled 
time itself, the "homeless millennia," has roamed since the 
destruction of the temple, into the sand of the desert from 
which both dust and glass were created. 
Perhaps the most affirmative of the poems in this volume, 
and the one in which the feeling of imminent return is 
strongest, is "Now Abraham has seized the root of the 
winds": 
Now Abraham has seized the root of the winds 
for home shall Israel come from dispersion. 
It has gathered wounds and afflictions 
in the courtyards of the world,
has bathed all locked doors with its tears. 
Its elders, having almost outgrown their earthly garb 
and extending their limbs like sea plants, 
embalmed in the salt of despair
and the wailing wall night in their arms— 
will sleep just a spell longer— 
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But youth has unfurled its flag of longing,
for a field yearns to be loved by them
and a desert watered 
and the house shall be built 
to face the sun: God 
and evening again has the violet-shy word
that only grows so blue in the homeland:
Good night! 
This poem is an encapsulated history of Jewish Exile in all 
its bitterness, a poetic realization of the Zionist dream of 
making the desert bloom, and a celebration of homecoming. 
But, if read as a discrete unit, the poem's affirmation 
appears to come at the cost of keeping the Holocaust 
decently out of view. It needs (as is often the case with 
individual poems by Nelly Sachs) to be complemented by 
another poem in this volume, which recalls that the 
wonders of Abraham are inescapably those "which we with 
our bodies must consummate." 
The overriding metaphysical premise of Nelly Sachs's 
poetic universe is a sense of the world's unity and integrity, 
in the sense of wholeness, oneness, a vast assemblage of 
organic parts each one of which impinges on every other, so 
that no part of the whole system can be removed or changed 
without every other part being affected. Therefore, in 
Eclipse of the Stars as everywhere in Nelly Sachs's poetry 
the images of transformation, metamorphosis and resurrec­
tion abound. "Ending flows to beginning / like the cry of a 
swan" and "the soul, folded, waits / to be born again / 
under the ice of the death mask." But here the images 
are given a habitation and a name; the generalized desire 
for rebirth is attached, albeit with full consciousness of the 
risk of doing do, to a living, struggling reality. 
"Land of Israel," the first of two poems so titled in this 
volume, pictures a people "seared by dying" moving back 
into the valleys of Eretz Israel. Such a picture, the poet 
believes, must surely evoke "the patriarchs' blessing / for 
those returning." The image of the patriarchs, com­
plemented by the poem's subsequent allusions to Elijah and 
to the imminent appearance of "a new Ruth," is meant to 
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remind us that the scheme of redemption in which disaster 
is the necessary prelude to apocalypse, is not the desperate 
invention of the poet responding to an otherwise 
meaningless modern history, but a scheme inherent in the 
ancient Covenant between God and His chosen people. The 
survivors of the Holocaust have "come home from the 
corners of the world with tear-stained eyes" not merely for 
the purpose of establishing themselves in a normal 
homeland such as all other people have but "to write the 
psalms of David anew" in a reconsecrated land. 
To read such lines is to recognize at once that the poetic 
solace which Nelly Sachs offered her people, the poetic 
embrace in which she sought to enfold them, aspires to more 
than rescue and relief. She does indeed desire, as the second 
"Land of Israel" poem says, to "stanch the blood / and 
thaw out the tears / which froze in the death chambers." 
But she instinctively recognized that to restore the human 
image to so tortured and humiliated a people as the Jewish 
survivors of Hitler's Europe, more was required than merely 
to return them to the status of tolerated aliens that they had 
formerly held. They had, rather, to be returned to "the lost 
memories / which smell prophetically through the earth / 
and sleep on the stone" in the land of Israel, and only there. 
The restoration of the human status to the survivors could 
not, she knew, be achieved without the restoration of 
nationality; nor could the poet herself, speaking for the 
Jews who remained outside the land of Israel, be born again 
unless the national center of her people was reborn, and 
"out of the desert sand" Israel "thrust up . . . trees again." 
These poems celebrating the idea of national redemption 
for a shattered people represent Nelly Sachs's most 
determined effort to penetrate what in one poem she calls 
"the mystery overgrown with forgetting," a mystery that 
contains the relationship between degradation and exalta­
tion, and between an exiled people and its homeland. Yet 
the very title of her next volume—And NQ One Knows How 
to Go On (1957)—shows how fragile and tentative was her 
Zionist affirmation. Several poems return to the dark 
prospect that life, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, has 
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become impossible on this planet. If it is indeed the case 
that, as she says in one poem, "all lands are ready to 
rise / from the map," then it can hardly matter whether the 
Jewish people resides in Israel or in Uganda. 
Yet the volume does continue to explore the possible link 
between the great Jewish death in Europe and the great 
Jewish rebirth in Israel. The figure of Daniel becomes the 
symbol of the poet herself in his ability to recover "forgotten 
dreams even from behind the last slope of coal." He gathers 
fragments and preserves what has been torn down. Nelly 
Sachs emulates Daniel's own courage by entering the space 
"between hangman and victim" in order to retrieve the 
possibility of a new life. Her Israel is both the land and the 
people, the latter being nourished in Exile by its memories 
but also nourishing what is remembered by its remember­
ing and suffering. "Israel," she cries, "is not only land!" Its 
desert sand took wing in prophecy, and its "eternity­
snorting mountains" were transmuted into "the milk-white 
foam / Of children's prayers." Yet the physicality of Israel 
has outlasted the Holocaust and now awaits that birth of its 
new self whose precondition has been the death of the old. 
By the intensity with which she perceives them, the 
bloodletting of the People Israel and the peeling of corpse-
skin from the dead become for Nelly Sachs part of a 
homeward movement and enable the elegiac transforma­
tion of death into new life: 
Late firstborn!

You have come home with the spade

into the unexcavated,

the unconstructed,

but into the line

that leads again

through the synagogue of longing

from death into birth.

Death Still Celebrates Life (1965) makes clear in a number 
of ways that the healing process for the Jewish people 
cannot be a simple reversal of the process of destruction and 
Exile, "for entrance can never be / the same as exit where 
farewell and return are parted by the incurable wound 
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of life." Biblical prophesy, which always points "from 
graves / into the next dawn," does prepare us for the para­
dox that a new dawn is always the gift of night. But 
Nelly Sachs could never rest comfortably in this paradox. 
Her work consistently yearns toward consolation and 
transcendence, but declines finally to lay hold of them, for 
fear that they may not be real. The image of an Israel reborn 
from ashes is her particular example—powerful as a symbol 
because it is first an actuality—of the more general desire, 
of a poet "on the track of my rights of domicile," for a 
homeland that will offer refuge to those who were cast out— 
from country, from life, from the human status itself. 
In Nelly Sachs's poetry the land of Israel is both itself and 
the crossroads where the poet's desire for, and disbelief in, 
redemption meet. In "I do not know the room," she insists 
with certainty that nothing is lost, that somewhere "the 
smile of the child / who was thrown as in play / into the 
peeling flames is preserved." In a poem explicitly labeled as 
one of mourning entitled "Everywhere Jerusalem," she 
says that ultimately everything is, indeed, saved, but 
"saved for the devouring fire / of His absence—." The 
Jerusalem that is said in the title to be everywhere is never 
mentioned in the body of the poem, for in the absence of God 
it has become the only enduring and universal presence in 
Jewish life. 
Abba Kovner 
My place of work is a wooden hut between the graveyard and
the children's house. There I am writing something that has no
beginning and no end. But if there is a central thread that goes
through the empty pages, it is the leitmotif of those who 
survived, those who were destroyed and those who come after
them. (Abba Kovner, 7 March 1975) 
Abba Kovner's work and life have been attempts to join 
together what has been separated by history, especially by 
the Jewish history of expulsion, dispersion, oppression, 
Holocaust. He himself has located the source of his creative 
work in a tension between two loves, his love of the Jewish 
people and his love of the land of Israel. He has sought to 
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bring together, as completing counterparts, those Jews who 
attached themselves to the Jewish people but had no 
experience of the living reality of the land, and those 
Israelis who saw themselves "as the first of a new 
humankind—."12 During the first half of his life, he gained 
honor and fame as a resistance fighter in Vilna and the 
surrounding forests and then as a leader in the Brichah 
movement that brought the pitiful remnant of European 
Jewry to the homeland in Palestine. In this period, he 
sought to bring the Jewish people to the land of Israel. But 
in his work as a creative writer, he has initiated a vast 
backward movement of recovery that is intended to carry 
the imagination of his contemporaries in Israel back to the 
Jewish people, back to a buried life they thought they had 
forgotten or, perhaps, never even known. 
To understand Kovner's poetry, we must recognize that it 
is based on the impulse to join people with land, matter with 
spirit, the living with the dead, past with present, life with 
literature. At any particular moment in his poems, we may 
be simultaneously at the foot of Sinai and at the edge of the 
shooting pits of Ponary, circling the walls of Jericho and the 
walls of a European convent or ghetto, defending Vilna (the 
"Jerusalem of Lithuania") and the Jerusalem of modern 
Israel, receiving the Covenant and giving it back. He is a 
writer whose imagination, like his life, may rise from the 
material to the spiritual, but may also return, for renewal, 
from the spiritual to the physical. Two examples of this 
forward and backward movement from Kovner's life may 
help to underscore its centrality in his poetry. 
At the war's end, Kovner felt powerfully the need not only 
for rescue but for transformation of the Jewish people. He 
was shocked by the apathy of those small segments of the 
European Jewish population that had not suffered in the 
Holocaust, people who had lived through an event of 
biblical enormity without even noticing it. "There blew in 
our faces a chill cellar-wind of a community that goes on liv­
ing as if nothing had happened, as it did before the deluge, 
as if there had been no deluge."13 His immediate goal was 
physical rescue, a task made difficult enough by allies as 
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well as enemies in Europe, and by the British Mandatory 
Government in Palestine; but he could not conceive of 
physical rescue apart from spiritual renewal. Physical 
rescue of European Jewry might perhaps take place if the 
survivors could be moved from the displaced persons camps 
to America, but spiritual renewal required their reunion 
with the Jewish land. Yet it was not only the European 
survivors who needed spiritual rebirth after the great 
catastrophe: "We want," he said in a speech of 1945, "to 
come to the Land of Israel, to its people, and by the force of 
our conviction, of our inquietude, our sense of the danger 
that hovers over us and is also latent within us, to change its 
ways of thinking . . . which is also largely the outcome of 
detachment, distance and indifference."14 If the Jewish 
people were one—and, Kovner believed, they were—then 
Palestinian Jewry could not achieve its mission unless it 
absorbed into its consciousness the central experience, grim 
and oppressive though it had been, of modern Jewish 
history. Just how true this was even Kovner could not know 
until the traumatic war of 1967 dramatically revealed how 
"young Israelis . . . in the most critical hours of their lives, 
found that their deepest feelings came into contact with 
that forgotten chapter . . . that seemingly repressed 
chapter, the destruction of our people in Europe."15 
But sometimes it is important, even essential, that spirit 
renew itself at the source, that literature revitalize itself 
through contact with life. Kovner is fond of pointing out 
that in classical Hebrew there was no single word for 
literature; rather, literature was called hayim she-bi­
khtav—life in writing. The Tightness of this apparently 
cumbersome phrase was proved to Kovner by his experience 
in commanding resistance fighters in the Vilna ghetto. 
On 1 September 1943, the Germans surrounded the ghetto in 
order to remove the last thousands of Jews to the death 
camps. It was necessary to build defense positions with 
sandbags, but—irony of ironies—the people whose fore­
fathers had for a thousand years built their homes of drift­
ing sand could now find none with which to protect them­
selves against German bullets. Their salvation (temporary, 
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to be sure) lay in "the great volumes of the Talmud in their 
brown leather binding," which were taken from the famous 
Jewish library of Vilna to serve in place of sandbags. The 
event has remained with Kovner as a revelation of the com­
plex possibilities of renewal in the interactions between 
matter and spirit, life and literature. From one point of 
view, the Talmud was here degraded from a spiritual to a 
physical role; yet in the process it enabled a preservation 
of Jewish life through a transformation of the traditional 
Jewish passivity in the face of violent threat. "I propped 
up my rifle on the back of the books. Were the books a sup­
port for the rifle with its ten bullets? Or, at that hour, were 
they a support for something else?"16 
The desire to overcome geographical and chronological 
discontinuity by joining Israel with Diaspora, present with 
past, is apparent in Kovner's account of the genesis of My 
Little Sister, published in 1967, that is, almost a quarter of a 
century after the events of the Holocaust that form its 
center. He was, he has said, walking late at night through 
the streets of a section of Tel Aviv when he heard the shrieks 
of a woman coming from a high window. Although his own 
attention was riveted on the terrible screams, neither the 
other passersby in the street nor the people behind the 
neighboring windows seemed to pay any attention. Kovner 
was at once carried back to the Holocaust years when the 
collective death rattle of the Jews of Europe failed to disturb 
the placidity or even attract the attention of the outside 
world. 
A cloister's wall is high.
A wall of silence 
still higher. 
(Section 8)* 
This gave the first impulse toward recovery of the past. The 
second came from Kovner's discovery of the truth behind 
the appearances. In actuality, he had been hearing the cries 
of a woman in labor coming from a maternity hospital; 
those who knew the neighborhood paid no attention 
*Subsequent parenthetical references for verse quotations should be
understood to be to section and not page numbers. 
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because they were familiar with such cries and knew their 
cause. Stirred by recollections of the past, of the sense of 
isolation and abandonment, by the particular memories of 
the agonies of mothers and children during the Holocaust— 
"I never thought a woman who had her child taken out of 
her arms had gone like a sheep to the slaughter"17—and by 
the paradoxical relation between torture and birth, Kovner 
set himself to what he has called "an enduring attempt to 
turn ashes into an eternal light."18 
The incident in Tel Aviv is specifically reflected in My 
Little Sister in several ways. The Dominican convent in 
which the little sister receives (temporary) shelter is shown 
to be out of touch with the true human actuality and the 
horrors raging through Europe among the Jews by virtue of 
the fact that here "No woman has crouched to give 
birth / on the floor." (11) The convent's mother is the 
Mother Superior, its ideal of motherhood the virginal 
mother of the infant Jesus, over whose image the nuns 
lovingly fuss. The contrasted ideas of motherhood give rise 
to the poem's contrasts between the sanctified Christian 
image of the crucified Jesus and "my crucified 
memory / outside the fence!" (10), a memory of images 
themselves crying for sanctification: "ashes that speak" (5) 
and "heaps of small shoes."(35) 
The mother's agony of which the cries from the lying-in 
hospital reminded Kovner is in My Little Sister illustrated 
in ways that, if considered logically, are mutually incon­
sistent; yet this inconsistency gives us a clue to the 
organizing idea of the poem. In the opening section of Part 
Four, the poet looks back "from the promised land" upon the 
carnage in Europe and searches among heaps of small 
shoes for his sister-bride. He then imagines all the little 
sisters who were killed, before their parents could say good­
bye to them or explain to them that they had not really 
resented the extra burden of weight on the road to death. He 
wishes that he could have 
even in one word 
whispered
that you were no burden to us. 
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On the way. Mother walked heavy.

All your brothers.

And the desperate convoy.

(35) 
In Part Five of the poem, however, the mother's agony is not 
that she was separated from her child on the way to 
execution in the mass graves evoked in part iii of Section 35 
but that her infant never survived the maternity hospital 
that was the starting point of Kovner's imaginative 
journey: 
The Bikur Holim Hospital
walls soaked 
with the smell of sour urine 
and dying hopes. 
In the old hospital 
among walls of red brick 
my sister died. 
She was two hours old. 
(45) 
In the following section, the suffering mother is said to have 
mourned eight years (1940-48, when the State of Israel was 
established) "a daughter / who never came into the world." 
This factual inconsistency in the narrative indicates 
clearly enough that we are dealing not with a single sister-
bride or a single mother but with a generalized account of 
the Holocaust. Kovner's mode of generalizing is something 
like Milton's; that is, he eschews abstract, generalized 
language and limits himself to specific images and concrete 
details, but says that the occurrence might have happened 
this way or that way or yet a third way; except that (unlike 
Milton) he omits the or. A hint of Kovner's intention is given 
in the poem's title itself. In grammatical strictness, the 
Hebrew title should be Ahoti Haktana rather than, as it is, 
Ahoti Ktana; the grammatical anomaly indicates that it is 
not a single little sister we are recalling but all the little 
sisters, born and unborn, who were swallowed up by the 
Holocaust. Long before Kovner heard the shrieks from the 
Tel Aviv maternity ward, his imagination was captured by 
a little girl who had died, yet lived. She was one of the 47,000 
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Jews taken from Vilna to the shooting pits of Ponary. 
Incredibly, she managed to crawl out from among the 
thousands of dead and dying bodies to tell her story. Like a 
myriad of such survivor-witnesses whom we now know 
from the history and literature of the Holocaust, she was 
believed by no one—except for Abba Kovner, who proceeded 
to organize the armed resistance. " . .  . The central fact in 
Kovner's life," according to Shirley Kaufman, "is his 
confrontation with the half-dead, half-crazed girl from the 
mass grave at Ponar. Her face haunts every line he 
writes."19 
The little sister of the narrative finds refuge in the 
convent but also "betrayal / —no island. / Only a folded 
sail in a storm." (15) Unlike the group that took her to the 
convent and was itself later shot by the mobile killing units 
of the Einsatzgruppen, the little sister was "not privileged 
to be condemned to death" and "did not enter a covenant of 
blood" (just as later she is said to be "not privileged to 
see / the light of the day!" [46] But Section 39 seems to say 
that she was turned over to the Germans by the nuns and 
eventually turned into ashes. Her "shorn head" (40) is both 
that of a nun and a death-camp inmate. 
The little sister's varied and contradictory fate is most 
fully explored in Section 28, which describes the 
preparations for her wedding. The brother-narrator here 
stresses her identity as the "sister-bride" of Song of Songs. 
Many of the central images and motifs of Kovner's poem are 
to be found in Solomon's song, especially in its eighth and 
concluding chapter, where the speaker wishes that the 
beloved could be "as my brother, / That sucked the breasts 
of my mother!" The speaker subsequently says of the sister 
that "thy mother was in travail with thee, / There was she 
in travail and brought thee forth." Finally, he asks: "What 
shall we do for our sister / In the day when she shall be 
spoken for?" (a line quoted from in Section 36). 
If, as traditional religious interpretation of Song of Songs 
holds, the sister-bride is no mere figure of romantic love 
poetry but a symbol of the people of Israel, then the little 
sister's wedding would be a reaffirmation of the covenantal 
relationship between God and his Chosen People. Every 
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Jewish wedding, to be sure, is to some extent such a 
reaffirmation, since there is "No man without a wife, 
neither a woman without a husband, nor both of them 
without God" (Genesis Rabbah 8:9). Kovner describes many 
of the customary appurtenances of the wedding ceremony, 
including the braided challah, the dish of honey, and the 
golden chicken soup. But an anomalous element intervenes. 
"The whole world drinks / kosher chicken soup:" Chicken 
soup, however, is not supposed to be drunk until after the 
ceremony, and then only by the bride and groom. Yet the 
canopy, the covering that symbolizes the consummation of 
the marriage, is not present at all, and therefore the "whole 
world" would seem to be celebrating an event that has not 
taken place. The mystery of the world's presence at the 
prematurely celebrated Jewish wedding is resolved in the 
following lines: 
Our father took his bread, bless God, 
forty years from one oven. He never imagined
a whole people could rise in the ovens
and the world, with God's help, go on. 
The world flocks to celebrate a Jewish marriage precisely 
because it is a marriage with death. The Covenant that was 
given at Sinai has been returned in Europe as the whole 
Jewish people returns—in smoke—to the God who did them 
the dubious favor of choosing them as his special people. 
The feeling at this point in Section 28 is similar to that in 
Glatstein's famous poem "Dead Men Don't Praise God": 
"We received the Torah on Sinai / and in Lublin we gave it 
back." But Kovner goes beyond Glatstein. Both feel the 
immediacy of the biblical past and its painful and para­
doxical continuity with the Holocaust present, but Kovner 
feels, and indeed embodies, the future, as well; after the 
givingback in Lublin, there is to be a retrieval in Sinai. Al­
though "the marriage contract will be written in stone" for 
multitudes of little sisters, the canopy missing from this 
wedding of death will again be raised, and raised in the very 
place from which the seemingly dissolved Covenant came, 
the desert of Sinai. 
The marriage contracts are written in stone, the whole 
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vanished Jewish world has become "a choir of stones" (40), 
a huge cemetery. After such material and spiritual ravages, 
is it possible to rebuild, 
to wipe from the lips

the taste.

To bring back

a world of innocence,

as if to its socket a bone

from the foot of the dead.

(32) 
The contrast between the wholeness, unity, and coherence 
of the Dominican convent and the "Jerusalem of 
Lithuania," Vilna, "a city thrust on its back / like a horse 
in blood, jerking its hooves / unable to rise" (17), like the 
contrast in Canopy in the Desert between Saint Catherine's 
Monastery with its 3,000 steps to Sinai and "the kind of 
stuff / Jacob's ladder was made of" (Eighth Gate), is at first 
dispiriting to the poet. He stands amidst the ruins of his 
world and asks, 
With what—

with what, little sister,

shall we weave and draw the dream

now?

(34) 
The question faced by Kovner was not very different from 
the one put to Martin Buber in 1933 by a Christian 
polemicist who asked whether the fulfillment of Jesus' 
prophecy that Jerusalem would be destroyed and never 
again come under Jewish rule did not prove that the 
Covenant between God and the Jews had been abrogated. 
Buber replied as follows: 
I live not far from the city of Worms, to which I am bound by the
tradition of my forefathers; and, from time to time, I go there.
When I go, I first go to the cathedral. It is a visible harmony of
members, a totality in which no part deviates from perfection. I
walk about the cathedral with consummate joy, gazing at it.
Then I go over to the Jewish cemetery consisting of crooked,
cracked, shapeless, random stones. I station myself there, gaze 
upward from the jumble of a cemetery to that glorious
harmony, and seem to be looking up from Israel to the Church. 
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Below, there is no jot of form; there are only the stones, and the
dust lying beneath the stones. The dust is there, no matter how 
thinly scattered. There lies the corporeality of man, which has 
turned to this. There it is. There it is for me. There it is for me, 
not as corporeality within the space of this planet, but as 
corporeality within my own memory, far into the depths of 
history, as far back as Sinai. 
I have stood there, have been united with the dust, and 
through it with the Patriarchs. That is a memory of the 
transaction with God which is given to all Jews. From this the 
perfection of the Christian house of God cannot separate me, 
nothing can separate me from the sacred history of Israel. 
I have stood there and have experienced everything myself; 
with all this death has confronted me, all the dust, all the ruin, 
all the wordless misery is mine; but the covenant has not been 
withdrawn from me. I lie on the ground, fallen like these stones. 
But it has not been withdrawn from me. 
The cathedral is as it is. The cemetery is as it is. But nothing 
has been withdrawn from us.20 
Kovner's answer, albeit it in far more secular terms, is 
also that the Covenant has not been withdrawn from the 
People Israel; but the covenantal relationship must be held 
in abeyance until the remnant of the Jewish people returns, 
spiritually as well as physically, from the Diaspora to the 
original source and site of the Covenant. 
There was no one 
with me there who spoke
or understood my tongue 
cleaving to the roof of my mouth 
(if I forget thee Oh canyon! 
if I forget thee) 
On all my roads 
I imagined I'd find the road 
to you 
(69) 
As this passage from A Canopy in the Desert suggests, the 
canopy missing from the little sister's wedding is to be 
found only in the homeland. The feeling with which we are 
left at the conclusion of My Little Sister has much in 
common with what we feel near the end of the book of 
Leviticus, when God announces that although he will bring 
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his Chosen People to nearly total destruction in the lands of 
their enemies, while their own land "shall lie forsaken 
without them," he will not even then break his Covenant 
with them, or theirs with the land. They have rejected his 
ordinances and abhorred his statutes; "And yet for all that, 
when they are in the land of their enemies, I will not reject 
them, neither will I abhor them, to destroy them utterly, and 
to break My covenant with them. . . .  " When Kovner 
returned to the liberated—and destroyed—Vilna, he found 
amidst the ruins only the eastern wall of the old synagogue, 
and on it an ancient inscription: "Lift up the miracle-
banner for the ingathering of our exiles."21 Already at the 
end of My Little Sister the poet seems to be embarking, with 
the imagined bier of his dead mother, on a ship that cracks 
through the ice floe of the vast cemetery of Europe on its 
journey south, out of exile and toward a renewal of life and 
the Covenant. The First Gate of A Canopy in the Desert, 
published three years later, is entitled "The Return to the 
South," suggesting both the trip to southern Israel, the 
Negev and Sinai, but also the larger return of the Jews of 
Europe from Exile to their homeland. 
That the rebirth in the homeland is to be no clear and 
unambiguous resurrection of life and rediscovery of the 
Covenant is already implicit in My Little Sister. Part Four 
begins with the poet-survivor-brother calling from Israel to 
the unanswering corpse of his sister in Europe: 
From the promised land I called you,

I looked for you

among heaps of small shoes.

At every approaching holiday.

Part Five concludes with the mother who both mourns her 
children and is herself mourned by the son who carries his 
mother's bier away from the ice fields of the European 
cemetery. The mother figure here represents Rachel 
weeping for her children, the centuries-old pain of the 
Jewish mother who bled and suffered in childbirth so that 
murderers should be amply supplied with victims for their 
knives, the shrieking mother in the Tel-Aviv hospital, the 
Israeli mother who mourns her sons fallen in battle, and— 
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not least of all—the poet's memory of his own mother, who 
when he ordered the headquarters of the Vilna resistance 
sealed off, fell against the gate and asked her son in terror 
whether she should remain in Vilna or flee with him into the 
forests: "And I, the commander of the ghetto fighters, could 
not look into her eyes as I answered, 'Mother, I don't know!' 
And so to this very day I don't know whether I am worthy of 
the honor of a ghetto resistance fighter, or the curse of a son 
who abandoned his mother and did not go with her on her 
last road."22 
In Section 46 of My Little Sister the mother whose 
memorial candles "ran out in the ghetto" carries her 
memories of the little sister elsewhere, kindling her "on all 
the seas." Her mourning continues until 1948, when the 
State of Israel is established. The speaker from the 
promised land asks her how she can mourn indiscriminate­
ly both her sons "who were cut down," apparently in the 
War of Independence, and the daughter "who never came 
into the world." Here "never came into the world" seems to 
mean not only never was born but never entered into 
history, died, that is to say, from the point of view of many 
native-born Israelis, a death both passive and meaningless 
because it was not an integral part of world history.23 In 
Canopy in the Desert, the poet himself speaks of the Sinai 
desert as "The one place in the world / where a man will not 
die alone" (79), presumably because here one fights and dies 
for the survival of the Jewish people. But here the mourning 
mother turns aside the accusatory question and repeats, 
with significantly altered words, her earlier reply: "my 
son—she was not privileged to see / the light of the day!" 
The little sister never saw either the literal light of the day or 
the light of the new dawn that emerged in 1948 after the 
darkest night in Jewish history; yet the mother insists that 
her aborted life and her many deaths in the Holocaust are 
inseparable from the life that seems to be starting ab initio 
in the homeland, in Israel. 
In yet another story of mothers and sons disputing over 
the ashes of their destroyed past, Kovner has told of 
a great fire in the house of the parents of the Maggid of 
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Mezeritch, when he was only a child often. His father was not
there. He saw his mother standing in the yard, wringing her
hands as she watched the conflagration and weeping bitterly.
"Mother," he said to her, "do this wooden house and this 
wooden furniture deserve to have you weep over them?" "Son," 
the mother replied, "it is not for the house or the furniture I am
weeping. The scroll of our family pedigree has been left behind
there in thefire." "Don't cry, mother," said the ten-year-old boy.
"I'll write you a new pedigree, starting with me." . . . 
It is said of the Maggid of Mezeritch that later when he was a
grown man, he would hide his face in his hands, whenever he
remembered what he had said to his mother.24 
Part of Kovner's poetic effort to reunite what time and 
history have separated has been his repudiation of what he 
calls the "infantile" Israeli myth of "It starts with me." The 
creative reunion of the People Israel with the land of Israel 
toward which A Canopy in the Desert moves cannot be 
realized unless those memorial candles of Section 46 of My 
Little Sister are replanted in the new soil. The dead sister 
who in the earlier poem was berated for the "offense" of her 
"scalding silence" at holidays now speaks in the desert: 
Don't hand me over to a mute wall 
embalmed in the sounds of words— 
I am the threshold of your holidays.
I am the candles in your forgotten
candlestsicks. . . . 
Make me grow, my love, in soil as naked
as it was created. 
(94) 
Thus the mother who insists on mourning not only her 
sons who were "cut down" but the daughter who never saw 
the light of day is vindicated. The continuity between the 
European past and the Israeli present and future proves to 
be stronger than the discontinuity. This is partly because 
the birth of Israel, like all birth, is inseparable from blood­
shed and suffering: "Can there / be spring without the 
danger?" (93). Thus the little sister who in the earlier poem 
is pitied because "she was not privileged to see / the light of 
the day" is now congratulated for having been saved from a 
terrible knowledge because she was "privileged not to 
66 The Resonance of Dust 
know / a taste of return."(10) The irony hereflows from the 
recognition, present throughout the poem in its many 
references to the three wars Israel had already fought in the 
desert, that the pariah people has become the pariah nation, 
and that the Jews in Israel, like their Diaspora ancestors, 
are destined to be persecuted and to live, if at all, under 
constant threat of destruction. 
Far from returning from darkness to "the light of day," 
the clarity and elevation of the Commandments, the Jewish 
people's return to Sinai to recover the Covenant involves a 
plunge into more darkness and ambiguity. When, in the 
Eighth Gate of Canopy, there is a disagreement between 
two visitors to Saint Catherine's Monastery about the 
wisdom of making the traditional early morning ascent of 
Mount Sinai, the one who refuses to climb says: 
There's nothing
there. Nothing. Except what
cannot be reached 
in the light. (54) 
The reason why God and his Covenant are said to reside 
only in darkness and mystery is that the Jewish people, 
having achieved its difficult return to the promised land, 
now finds itself "mixed up in an unfortunate / ambiguity" 
(58). Having carried the letters of the Covenant back to their 
source for validation and reconsecration, the Jewish people 
finds itself caught in a conflict between the Covenant and 
the historical necessity to survive within history, whose 
overriding commandment is an inversion of the Sinai 
injunction, saying to the Jews of a beleaguered Israel: "You 
may attack your brother / (shalt murder / shalt murder)" 
(63). The "unfortunate ambiguity" is in fact a horrible 
paradox whereby the price of Jewish survival may be the 
surrender of the very reason why Jewish survival was ever 
thought important. 
The reaffirmation of the Covenant in the Sinai, like its 
abrogation in Lublin or Vilna, is sealed in blood. This 
wedding, like the abortive one in My Little Sister, requires 
death as the bride-price: 
in sandstone still 
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red from the drop of the covenant
my voice is wrapped in a package of vows
on a land in its time of bleeding: 
I will pay for a marriage contract with my best 
my chosen from the land. 
(7o) 
This very recognition of the dreadful continuity between 
Israeli experience and that of the Jews during the Holocaust 
compels the survivor to search in the sands of the desert for 
that buried life which is in truth his own and without which 
he cannot guarantee his own survival. 
. .  . I will dig with fingers
down to the flesh the blood 
until I hear their voice a voice 
tearing the desert coming back
split in long burrows
in the dry waste 
that was not destroyed. That won't be destroyed
again 
(27) 
In the poem entitled "From Another Homeland," an Israeli 
soldier fallen in battle in the Sinai makes his last act before 
death the carving of his mother's name in the sand, with a 
gold tooth that is the sign of her murder and mutilation. His 
destruction transplants his destroyed mother from Europe 
to the promised land, where they share the common Jewish 
fate. 
Canopy in the Desert yearns toward, but does not fully 
realize, the consummation of the marriage between past 
and present, Vilna and Sinai, the People Israel and the land 
of Israel. The section (82) in which the canopy missing from 
the wedding in My Little Sister is set up in the desert is 
entitled "A Canopy Fades." The glass is shattered to 
commemorate the destruction of the temple—the original 
khurbn—but the discordant element of burning memorial 
candles is introduced because, as the groom says, "my love 
is not at my side." The hope that the little sister expressed in 
Section 94 to be replanted "in soil as naked / as it was 
created" has not yet been fulfilled, but the poet himself, in 
his effort toward reconstruction, pledges in the last 
numbered section of Canopy in the Desert (96) to take "you, 
68 The Resonance of Dust 
my little sister, . . . on my back. To carry you beyond / my 
naked plot of soil." She will at least be rescued for the 
imagination, a realm that exists beyond the plot of soil. In 
the coda with which he ends the poem, Kovner expresses 
both despair and determination. The eye of his mind 
beholds a dozen scenes that show forth, mysteriously, both 
"abyss within abyss" and "hidden canopies within 
canopies," fire-destruction and fire-consummation. If there 
is, after all, "no voice divine / no king to find," the poet 
wonders: "should I persist"? Within the order of nature he 
discerns a refuge, a plan, a map for all creatures, but "none 
for me." What remains to him is "only the curse," the 
inescapable fate that was assigned to him when it was 
assigned to the 600,000 slaves who 3,300 years earlier made 
the exodus from bondage into the promised land—and the 
new bondage of the Covenant. In the Second Gate of the 
poem, he had sought to evade this fate: 
Before 
I began my image was carved 
in the bedrock. There must be 
a way to get out
to break through! To make a shortcut. 
(9) 
But in the Eighth Gate, he had embraced, in preference to 
the alternative represented by the Christian monastery, the 
subjection of the Covenant that is the precondition of 
Jewish survival: "—will not die! / Will live enslaved" (56). 
This subjection is again embraced in "A Returned Gate," 
when the poet praises "Those who love / and don't want to 
escape." (93) Although not a religious writer like Moshe 
Flinker or Nelly Sachs, Kovner too is possessed of a 
mystical sense of the linkage between Holocaust and 
rebirth, a mystical sense of Jewish existence itself. That 
this sense can exist in Jewish writers of the most rationalist 
cast of mind is proved by the work of the Jewish historian, 
Simon Dubnow, who insisted that: 
Jewry at all times . . . was preeminently a spiritual nation,
and a spiritual nation it continues to be in our own days, 
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too. . . . Jewry, being a spiritual entity, cannot suffer anni­
hilation: the body, the mould, may be destroyed, the spirit is
immortal. Bereft of country and dispersed as it is, the Jewish
nation lives, and will go on living, because a creative principle
permeates it, a principle that is the root of its being and an
indigenous product of its history.25 
Kovner, sharing his view, believes that the return to Sinai 
must be spiritual as well as physical. It therefore entails not 
only the desire to embrace the homeland but the courage to 
reject what Cynthia Ozick has called "the Diaspora of 
freedom," which tempts—the more thoroughly to oblit­
erate—those who seek to escape the burden of Jewish fate.26 
As the poem draws to an end, the curse and the enslavement 
of Jewish history are accepted as inseparable from the 
return to the land from what seemed the nethermost abyss 
of the Holocaust, and as the price of Jewish survival. 
In The Seventh Day (1967), a book of conversations with 
soldiers about the then recently concluded Six-Day War, 
Kovner observed how Israel-born soldiers, who had thought 
nothing more foreign to themselves than the fate of 
European Jewry, kept associating themselves with it in 
the time of crisis. He came to the conclusion that the Six-
Day War had been a turning point in history just because it 
demonstrated to Israelis that their own fate was continuous 
with that of the Jews of Europe, that they too must live with 
the paradox of chosenness, must commit themselves to life 
in defiance of the omnipresence of death. "In the Diaspora," 
he wrote, "fathers didn't bring up their sons to commit 
suicide, or to despair. No one brought up his sons to 
abandon Judaism. They taught them that it was their 
destiny to be persecuted; but, at the same time, they 
educated them to life."27 Kovner, participant in the two 
most important (and wildly improbable) events of modern, 
perhaps of all, Jewish history, seeks to join the Holocaust 
and the return to the homeland by a prodigious feat of poetic 
imagination, which steps into the void left by the divine 
silence to affirm that the Jewish people shall not die, but 
live: "I speak to / myself I speak and speak I'll 
return / I'll return here alive." 
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Jewish history is dull, uninteresting, It has no glory or 
action, no heroes and conquerors, no rulers and masters of 
their fate, just a collection of wounded, hunted, groaning, 
and wailing wretches, always begging for mercy. You can 
see for yourselves that it can't be interesting. The least you 
can say is it's uninteresting. I would simply forbid teaching 
our children Jewish history. Why the devil teach them 
about their ancestors' shame? I would just say to them: 
"Boys, from the day we were driven out from our land we've 
been a people without a history. Class dismissed, Go out and 
play football."—"The Sermon," by Haim Hazaz 
chapter 3 
Between Diaspora and Zion: 
Israeli Holocaust Fiction 
Nowhere does the Holocaust inspire more sympathetic 
interest and remembrance and also more shame and 
revulsion than in Israel. The majority of the survivors live 
in Israel; the major centers of Holocaust research are in 
Israel; most of the world's museums devoted to remem­
bering the victims and their destroyed cultured are in Israel. 
Israel is surely the only country in the world in which a 
national television audience will have its attention riveted 
to a "This Is Your life" program that re-creates the life of a 
survivor of Auschwitz and introduces, among the hero's old 
friends, a woman who recounts the slow killing of her child 
in one of Dr. Mengele's experiments.1 It is the only country 
in the world that annually honors, in formal ceremonies 
throughout the country, the six million Jews murdered by 
the Nazis with siren blasts, flags lowered to half-staff, and 
the prime minister delivering a formal address on the 
historical and moral relation between the Holocaust and 
the people and State of Israel. 
Yet there is another side to the picture. The Day of 
Remembrance is called not only Yom Hashoah (Holocaust 
Day) but also Yom Hagevurah (Heroism Day), as if the 
action of a small handful of ghetto fighters were needed to 
counterbalance the passivity with which the vast majority 
of the victims went to their deaths. According to the Israeli 
writer Matti Megged, most sabras have thought of the 
European Jews contemptuously, as having gone like "sheep 
to the slaughter."2 The formal title of the ceremony that 
takes place at Yad Vashem, as if aware of the omnipresence 
of this slur in Israel, is "Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance 
Day," implying that the millions who were not heroes can 
be made acceptable only if they are thought of as martyrs. 
Yet martyrdom traditionally implies a choice of death 
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rather than abasement of oneself or desecration of God, 
whereas the victims of Hitler had no choice at all; 
conversion to Christianity or even, if that were possible, to 
Nazism would not have saved them. The speech of the prime 
minister on this day generally insists that the State of Israel 
has changed both the Jewish character and the external 
conditions that made the Holocaust possible, so that today 
Jews have both the internal fortitude and the external 
means with which to defend themselves against danger 
from the outside.3 
This mixture of contradictory Israeli attitudes toward the 
Holocaust is an extreme version of the general Israeli 
ambivalence about the relation between Israel's present 
and the Jewish past in the Diaspora, in Exile. Nowhere are 
these contradictory attitudes and the emotions that 
underlie them more brilliantly illuminated than in Haim 
Hazaz's short story "The Sermon" (1942), from which the 
epigraph to this chapter comes. The story does not touch 
explicitly on the Holocaust. Rather, it conveys, through a 
lengthy speech given by a man named Yudka to his fellow 
kibbutz members, the whole problematic relation of Israelis 
to Jewish history. But since the Holocaust represented the 
culmination and also the end of Jewish history in Europe, it 
is safe to assume that the mixed attitudes of revulsion and 
affection that pre-Holocaust Jewish history inspired in 
Israelis like Yudka would be drawn out into their most 
extreme form by the Holocaust itself. 
Although cast in the form of a dramatic monologue in the 
style of a Browning in prose, the story directs attention not 
to the presentation of character but to the exploration of 
"issues." On the surface, Yudka appears to have nothing 
positive to say, nothing to praise either in the Jewish past in 
Diaspora or the present in Israel. Much of his speech is an 
embittered complaint about the past, and yet when, in the 
final pages, he comes to speak of the Zionist present, he is 
resentful at the way in which it has cut itself off from the 
(deplorable) Jewish past. 
In the first part of his speech, this generally silent man 
pours out a long-pent-up revulsion from Jewish history, to 
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which he declares his "opposition." Strictly speaking, he 
maintains, Jews have no history at all because they have 
always been mere instruments of the Gentiles, who were the 
great movers and shakers of the world. Jewish history, so-
called, is an unending tale of misery and woe, of passive 
suffering; it has no heroes, and endlessly chronicles the 
consequences of powerlessness. It then has the gall to take 
pride in just how much suffering the Jews have undergone 
and perversely to make a kind of ersatz heroism out of 
despair, as if it were somehow a virtue to have suffered. 
" 'See what great torments I withstand! See what untold 
shame and humiliation I suffer! Who can compare with 
me?' " Some Jews, he says, even have come to the 
conclusion that persecution itself keeps the Jewish people 
alive, and that without it they could not exist.4 Such Jews, 
Jews with the Diaspora mentality, believe that "a Jew 
without suffering is an abnormal creature, hardly a Jew at 
all, half a goy. . . .  " For Yudka the Jewish attachment to 
suffering is a badge of final degradation, self-degradation, 
because in truth "everything is rotten around suffering. 
. . . History, life itself, all actions, customs, the group, the 
individual, literature, culture, folk songs . . . everything!" 
The Jewish attachment to suffering, the Jews' belief that 
there is even a kind of greatness and heroism in their 
suffering that raises them in stature above those who act 
within history, is, according to Yudka, the foundation stone 
of the Exile. So debased are the generality of Jews that they 
have inverted their own theology and fallen in love with 
Exile, which is to them sacred, "more Jewish than 
Jerusalem." If martyrdom is the base of the pyramid of 
Exile, then the belief in the Messiah is its peak, the 
crowning, fantastic myth that for two thousand years has 
given the Jews their justification for doing nothing to 
forward their redemption. "If not for this myth it would all 
have been different. For then, they would finally have had 
to go right back to Palestine, or . .  . pass on out of the 
world." As it was, the messianic myth convinced them that 
they were prohibited to "force the end" and must remain in 
Exile until Heaven chose to redeem them. If any further 
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proof than the myth itself were needed that the Jews do not 
really want to be saved and to return to the land of their 
fathers, it would be the folk tradition grafted onto the myth 
that says that a great catastrophe must immediately 
precede the redemption. What could better show forth the 
underlying fear of redemption, of returning to the land of 
Israel? 
All of these tortured complaints against his people and 
their traditions would seem to make Yudka a spokesman for 
Zionist self-affirmation at the expense of Diaspora Jewry, 
self-fascinated by its very degradation. But here Yudka 
veers off in the opposite direction. Maybe Diaspora Jewry is 
right to be afraid. "What if it's true that Judaism can 
manage to survive somehow in Exile, but here, in the Land 
of Israel, it's doubtful? . . . What if this country is fated to 
take the place of religion, if it's a grave danger to the 
survival of the people, if it replaces an enduring center with 
a transient center . . . ?" If Judaism before survived for all 
the wrong reasons, perhaps now that all those external 
pressures and the suffering they brought and the kind of 
character they formed are removed, the Jewish people will 
cease to exist. Yudka now, to the considerable surprise of his 
fellow-kibbutzniks, launches into an attack on Zionism as 
the real uprooting of the Jewish people. If Zionism has at its 
base a revulsion from the experiences and values of the 
Diaspora, which has encompassed Jews for two thousand 
years, is not Zionism itself anti-Jewish? "To my mind, if I 
am right, Zionism and Judaism are not at all the same, but 
two things quite different from each other, and maybe even 
two things directly opposite to each other! At any rate, far 
from the same. When a man can no longer be a Jew, he 
becomes a Zionist." 
Ironically, when Yudka charges that the land of Israel 
already is no longer Jewish, he is complaining precisely 
about the removal of all those aspects of Diaspora Judaism 
he had declared reprehensible during the first part of his 
speech. But the irony, we must remember, lies not only in 
Yudka or in the Palestinian Jews whom he represents but in 
the paradox that is Israel itself, all the more so in the 
aftermath of the Holocaust. Zionism had its roots deep in 
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Jewish tradition, yet predicated its success on a repudiation 
of the unworthy culture of the ghetto and shtetl that it held, 
in any case, to be doomed by the acrid dissolvents of 
Western culture. It sought to weaken the idea that the return 
to the land of Israel had to wait upon some great 
catastrophe that would bring the end of days, but it 
succeeded in establishing a state only after (though not 
because)5 the Jewish people suffered the greatest catas­
trophe it had ever known and not merely the culture but 
most of the inhabitants of the ghetto and shtetl were 
destroyed. Somewhere between Yudka's extreme revulsion 
from Diaspora culture and his extreme insistence that a 
Zionism which rejects this culture is no longer Jewish the 
whole range of attitudes we shall meet in Israeli Holocaust 
fiction is encompassed. 
Yehuda Amichai's novel of 1963, Not of This Time, Not of 
This Place, is not only the first major example of Israeli 
Holocaust fiction but, to judge by what has followed it, 
seems to contain within itself almost the whole potentiality 
of the genre. There are few important themes of Israeli 
Holocaust novels subsequent to Amichai's that are not 
adumbrated in this book: the desire of the German-born but 
Israeli-bred hero to recover his past and to avenge the 
murder of his family and friends; the frustration of revenge 
due to the Jewish incapacity for normal hatred; sabra 
(native-born Israeli) shame for, and disgust with, Jewish 
survivors of the Nazis; the distraction from historical 
mission into personal relations, especially sexual ones; the 
conflict between the longing to forget, and the compulsion 
to remember, the past; the paradoxical relation between the 
German death-factories producing Jewish corpses and the 
peacetime factories producing the German "economic 
miracle"; the nature and extent of German guilt. Amichai 
made available all these themes for those who have 
followed him: Bartov, Gouri, Ben-Amotz, Kaniuk. Most 
important of all perhaps, Amichai initiated the practice of 
concentrating attention on the moral questions that arise in 
the aftermath of the Holocaust while tacitly assuming that 
imaginative re-creation or simulation of the victims' unique 
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experience is beyond the reach of art. "Ruth had seen many 
horrors before she died. Those who died like her removed 
many of the horrors from the world; they had seen these 
horrors and taken them along into their great oblivion, the 
scenes of carnage and the images of their murderers." 
Not of This Time, Not of This Place tells the story of Joel, 
an Israeli archeologist of German birth, who, as the novel 
opens, finds himself in a state of spiritual dryness and 
vacillation. He is faced with the necessity to decide whether 
to spend his vacation at home in Jerusalem pursuing love 
(and forgetfulness), or in Germany seeking to recover his 
buried life and to take revenge against those who buried it. 
This seemingly trivial decision is in fact symbolic of the two 
paths open to the Israeli who would know the truth about 
his moral and spiritual relation to the Holocaust. Amichai 
approaches the question through a technical device that 
symbolizes and tries to represent the two choices available. 
He splits his hero into a narrator, who returns to Germany 
in search of his childhood and of revenge against those who 
mutilated it, and a third-person incarnation, also Joel, who 
stays behind in Jerusalem and falls in love with an 
American doctor, a Christian. This technical device is 
clever and enables Amichai to render more successfully 
than most of the Israelis who have followed him the Israeli 
reality, which in Bartov and Ben-Amotz, for example, 
comes, and very feebly, through flashbacks coursing 
through the minds of characters who are in Italy and 
Germany. 
But the device has its drawbacks as well as its advan­
tages. Having multiplied his hero, Amichai cannot resist 
the temptation to multiply other things as well, and to imply 
symbolic parallels at every turn. Joel's wife is named Ruth, 
and so was the childhood sweetheart whose story he seeks 
in Germany; he himself insists on renaming yet a third 
character Ruth.6 In Jerusalem, we meet an Israeli concen­
tration camp survivor who partially conceals his blue 
numbers with a mermaid tattoo, the concealment ex­
pressing his wish "to forget the past," its partiality 
expressing his wish "to remember the past." In his home 
Between Diaspora and Zlon 79 
town of Weinburg, Germany, Joel assaults a supposed Nazi 
whose tattoo turns out to be this very same mermaid. 
Melvin, the husband of the Jerusalem Joel's American 
mistress Patricia, was the commander of the American unit 
that destroyed Weinburg during the war. The Joel who goes 
back to Weinburg now meets Melvin in his new role as 
director of afilm about the Holocaust. To the Weinburg Joel, 
Melvin seems the potent man of destruction, he himself the 
impotent, vacillating Hamlet-figure; to the Jerusalem Joel, 
seducer of Melvin's wife, Melvin appears in quite another 
guise. This merciless proliferation of symbolic linkages, 
intended to demonstrate what George Eliot once called the 
interconnectedness of all human fates, sometimes comes 
close to obliterating the main lines of the novel (which are 
complicated enough). One reason why this novel can stand 
as a kind of paradigm for all Israeli Holocaust novels is that 
it is overly busy. 
There is a wry humor as well as significance in the fact 
that Amichai's protagonist is an archaeologist by profes­
sion. It is a well-known fact that archaeology is virtually the 
national pastime of Israel. This would seem to imply a 
national recognition that the fullness of present life is a 
function of its continuity with the past. But the past that 
Israeli archaeologists dig up is the past of ancient Israel, a 
civilization buried for thousands of years, rather than the 
past of their own parents and grandparents, whose dust lies 
in quite a different place. The deep-seated resistance to 
knowing this immediate past is epitomized early in the 
novel by a girl named Einat. She does not recognize the 
numbers half-concealed on Yosel's arm by the mermaid 
tattoo. "Born among the orange groves of Sharon," she is 
contemptuous of girls with "Jewish" names like Leah or 
Rachel or Ruth: " 'They remained in the Diaspora.' " Einat 
is proud of herself and much beloved of tourists because 
" 'she doesn't look Jewish at all.' " Einat represents Israeli 
rejection of the yoke of Jewish identity, the burden of the 
Jewish past that is not to be found through Palestinian 
archaeology or the Negev excavations she wants Joel to 
show her. "She was fed up with the talk about the Jews of 
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Europe—all this literature about the heder and synagogue 
and Feierberg and Mendele that she had been made to study 
as a child. She was almost an antisémite, she said, and had 
her reasons, for she was employed afternoons in an office of 
former concentration-camp inmates." She too will 
reappear, with another name, in Germany. 
The Joel who returns to Germany, like the Israeli 
archaeologist he is, searches for his roots, but in a different 
time and a different place from ancient Israel. His return to 
Germany is a return to his childhood. He wants to find out in 
all its terrible particularity how his childhood love Ruth, an 
amputee, was arrested, deported, and burned. He also 
learns, through investigation, how many of his other 
classmates, now "attached to my heart with terrible hooks," 
had been killed. But soon he feels that it would be a sacrilege 
to turn this trip into just one more archaelogical expedition. 
"Archaeology consists only of digging and restoring. A 
destroyed city is uncovered and soot is found on the bricks 
and stones, and one says that this city has been conquered; 
this city has been burned; slaughter was done in this city. 
But there is neither compassion nor desire to avenge. I, too, 
had reached this point, as if the purpose of my coming here 
was merely to reconstruct Ruth's last years." Catharsis 
cannot come through knowledge but requires action as well, 
for memories, unless they issue in action, become an acid 
that consumes the rememberer. 
Joel's inability to carry out vengeance arises not, as in 
other novels dealing with this subject, from the alleged 
difficulty of distinguishing guilty from innocent Germans. 
On the contrary, he assumes that everybody in Weinburg 
except the American tourists could have been involved in 
burning Jews. The much-praised politeness of the Germans 
does nothing to blur the recognition that "if my father 
hadn't taken us out of the city in the early thirties, these 
courteous people would have sent us to the crematoria." 
When Joel questions a railroad official about his role in the 
transports of Jews, the official cracks under the question­
ing, "like the evil king in Hamlet." Both literally and 
figuratively, the German economic "miracle" is built on the 
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ruins of the Jewish world. A supermarket is being built on 
the site of the Weinburg Jewish school and synagogue, in 
whose ruins this vacationing archaeologist finds the 
sermons of Ruth's rabbi father. A film of the Holocaust, 
complete with deportation scenes and mass shootings 
staged at gravesides, provides the ultimate example of 
industry and art living off the dead, and thriving in the 
process. 
What paralyzes Joel and causes procrastination and 
inaction is not uncertainty but incapacity, the incapacity to 
hate. A sympathetic nun who says of the Germans, " 'All 
are guilty,' " asks him, " 'Have you learned to hate?' " 
" 'Not yet,' " he replies. Does he too, despite his Israeli 
experience of combat, suffer from the inherited Jewish 
disability? He goes into a hotel and notices people eating 
from big platters of venison, rabbit, and other hunters' 
delicacies. "Me, I eat only sheep led to slaughter, submissive 
cattle bellowing, stupid chickens. . . .  " This has been his 
nourishment; he cannot be other than he is. He cannot exact 
the vengeance that he had hoped would enable him "to 
return to Jerusalem strengthened and unraveled like a 
complex riddle that had been solved." 
The ultimate meaning of Joel's experience in Weinburg 
may rest in his encounters with another German-born 
Israeli (or ex-Israeli) named Leonora. She is the Weinburg 
version of Einat, the antisemitic sabra. She too is the 
beloved of tourists, and in fact models for posters that urge 
people to "Visit Romantic Germany." Also like Einat, she 
does not "look Jewish," and in fact was saved, at age six, by 
a German officer because of her "Nordic" features. She 
competes in the Weinburg skating tournament in the 
category of "stateless participants" who come in the wake 
of the standard-bearers of the different countries. She will 
not return to Israel: " 'I have nothing there. I like it here.' " 
For her devotion, she is rewarded with a role in the 
aforementioned movie: she makes love to a Gestapo 
commander while beyond the wall a Jew is shown being 
tortured. This is the fate of the spiritual counterpart of 
Einat, the "non-Jewish" Israeli who believes herself to have 
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been born not from the Jewish people but from the sand of 
the desert. The Israeli who cuts herself off from the 
European Jewish past does not thereby join the past of 
ancient Israel, but the world of the Gentiles, which in a very 
imperfect universe may well mean the world of the Nazis. 
The Joel who stays in Jerusalem immerses himself in his 
love affair with Patricia. He seeks to escape the burden of 
the Holocaust past, and even the burdens of consciousness 
itself, through sexual passion. The love affair, as Robert 
Alter has pointed out,7 is intended to cover over ugly reality 
in the same way that the tattooed mermaid covers the blue 
numbers on the arm of the concentration camp survivor. 
Yet the detail with which Amichai traces the development 
of this romance seems excessive, and in a curious way 
analogous to the insufficiently intense concentration of the 
hero himself on the task of revenge, which does often get in 
the way of personal relations. 
But the Joel who stays in Jerusalem, pursuing pleasure 
and averting his gaze from his own past and that of his 
people, is destroyed. Within a few hours of that moment in 
his affair with Patricia where "they attained perfection in 
their love," this Joel goes off to do some work in the 
Archaeology Building of the now largely abandoned 
campus of the Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus, which 
between 1948, when Jordanian forces overran East 
Jerusalem, and 1967 was in occupied territory and was 
accessible only to a few Israelis with permission from the 
UN. As he is wandering through the overgrown botanical 
garden, he looks out at the Dead Sea and feels at peace with 
himself and with the world. "Just then a mighty explosion 
rocked the mountain and a cloud of dust and smoke 
rose. . . . When they reached Joel, he was already dead." 
For the Joel who takes refuge from the specters of Hitler's 
war against the Jews, for any Israeli who does so, there is 
also no peace and no immersion in sheer presentness. Joel 
has been killed by stumbling over " 'an old mine . . . from 
another war apparently . . . not of this time. . . . ' " 
The Joel who goes back to Jewry's European experience 
to reconstruct the last years of his childhood sweetheart's 
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life discovers that digging up the past can be enlightening 
but also dangerous. Nevertheless, it is the Joel who stays in 
Jerusalem rather than confronting his and his people's past 
who is destroyed. Jerusalem, itself, moreover, is inherited 
by the Joel who has left it, who has delved into the past 
because that is the only way of living fully and honestly in 
the present. He has left, but left only in order to return, for 
"he who does not go forth cannot return." 
But if the Jerusalem Joel's death by a mine left from 
Israel's War of Independence is a symbol of separation 
between himself and his alter ego, it may also be viewed as a 
symbol of the paradoxical union between the age-old 
Jewish experience in Diaspora and the Israeli experience in 
the homeland. Amichai's own sense of the relation between 
the Jews of Israel and their European past is expressed in 
his poem entitled "Jews in the Land of Israel," which begins 
with a reflection, of a sort very common in modern Israeli 
literature, on the signification of the names of Israeli 
citizens: 
We forget where we came from. Our Jewish 
Names from the exile reveal us, 
Bring up the memory of flower and fruit, medieval cities,
Metals, knights that became stone, roses mostly,
Spices whose smells dispersed, precious stones, much red,
Trades gone from the world.
(The hands, gone too). 
The poet then stumbles over, and is momentarily halted by, 
a recognition that in some sense the Jews are strangers in 
their homeland, to which they have brought as baggage 
mainly their suffering: 
What are we doing here on our return with this pain.
The Longings dried up with the swampland,
The desert flowers for us and our children are lovely. 
But here too, as Israelis have long since discovered, Jews 
live, just as they did in Europe, in the most precarious state, 
without ease, without happiness, without peace. The poet 
therefore comes to rest in the conviction that Jews have 
taken root in their homeland precisely because their 
centuries-long experience of suffering in the Diaspora is 
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being continued in the land of Israel, and is an unsettling 
confirmation of the Covenant itself, whose original marks 
were the blood and pain of circumcision: 
Spilt blood isn't roots of trees,
But it's the closest to them 
That man has. 
The Brigade, by Hanoch Bartov (1965), is a novel that 
tries, albeit without sufficient concentration and single­
mindedness, to penetrate to the heart of Israel's continuing 
crisis of national identity by studying the response of 
Palestinian Jews to the just-completed slaughter of their 
Diaspora brethren when they enter Europe as part of the 
army of occupation upon the victory of the Allies in June 
1945. Here, as in Amichai's novel, we are concerned with the 
moral and metaphysical relations between the Israeli 
(strictly speaking, the Palestinian) Jew and the Jewish 
victims and German perpetrators of the Holocaust. But here 
the Israeli is epitomized not by the archaeologist but by the 
soldier, who has been defending his homeland by force of 
arms while his fellow Jews in Europe have been (or so it 
seems) the passive victims of genocide. 
The spiritual background of this novel may be provided 
by two stories emanating from the Warsaw Ghetto, one 
little known, the other virtually an Israeli sacred memory. 
The first, recorded in Emmanuel Ringelblum's Notes from 
the Warsaw Ghetto and also in Chaim Kaplan's Warsaw 
Diary, is an account of an eight-year-old Jewish girl in a 
refugee center who screamed with a mad frenzy: " 'I want to 
steal, I want to rob, I want to eat, I want to be a German.' "8 
In extremity, the anecdote implies, the victim can survive 
only by emulating his torturer; the atmosphere of bar­
barism infects even the primary victims of the barbarians. 
The second story is the account of the uprising of the Jews of 
the Warsaw Ghetto, an uprising unprecedented in modern 
Jewish history; for after two millennia of submission to 
their fate, the Jews, on 19 April 1943, were using force 
against their enemies. 
The Warsaw uprising was, to be sure, very belated. In 
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September 1942, shortly after the children of Janusz 
Korczak's orphanage were taken away, 310,000 Jews were 
deported from the ghetto to the death camps. In mid-
October, Ringelblum asked himself in bitter reproach: 
"Why didn't we resist when they began to resettle 300,000 
Jews from Warsaw? Why did we allow ourselves to be led 
like sheep to the slaughter? Why did everything come so 
easy to the enemy? Why didn't the hangmen suffer a single 
casualty? Why could 50 S.S. men (some people say even 
fewer), with the help of a division of some 200 Ukrainian 
guards and an equal number of Letts, carry the operation 
out so smoothly?" In November, he wrote in a similar vein: 
"The Jews . . . calculate now that going to the slaughter 
peaceably has not diminished the misfortune, but increased 
it. Whomever you talk to, you hear the same cry: The 
resettlement should never have been permitted. We should 
have run out into the street, have set fire to everything in 
sight, have torn down the walls, and escaped to the Other 
Side. The Germans would have taken their revenge. It 
would have cost tens of thousands of lives, but not 300,000. 
Now we are ashamed of ourselves, disgraced in our own 
eyes, and in the eyes of the world, where our docility earned 
us nothing."9 
Yet even after the recognition became widespread that 
Jewish powerlessness, rather than mollifying the enemy, 
encouraged him, many opposed physical resistance as 
antithetical to the Jewish character, a desecration. We 
recall Alexander Donat's friend in the ghetto who argued: 
" 'For two thousand years we have served mankind with 
the word, with the Book. Are we now to try to convince 
mankind that we are warriors?' " By the time people chose 
to resist, eighty-five percent of the ghetto Jews were already 
dead. What made the uprising unique, according to Donat, 
was that it was undertaken without any hope of victory 
whatever. Its purpose was not so much to save lives as to 
return the Jews to history, to make of them something other 
than victims. "Although we were all doomed to a terrible 
death, we were gripped by a strange ecstasy. . .  . I felt we 
were going to die but I felt a part of the stream of Jewish 
86 The Resonance of Dust 
history."10 That the Warsaw resistance was an epoch-
making event for Jewish history became clear not at that 
time nor at that place, but five years later in Palestine. In 
1948, the kibbutz named after the leader of the Warsaw 
ghetto uprising, Mordecai Anielewicz, held out—against all 
expectation and probability—for five days against an 
invading Egyptian army, and as a result the recently born 
state was saved. As Emil Fackenheim has pointed out, "The 
battle for Yad Mordecai had begun in the streets of 
Warsaw."11 The Warsaw Ghetto uprising, teaching the 
lesson that in the long run nothing undertaken from a sense 
of justice is practically useless, became to the Jews of 
Palestine the crucial event of the Holocaust years, out­
weighing the horror and "shame" of the fate of the great 
majority of the victims, who did not resist. 
The Palestinian Jews who form the brigade of Bartov's 
novel have been sent to Europe officially for the purpose of 
rescuing the survivors and expediting their movement from 
the displaced persons camps to Palestine. But many of them 
in fact give priority to revenge over rescue. One character 
says that from the time his family fled Europe he dreamt 
only of returning through the battle lines and turning the 
tables on the Germans. Another, named Giladi, says that 
the Jewish Brigade has come " 'not for Roosevelt's free­
doms or the British Empire or Stalin . We're here to take 
revenge. One wild Jewish vengeance. Just once to be like the 
Tartars. like the Ukranians. Like the Germans.' " Even the 
chaplain of the brigade insists that the dead cannot be 
remembered nor their honor redeemed except through 
vengeance, " 'for he that avengeth blood hath remembered 
them; he hath not forgotten the cry of the humble.' " 
But the brigade's leader, Tamari, keeps insisting that 
revenge distracts the brigade from its true mission, which is 
rescue. The ten commandments for a Hebrew soldier on 
German soil piously proclaim that the very act of coming 
into Germany as part of an army of occupation, with the 
Jewish flag and emblem as military insignia, constitutes 
vengeance; and the ninth commandment particularly 
enjoins the soldiers to " 'remember your mission: The rescue 
of Jews, immigration to a free homeland.' " Every act of 
revenge, Tamari warns, will interfere with their central 
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purpose of bringing the survivors to Palestine, where they 
can become a part of the only future left to Jews as Jews. 
The idea of a collective act of revenge against the German 
people is not merely the fantasy of the novelist, nor was it in 
actuality the impulse of a mad sadist or two. Yehuda Bauer, 
in his study of the Brichah movement, the underground 
organization that worked to bring 300,000 Jewish survivors 
of the Holocaust, through illegal immigration, from Europe 
to Palestine, has described in detail the conflict between 
those whose sole commitment was to flight and those 
committed both to flight and revenge. The faction led by 
Abba Kovner was revolted by the way in which the 
remnants, the inheritors, of the destroyed Jewish communi­
ty were now investing all their energies in the establish­
ment of committees, the shuffling of papers, the tedious 
paraphernalia of organized community life. Kovner and his 
group of partisans had for some time considered suicide, 
believing that once the war was over they could best show 
their solidarity with the victims, their respect for those 
tragic experiences, by joining the dead. Only the prospects 
of revenge and flight—in that order—could validate 
existence after the destruction: 
Life seemed justified only if some attempt was made to take
revenge on the German people in such a way as to leave a
lasting impression on its history and show that Jewish blood
would not be spilled in vain. There was no point in simply
killing a few, or even a few hundred, known Nazis. In the
darkness of the despair of men and women who had seen their
people—practically all their people—brutally massacred, the
only meaning of revenge, and therefore of life, could be the 
mass destruction of Germans in the same way that the 
Germans had murdered Jews. The Germans had given rise to
Nazism. Millions of Germans must have known, millions 
therefore should suffer. This could only be done by using 
poison.12 
This poet's vision of death and revenge (not unlike the 
catastrophic fire dreamed into being by the poet Mordi in 
Haim Gouri's The Chocolate Deal) had considerable 
support within the Brichah movement (although it could 
not be spoken of openly) but it failed to win the majority, 
who moved away from Kovner and his followers toward 
more "practical" objects. 
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In The Brigade, the continuing debate between rescue 
and revenge hinges less on the desire of the would-be 
avengers to find a raison d'etre than on their need to 
separate themselves from the Jews who have been victims. 
Their hatred for the Germans is real, and they have a strong 
and immediate sense, again rather like Mordi's in The 
Chocolate Deal, of Germany as Sodom and Gomorrah, a 
country of " 'butchers and their henchmen, . . . the people 
who applauded them, . . . who welcomed the slaughter 
and grew fat on the spoil. . . . ' " But it is the Germans' 
victims by whom they feel themselves to have been tainted, 
the centuries-long Jewish " 'nightmare of helplessness' " 
from which they desire to awake. These would-be avengers 
have come back to Europe to destroy Germans, but before 
they can reach the battle lines, the Germans have sur­
rendered. Yet what they fear is that it is less this accident 
of timing than their own Jewish character that frustrates 
the desire for revenge. They measure their success in 
separating themselves from the pacific and passive ethos 
of European Jewry by their ability to retaliate the injuries 
inflicted upon the very people from whom they wish to 
distinguish themselves. 
By a strange paradox, the Jews of Palestine, who did far 
more than any other segment of world Jewry to save the 
remnants of European Jewry, are the most eager to separate 
themselves from European Jewry's life-principle. Elisha 
Kruk, the novel's narrator-hero, meets one of his relatives 
among the survivors and is astonished to find that this man 
managed to survive by working in the crematorium of a 
death-camp. "I was filled with revulsion at the thought of 
being connected with him." Covered with shame at the 
thought that he is related to such a creature, Elisha flees 
him as quickly as possible. Later, he confesses, of his 
relation to the survivors in general, that " 'I want to love 
their burnt faces, but I can't. I walk among them and I don't 
recognize a one. They're all strangers to me.' " If these 
people are Jews, can he be one? If these people are Jews, 
does he want to be one? 
To Jews who believe they have reentered history because 
they belong to the first Jewish community in two thousand 
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years to control its own fate, the shattered Jews of the 
European Diaspora must seem strangers. The Jews of 
Europe, especially of Eastern Europe, which contained the 
great reservoir of Jewish population before the Holocaust, 
had indeed been, as the speaker in Hazaz's story says, a 
collection of wounded, hunted, groaning wretches. But 
according to their ideal conception of themselves, they had 
managed to thrive, not merely in spite, but in a way because, 
of their difficulties, suffering, dependence. This ideal 
conception expressed itself, according to Irving Howe, in 
the great themes of Yiddish literature: "the virtue of 
powerlessness, the power of helplessness, the company of 
the dispossessed, the sanctity of the insulted and the 
injured. . . . "13 "Normality" and self-sufficiency were for 
the majority of these Jews fantastical notions, notions 
suitable to, for example, Zionists, who could contemptuous­
ly be dismissed (in happier days than ours) as "those people 
[who] wish to be happy."14 
Growing up in the beleaguered yishuv, Elisha had sought 
to leap backward over Diaspora Jewry to his biblical 
ancestors, and had on one occasion voiced his disgust with 
the Jewish tradition and literature of martyrdom, en­
treating: " 'Let's be just a little like we are in the Old 
Testament for once. . .  . A little "eye for an eye," amen. A 
little of "the sins of the fathers on the children," amen. A 
little innocent blood under our fingernails so that for once 
we can have something to be sorry for, to really be ashamed 
of.' " Nevertheless, Elisha declines every opportunity that 
presents itself for revenge against the Germans. He and his 
friend Brodsky take a room in the elegant home of the 
family of an S.S. man but are unable to wreak vengeance on 
the defenseless women. When some of the brigade do 
attempt a rape, Elisha actually saves the women from his 
comrades by gunpoint. "I couldn't do it, couldn't stand to 
see a girl raped. Couldn't take it—my delicate Jewish soul." 
Elisha finds that he is saddled with the traditional Jewish 
disabilities, tied more closely to his immediate ancestors in 
Europe than to the heroes of the Bible: "We were soft 
weaklings, warped Diaspora Jews." 
Elisha's reaction, and presumably Bartov's, to this 
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discovery of the continuity between Israeli and Jewish 
identity is a complicated one. There is no attempt to hide the 
sense of frustration at being unable to take revenge, or to 
soften the awareness that this failure to take vengeance will 
plague him like an incubus for the rest of his days. Neither 
does Elisha follow his Eastern European ancestors in 
interpreting impotence wholly as a virtue and an occasion 
for self-congratulation; it is even called a sickness at one 
point. But Elisha recognizes that chosenness involves 
distinction, and that no distinction can be more important 
than that between Jew and German. Jewish identity offers 
no way out, but only a choice between two curses, the curse 
of history and that of God. If the Jews can take revenge only 
by thinking and acting like the Nazis, " 'that would be more 
than ironic,' " says one character, " 'it would be history's 
curse.' " Instead, the Israeli must live with the paradox of 
chosenness: "Now I knew: such were we, condemned to 
walk the earth with the image of God stamped on our 
foreheads like the mark of Cain. . . . Like a camel's hump, 
beneath which I and all of us would have to walk forever as 
beneath the coat of arms of a knight: 'How can we beat them 
if we become like them?' " The Israeli is still a Jew, and the 
Jew is forbidden to become a German. The voyage of the 
Jewish Brigade to Europe was after all a test not of the 
ability to take revenge but to resist temptation: "Thank God 
I did not destroy myself in Germany, thank God that was 
beyond me. I am what I am." 
The main problem with this formulation is that the 
Israeli's recognition of his indelible Jewish character grows 
less out of his experience of actual European Jewish 
survivors of the Holocaust than out of a revulsion from the 
act of vengeance against helpless Germans. The survivors 
have already departed from the novel when the hero comes 
to recognition of his ultimate identity with them. 
Nevertheless, Gouri has succeeded in making this en­
counter with the Holocaust an instrument for under­
standing the difficulties inherent in the Israeli's self-
definition as a Jew. For it is not just the members of the 
Jewish brigade but all the Jews of the State of Israel who 
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can find no resting place between the two extremes: the 
Diaspora worship of the purity of powerlessness and the 
prophet's injunction to uproot Amalek "utterly." 
Compared with the other examples of Israeli Holocaust 
fiction, Haim Gouri's The Chocolate Deal (1965) is a novel of 
almost ascetic severity. Gouri does not indulge in ex­
planations, or atmospheres, or descriptions, or even coher­
ence. The world of circumstantial reality has only the barest 
existence in this book, which is so bleak and abstract as to 
make it nearly unrecognizable as a novel. It is the one 
Israeli work of Holocaust fiction that carries to its logical 
and perhaps absurd extreme the view that a literary work 
that seeks to embody a world from which coherence, order, 
and logic have fled should itself be incoherent, disordered, 
and illogical. If one's subject is supreme disorder, Gouri 
assumes, that subject should not be contained within an 
orderly framework. The frustration experienced by the 
writer who seeks to encompass the Holocaust within an 
imaginative mould should be felt by his readers as well— 
and there can be few readers of The Chocolate Deal who 
have not felt frustrated by the elusiveness of the story, 
dialogue, and ultimate meaning of this remarkable book. 
The tentativeness with which the setting, characters, and 
story are set forth is such that any description of the novel 
must be hedged about with "apparently," for there is here 
little that is certain, tangible, definite. The temptation is 
strong to dismiss Gouri's book with Matthew Arnold's 
sensible dictum: "One gains nothing on the darkness 
by being . .  . as incoherent as the darkness itself." 
Nevertheless, the temptation should be resisted. 
The story is set in the ruins—"the motionless remains"— 
of a city that we are invited (though not required) to call 
Germany after the war. We begin with a reunion between 
two Jewish survivors, Rubi Krauss and Mordi Neuberg. 
According to one of the several disembodied voices of the 
narrative (none of which may be safely identified as the 
novelist's), Mordi has been hopelessly defeated and 
diminished by his suffering and the loss of his family and 
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his people. For him the decision to survive is itself 
problematic. The process of recovery, he thinks, involves 
reaching the "level of the pampered who allow themselves 
refusal or preference." Out of pity for himself, he has 
momentarily pushed aside the terrible questions pressing 
on him and made the existential decision: " 'I choose, 
therefore I am Mordi.' " His friend Rubi is eager to look for 
relatives, especially a lawyer named Salomon. But Mordi, 
knowing that everyone (and, he assumes, everything) is 
dead, tries to discourage him from the attempt. Meanwhile, 
they take shelter in an abandoned warehouse in the 
courtyard of the Convent of the Merciful Sisters. Shelter is 
necessary because events of biblical enormity are taking 
place: "Outside the flood begins." 
"Before the flood," we learn, Mordi had gone "west," that 
is, had left the Jewish world to pursue Western European 
culture, and had written a doctoral thesis on troubadour 
poetry. His professor had helped him to find refuge in a 
monastery, and left him with the prophetic warning, which 
also justifies the temporal scheme of the novel, that " 'just 
as there are earthquakes, so there are, among men, 
timequakes.' " This time is out of joint, and nothing can 
ever set it right, least of all the efforts of poets and artists. 
"Who," asks a voice, "can talk about paintings now? Who 
has a head for paintings?" The book's official represen­
tative of time and memory, of the lingering possibility of 
coherently linking the present with the pre-Holocaust past, 
is one Schechter, "the uncrowned King," a watchmaker 
who owns no watch. But it is Mordi, the representative of 
art, who speaks against meaning and against hope. This 
former poet even warns Rubi against saddling himself with 
so negative a spirit, one who might turn him into "a total 
wanderer in a world of chaos, a world where even the song of 
a bird will seem sin's accomplice to you. . . .  " 
Yet at the outset of the book Mordi himself is willing to 
consider the possibility of a new beginning. Thus, in the one 
passage in the novel in which Gouri allows himself to 
participate in so plebeian an impulse of Israeli Holocaust 
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writing as the desire to redeem disaster in Europe through 
rebirth in Palestine, Mordi asks: 
What's certain? Maybe we'll go from here to another land, we'll
go and try it out. Meanwhile we can look for an address. It's not 
easy, I know. Many houses are shut and covered with soot, and 
others are too blown open. But in the meantime we have to
move and think and change. We'll go and adjust ourselves 
accordingly. Perhaps we'll succeed, and then we'll be so 
different and far away we can make a new start in a new place.
We'll get other clothes. Get other names. 
This is the first and the last time in the novel that Mordi 
expresses anything that resembles a desire to join again the 
world that had so recently spat him out. 
The crucial piece of action in the novel occurs near the 
beginning of the book, even though its pivotal character is 
revealed only much later. A horrific fire breaks out in an 
apartment house "of many stories, magnificent, crowded." 
The catastrophic magnitude and fury of the blaze make us 
aware that this is a story not merely of the geographical 
entity called Germany but of a Germany that had become, 
what the narrator here calls it, "Sodom and Gomorrah." By 
those two words, Gouri wishes to bring before our mind's 
eye, with literal accuracy, the two neighboring cities of the 
Bible, which were destroyed byfire from Heaven because all 
the people in them had become equally guilty. Con­
templating this scene of "Primordial Chaos," Rubi sudden­
ly grabs a wet blanket and a ladder and, risking his life, 
saves a "blond-haired little girl" from the top floor of the 
burning building. Rubi's motives for the heroic act are not 
clear. He had wanted to do something so that he could get 
out of the position where people were always taking care of 
him. He wanted to assert that he was alive, and intended to 
go on living. 
Yet his heroic action causes his friend Mordi deep pain. 
This apparently beautiful and generous act, according to 
Mordi, " 'finally leaves behind a darkness sevenfold.' " The 
rescue is really a betrayal, in which you " 'atone, in one 
moment, for the long crime against the many.' " Mordi saw 
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this seemingly heroic act as Rubi's taking it upon himself to 
forgive criminals for crimes he had no right to forgive, since 
he was far from being the only, or the most, injured party. 
By rescuing the girl, Rubi had betrayed " 'all those in whose 
behalf nobody climbed up to the seventh floor.' " This is the 
case not only because the little girl turns out to be the 
daughter of Dr. Hoffman, "a successful skin doctor" (i.e., 
perpetrator of scientific mass murder) but because Germany 
is Sodom and Gomorrah, and its guilty population deserves 
punishment by fire from above. To save Hoffman's 
daughter is to leave all the other little girls crying through 
eternity. For what sin had they committed that they did not 
merit to be rescued by a Rubi Krauss? The rescued girl's 
father turns out to be a mass murderer, as well as the 
inheritor of Uncle Salomon's apartment and belongings, 
because any traffic with this world, which has been created 
in their image by Germans, is traffic with murder. 
Mordi's vehement objection to Rubi's heroic action is an 
aesthetic as well as a moral one, and is made partly in the 
language of a poet. He calls the rescue the climax of a 
" 'false play'," the ruination of a true poem, albeit a poem 
conceived by a diseased imagination, warped by vengeful­
ness: "Ah, who," asks the narrator about the fire, "created, 
in his cockeyed dream, a vision so absurd, so gorgeous? For 
what purpose? What frenzied poet turned his sick imagina­
tion or blind desire for revenge into fact?" Since for 
Mordi the only satisfactory relation that can exist with the 
post-Holocaust world is one of vengeance, the ruination by 
Rubi of the vision of vengeance seems to deprive Mordi of 
all desire to live. "The claim that I have an obligation to 
fight in order not to become one of the defeated has only a 
weak hold on me. I'm too smart and too tired to marshal 
the energies needed for going on." He can no longer think 
about "the wonderful countries of immigration" or about 
changing his name to suit a new life, for he would only be a 
burden to Rubi. He has no future. 
Mordi wishes his death to be seen as a spiritually 
inconclusive exhaustion, rather than a passionate protest 
against an unjust, indifferent god. "Protests," he says, "are 
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addressed to someone. Don't imagine any bold movement 
against the powers above. . . . All that's going on here is 
nothing more than a silent diminution." We are, he says, 
living "in days when there is no King and every man does 
what is right in his own eyes. . . .  " 
Rubi, for his part, must decide whether he wishes to tie his 
fate to Mordi and be loyal to the brotherhood of invalids 
that has for so long included him, or to break free of these 
impediments and rejoin the world. He goes to bed with a 
woman he meets in the streets. After the act, he learns that 
she is none other than Gerti, who had worked as the maid of 
Salomon, but is now the secretary to Dr. Hoffman. Every 
connection with the world leads back to the Gestapo. Gerti 
is the perfect representative of a society in which "scarcely 
any are troubled by the problem of crime and punishment, 
with mousy thoughts of regret, so as to permit their 
neighbors time to get used to the new situation, allowing 
that it's hard to ask for more than that and what's done is 
done." 
Between Gerti's body and what it proffers—recovery 
through sexual immersion, which is tainted with Nazi 
criminality—Mordi stands as an obstacle. "Let's go die 
together," thinks Rubi about Gerti. "A shared sorrow is half 
a sorrow. . . . I'll go to her. I'll leap over his torso. . . .  " 
The self-forgetfulness that he seeks in Gerti's body must 
contend with the spirit of Mordi, "the dead guardian of my 
life," with the "cadaver stench exuding from his long 
thoughts." When he leaves Gerti's bed, Rubi discovers that 
Mordi has expressed his loyalty to the murdered in for him 
the only authentic way—by dying himself, apparently by 
suicide. 
The remainder of the book traces Rubi's attempts to 
escape from the fraternity of victims, and his eventual 
discovery that, as Mordi had insisted, there is no way of 
escape but by dealing with the criminals. Rubi believes that 
Mordi died because he "look[ed] too much into things. 
. . . " Yet without him Rubi feels deprived of his ground of 
being, emptied, afflicted by "a weird lightness in myself." 
He too looks into things, but is cautious about keeping his 
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glance an inch above morbidity. In one of the novel's many 
passages that in its elliptical compression seems closer to 
poetry than to fiction, the mixture of hope and desolation in 
a Holocaust survivor is movingly expressed: 
Many things vanished. The weak beatings of the heart 
remained. The sources. Luckily the sun kept its orbit, 
magnificently unconcerned. Therefore a few certainties en­
dured, like the winds of heaven: East. West. North. South. Day 
and night. The seasons of the year. There was, in this, a sort of 
splendid abundance of mockery. What was left for him to do
with the seasons of the year, or the winds of heaven? But the
passing of time prompts the feeling of going from here to there. 
The question of whether the time measures progress or the 
going has any meaning must not be asked. 
Eventually Rubi is forced to admit that Mordi was right 
about the futility of seeking Uncle Salomon, who is but one 
of "many many disappearances." But Rubi still takes 
refuge in supernatural explanations. "The number of those 
no longer heard from or seen became so large that he 
imagines they were summoned heavenward." Unfortunate­
ly, the eyes offer no support to the imagination; and so he 
resorts to "the illogical explanation that some giant, 
merciful sorcerer turned all the missing ones into stone so 
they wouldn't be marred by the fisticuffs of those unlike 
themselves." Gouri's toying with these metaphysical con­
ceits is not, as it may seem, an indulgence in blasphemy but 
a suggestion that religious "explanations" of the Holo­
caust as a glorious resurrection are themselves blas­
phemous. 
The ultimate confirmation of Mordi's allegation that 
merely to remain alive is to betray the victims and embrace 
the murderers is the "chocolate deal" of the title. In order 
to ease the food shortage, the American occupation 
authorities have diverted to the market considerable 
amounts of surplus military chocolate. This is the oppor­
tunity for Rubi to satisfy his desire for riches, if only he can 
find someone who will help him first to lower the price of the 
chocolate so that he can buy it cheaply, then to raise the 
price so that he can sell it at a profit. From the ghost of a 
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murdered friend named Moshko he receives the advice to 
exploit the desire for peace and quiet of the innumerable 
people in this "bloody city" who are prepared to pay a good 
price for these elusive commodities. To do this, Moshko 
says, Rubi will need "the opinion of a doctor and the hired 
pen of a famous man." Although the word is never used, 
Gouri here appears to offer, if not quite an allegory, at least a 
parabolic representation of the moral taint that must attach 
to those who accept reparations from the German govern­
ment. Rubi confronts Dr. Hoffman with his crimes— " 'By 
the way, how many young girls never reached the canopy 
on account of you?' "—and invites him to escape respon­
sibility for them by issuing a false medical opinion to the 
effect that the chocolate has a pacifying, tranquilizing 
quality, presumably the last thing a German public 
wants. Dr. Hoffman complies and is rewarded amply with 
the chance to go far away, and take a new name, "south­
western, hot and gay." 
If the "chocolate deal" does indeed refer to German 
willingness to pay and Jewish readiness to accept "rep­
arations," then Rubi's deal with Hoffman would be an 
extension of his earlier guilt in offering forgiveness on 
behalf of those who are no longer alive to express their 
opinion in the case. It is a commonplace that "reparations" 
did not cover all the surviving victims of German brutality; 
rather, as Raul Hilberg points out, it comprised "in the main 
only refugees from Germany and the nonrepatriable 
displaced persons who had passed through camps on 
German soil." Jewish survivors from northern Europe, 
from the East, from the Balkans, even from Austria, were 
excluded. But the more serious omission, from a moral point 
of view, was the failure of the Jews who chose to deal with 
the Germans to step forward as the heirs in law of the 
destroyed European community. Instead they asked the 
perpetrators of the crime "to pay for the incompleteness of 
their job" by compensating the few who survived, thereby 
purchasing silence and safety.15 
It is typical of the novel's willed indefiniteness and 
tentativeness that the consummation of the chocolate deal 
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should be put off to the future and that the last brief chapter 
should be written wholly in the future tense. Apparently, 
just as Mordi had foretold, Rubi will be deeply tainted 
merely by staying alive, and how much more so by freeing 
Dr. Hoffman instead of killing him, and by repaying the 
treacherous Gerti for opening the door of the business world 
to him with minks and diamonds. But he will also try to 
reforge the link that his own actions have broken by 
returning to the old cemetery and setting up a tombstone on 
Mordi's grave. In our final imagined glimpse of Rubi's 
future, he is at Mordi's graveside, still wearing the signs of 
mourning, and summoned by Mr. Shechter, the watch­
maker, the uncrowned king, the man who represents the 
faint possibility of overcoming the disunity between past 
and present caused by the timequake that was the 
Holocaust. 
Of the Israeli novels about the Holocaust treated in this 
chapter, none is less recognizable as the work of an Israeli 
than The Chocolate Deal. No one reading this book is likely 
to guess that its author is an Israeli, much less that he is an 
active nationalist and one of the original signatories (in 
August 1967) of the Manifesto of the Land of Israel 
Movement, which insists on the historic and religious right 
of the Jewish People to the Land of Israel.16 Rubi is said to 
have asked Mordi to "go far away" with him, and Mordi to 
have insisted on staying behind, in the vast European 
graveyard. But there is no indication that this faraway 
place is more likely to be Jerusalem than London or New 
York. The concern with the moral implications of 
reparations is indeed an Israeli preoccupation, but it is here 
presented so abstractly and also individually that it can 
hardly be labeled as Israel's peculiar problem rather than 
that of German Jewish survivors. Finally, in its resistance 
to the possibility that there might be some middle course 
between killing the Dr. Hoffmans and making common 
cause with them, the novel—until its final conciliatory 
scene in the cemetery—comes close to saying that any form 
of life after the Holocaust (including, if only by implication, 
life in Israel) is a betrayal of the victims of the Holocaust. 
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Dahn Ben Amotz's To Remember, to Forget (1968) is a 
first-person narrative of inordinate length told by a young 
Israeli architect named Uri Lam who was born in Germany 
and lost his parents and a brother and sister to the Nazis. In 
1959, he returns to Germany, allegedly after much soul-
searching, to claim reparations. His doubts about whether 
he has the moral right to accept reparations for the 
suffering of his parents and thus to give absolution on their 
behalf—doubts that will recur frequently throughout the 
period of his "adventures" in Frankfurt—have been 
temporarily squelched by his desire to buy an old Arab 
house on Jerusalem's border and a new car. His underlying 
aim in returning to Germany and his past is to close the 
matter of the Holocaust once and for all, to forget all that 
had happened to his family, to forget the abstract question 
of retributive justice. Although it is not readily apparent in 
what way his rather feeble remembrance of the Holocaust 
interferes with either the activities of his life or his peace of 
mind, Ben Amotz asks us to believe that Uri suffers 
considerable distress when he is forced to remember what 
he would rather forget. 
The sharp presentation of mutually exclusive moral 
alternatives—execute justice upon the criminal, or become 
his collaborator—that characterized Gouri's novel appears 
in this book only as something to be frowned upon as the 
outlook of morally obtuse Israelis when they learn of Uri's 
fate in Frankfurt: namely, that he has married Barbara 
Stahl, a German girl, daughter of a manufacturer of optical 
equipment, whose first orders, in 1942, were from the 
German War Department for binoculars, telescopes, and 
periscopes. In one of Uri's endless "imaginings" of the 
immediate future, he hears his friends in Israel say: "Uri 
married a German girl and is living in Frankfurt. Impossi­
ble. It's true. He lost his whole family in Germany, went 
there to collect reparations, and married a German girl. 
How's that for an outrage! He marries the daughter of his 
family's murderers, is awarded reparations, and uses this to 
raise a family." The style in which the narrator imagines 
this reaction indicates his contempt for it. He is reenforced 
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in this view by Barbara, who is a paragon of all the modern 
virtues—sexually experienced, the thinking man's liberal 
in her "opinions," and a reader of Buber, who for Uri is a 
long face and a long beard he once saw in Israel. She 
assures him that he is justified in pursuing and accepting 
reparations because they are not meant as atonement for 
German crimes but only as a partial compensation to 
victims to help them survive. 
The contrast between the severity of Gouri and the self-
indulgence of Ben Amotz is well illustrated by an episode in 
which Uri (like Rubi in The Chocolate Deal) visits a house 
formerly belonging to Jews (Uri's parents, in fact), but now 
occupied by Germans. Here too Ben Amotz tries to show 
his sophistication by blurring the sharpness of moral 
distinction between victim and criminal. Have not Arabs 
been displaced as well as Jews? Is not Uri himself planning 
to use his reparation money to buy a house formerly 
belonging to an Arab who fled during the War of In­
dependence? Besides, the new German occupants of the 
house of Uri's parents are themselves refugees who have 
had to scrimp and save to buy and rebuild this wreck. No Dr. 
Hoffmans, they. 
This desire to blur the distinction between German and 
Jew, especially between German and Israeli, characterizes 
the book. It expresses itself through what might be called 
the rhetoric of "complexity" and the banality of sophomoric 
questions based on tenuous analogies. Is the anonymous 
German caller (who turns out to be an Israeli prankster) 
who objects to Barbara marrying a Jew any worse than the 
caller Uri imagines in Jerusalem who will object to his 
marrying a German when he and Barbara move there? At 
another point, Uri is asked by Martin Schiller, a German 
whose homosexuality is intended to conciliate our sym­
pathy with him because it separates him from the 
"normal," virile Germans, what he would have done in 1933 
if he had been eighteen and German? Ben Amotz is as a rule 
content to rest in the heavy portentousness of these 
questions, as if it had never occurred to him that between 
the actuality of what the Germans did and the potentiality 
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of what other people might have done, there remains a 
yawning chasm. 
In dealing with postwar Germany, the novelist shows a 
similar inclination to ask "big" questions for which he has 
not formulated, either imaginatively or morally, any clear 
answers. "Normal" Germany is castigated as the collective 
inheritor of the Nazi regime by Martin Schiller, the 
homosexual son of an army officer who arranged the 
transport of Jews to death camps. Martin flaunts his 
homosexuality in order to humiliate his father and outrage 
the whole society of normal, respectable Germans. 
"Millions of normal people. Talk to them and you won't 
believe there's another Germany. The merchants, officials, 
the lower middle class. Good citizens who did as they were 
told, who neither knew nor wanted to know what was 
happening behind the fences, right under their noses—they 
are the normal ones. The scar-faced students, the new rich 
gaping at Germany's industrial wonders, the Nazis in 
government offices who speak of democracy as if they 
invented it, the aristocracy sated with culture, switching 
from the production of arms, soap, and poison gases to the 
production of washing machines, cosmetics, optical equip­
ment, and insecticides.' " He argues that all those who were 
involved in the final solution—and by his calculation that 
would involve millions—should be castrated, " 'their 
memory and genes erased forever.' " Martin Schiller (whose 
very name seems to suggest that he, and not the mutant 
generation preceding him, represents the true Germany) is 
so oppressed by the sense of guilt that he does not allow 
himself to dislike particular Jews " 'even if they are 
uncongenial.' " Schiller is a constant irritant to Uri, 
because he insists relentlessly on justice and forces the hero 
to remember what he wants to forget, even as his own 
miserable life exemplifies the fate of those who demand 
remembrance and justice. The "other Germany," the 
Germany willing to reject entirely the Nazi heritage, moral 
and material, is, according
 to Martin, the Germany of" 'the 
un-normal.' " These righteous characters are " 'beatniks, 
pot smokers, priests of opium and hashish, homosexuals, 
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deviates.' " This group of Germans not only questions the 
need for a strong, united Germany, but the need for " 'any 
nation to exist—and not Germany alone, but any nation 
that toys with anthems, boundaries, and flags.' " 
Although Ben Amotz does not intend us entirely to adopt 
Martin's views of the new Germany (which are contradicted 
by Uri's own experiences of Barbara and of her father, for 
example), it is remarkable that, writing in 1968, he does not 
see their implications for Uri's own nation—Israel—which 
does toy with anthems and flags, and has more than a 
passing interest in "boundaries." Whereas in 1959, the date 
of the novel's action, the view that Nazism, a distinctly 
internationalist movement,17 was only an extremely 
aggravated case of the disease of nationalism, might have 
been dismissed as a typical liberal cliche, by 1968 it had 
been made by young Germans of the "New Left" into the 
underpinning of "anti-Israelism." Barbara, as well as 
Martin, is a liberal universalist, and it is hard to escape the 
feeling that if she had not married Uri and moved to 
Jersulem in 1959 she might have been arranging charity 
balls in Frankfurt for the PLO after the 1967 war. Elie 
Wiesel, in an open letter to young Germans of the New Left 
written in 1968, said: "By taking a stand against the Jewish 
people today, you become guilty of what was done to Jews 
yesterday. By agreeing to deliver to death the survivors of 
yesterday's massacres, you become, today, the execu­
tioner's accomplice and ally."18 The lack of any awareness 
of this relationship between "anti-Establishment" and 
anti-Israeli Germans is a distinct failing in a book that 
assumes that Israeli self-understanding depends upon an 
accurate knowledge of the current relation between Ger­
mans and Jews. The book is filled with allusions to the 
resurgence of Nazism in Germany in the form of veterans' 
organizations, right-wing fringe parties, and so on, but 
gives no hint of the fact that the latest form of antisemitism 
is growing among the unwashed revolutionaries. 
In the same open letter, Wiesel wrote that "for a German 
today there is no possible salvation outside his relationship 
with Jews. Your path will never lead to man unless it leads 
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to us first."19 But in Ben Amotz's novel, the character who 
tries to apply this conviction is revealed to be a masochist. 
Her name is Erna, and she belongs to a Christian 
organization that does practical work in Israel to atone for 
German crimes. When Uri, after the first quarrel with his 
wife (one of the many marriage-manual exempla of the 
book), seeks revenge by taking Erna to bed, he discovers her 
to be a woman who can gain pleasure from sex only if she is 
beaten in the process. The incident suggests (though not to 
Uri) that young Germans who show an overdeveloped sense 
of responsibility for their ancestors' guilt are at bottom 
literally sick with masochism. 
Barbara, with her rational outlook, commonsensical 
attitude toward reparations, and willingness to treat Jews 
as individuals instead of covering them with the blanket of 
liberal condescension, is offered as the ideal German of the 
postwar generation. It is she who forces Uri the Israeli to 
come to terms not so much with her German identity as with 
his Jewish one. Uri thinks of himself as an Israeli rather 
than a Jew, and his views on religion, are characteristic of 
that half-educated intelligentsia that Israel, in its progress 
toward "normalization," now shares with other democratic 
countries. He has been in a synagogue only twice in his life, 
and parades his illiteracy in Judaism as a sign, rather like 
his taste in clothing and women, of sophistication and high 
culture. On the two occasions in the novel when he 
consciously seeks to identify with the Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust, he describes his emotions in explicitly Christian 
language. In his honeymoon visit to Dachau—yes!—with 
Barbara, he "yearned to feel the crown of thorns, to reach 
my hand into the fog and touch their frozen fingers. I 
searched for a sign, the faintest sign of stigmata." When he 
goes to a masquerade ball as a Chassidic Jew, he fancies 
himself traversing the stations of his "Via Dolorosa." "Why 
am I dragging myself around like a crucified Christ? You'd 
think I was really Jewish." 
What disturbs Barbara, however, is not Uri's lack of 
Jewish religion (for she is properly agnostic herself) but his 
willingness to be identified, in the eyes of others, as an 
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Israeli rather than a Jew. Many of Barbara's friends find it 
hard to believe " 'that Jews and Israelis are one people. 
They're so different, in behavior, in personality, in outward 
appearance. Take Lam, for example, who'd guess he's a 
Jew?' " Whereas Barbara cringes at these compliments and 
repudiates the distinction, Uri takes pleasure in the fact 
(which is one of the elements of the novel's unreality) that 
his own self-definition is recognized by the Gentiles as well. 
" 'I'm no Jew,' " he upbraids her, " 'I'm an Israeli—and the 
two are not synonymous.' " 
The belief of many Israelis, especially the avowedly 
secular ones, that the form of life they have created in Israel 
has almost no connection with past Jewish life in the 
Diaspora is brought under scrutiny in the last segment of To 
Remember, to Forget. Israeli sociologists have often 
explored Israeli attitudes toward "Jewishness" by asking 
young Israelis whether, if they were to live abroad (not 
necessarily in Germany, of course) they would wish to be 
born Jews. Professor Simon Herman, who has thoroughly 
investigated the relationship between Jewish and Israeli 
identity, reports that when he posed this question to a 
substantial number of Israeli students, only a minority 
(thirty-seven percent) of the secular students answered 
affirmatively, thirty-four percent said it would make no 
difference to them, and fully twenty-nine percent said they 
would prefer not to be born Jews if they lived outside of 
Israel.20 Uri Lam belongs to this twenty-nine percent, until 
Barbara goads him into an act of self-discovery. 
Stung by her criticism of him, Uri decides to attend the 
social event of the season in Frankfurt, a masked ball, as a 
Chassidic Jew. "I, Uri Lam, would be a Jew for one night. I 
will finally know what it means to be a Jew." Predictably, 
the reaction to him is hostile, indeed antisemitic. The 
hostility forces him to play the adopted role more fully than 
he had anticipated, so that he must forsake his secular 
Israeli identity even to the point of refraining from the 
smoked pork. Irritation with his antics grows until he is 
attacked by two ushers who rip off his beard and his yellow 
patch and are about to eject him bodily from the ball when 
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he is rescued by Martin Schiller, dressed in the black 
uniform of an S.S. officer. Distressed by the amusement the 
other masqueraders seem to get from this odd turn of events, 
Schiller quickly reverts to the true relationship of Nazi to 
Jew and himself beats Uri from the hall. 
This is the culminating scene of the novel, and it turns out 
to be something of a blank cartridge, making a big noise but 
not hitting its target. The conflicting intentions of the book 
reveal themselves in the confused symbolism of the 
costumes. Schiller wears the costume of his ancestral 
opposite, the S.S. officer, Uri the costume not of his 
ancestral opposite but of his fraternal, if distant, relation: 
the Chassid. Uri's relation to a Chassid is not the same as 
Martin's relation to an S.S. hoodlum, but Ben Amotz 
manages the scene in such a way that the distinction is lost 
on everyone, apparently including the author. " 'For a 
minute,' " says Uri to Schiller, " 'I thought you were a real 
Nazi.' " " 'And I thought you were a real Jew' he said." 
Having gone to the ball in order to "know what it means to 
be a Jew," Uri soon decides that in fact he "came to remind 
the amnesia victims of their past." The desire to discover his 
own identity, to find what continuity, if any, there is 
between the Jew and the Israeli, gives way to the desire, 
already carried out countless times in the book, to "test" the 
Germans, to provide for them a moral gymnasium in which 
they can be challenged " 'to remember that it can all 
happen again—today, tomorrow, here or anywhere.' " The 
desire to teach the Germans a lesson, even if it is the wrong 
lesson, even if they are incapable of learning a lesson, 
overcomes the compulsion to learn the truth about himself. 
To Remember, to Forget lacks both the technical re­
sources and the intellectual stamina to resolve any of the 
questions it raises. Its incessant use of the device of 
flashback (as well as what might be called "flashforward" 
to imagined eventualities) is as much a cliché as are many 
of its characters and situations: the "Ugly Israeli" abroad, 
the German-Jewish refugee returning to his "native land" 
so as to help prevent another such catastrophe, the endless 
banalities of the developing romance between Uri and 
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Barbara. Ben Amotz's refusal to commit himself is evident 
through the last page of the novel, which returns us to 
Israel, where the child of German Barbara and Israeli-
Jewish Uri is born on the day Eichmann is arrested: 
"Signifying what? I don't know. The end of one chapter and 
the beginning of another? . . . Perhaps." Strictly speak­
ing, this indecisive posturing is only that of the protagonist, 
since we never hear directly from the author himself. But 
there are too many instances in the novel when we cannot 
decide whether the inadequacy of the language to the 
experience the author wishes to convey is a reflection on the 
protagonist-narrator or on Dahn Ben Amotz. In the absence 
of some implied standard of judgment distinct from Uri's, it 
requires an excessively charitable reader to dissociate the 
author wholly from his creation. Ben Amotz seems to have 
carried his reader into the wilderness that is the relation 
between Germans and Jews, Jews and Israelis, and then to 
have abandoned him there. 
Yoram Kaniuk's Adam Resurrected (1971) is imagina­
tively the richest, and linguistically the most inventive and 
energetic, of the examples of Israeli Holocaust fiction we 
have examined. Both spiritually and geographically, it is 
set more firmly in Israel than any of the others (including 
Amichai's) and is the only one of the novels that makes the 
relation between Israel and the Holocaust its overriding 
concern, permeating every relationship between char­
acters, every aspect of the action. This is the more re­
markable in that the action comprises many levels of 
experience, various modes of being, from the animal to the 
human, from the natural to the supernatural. In its 
insistent combination of moral urgency with a comic spirit, 
and of fantasy with realism, Adam Resurrected is reminis­
cent of Swift and Kafka. Highly ironical yet intensely 
serious, aggressively cynical toward, and yet curiously 
respectful of, belief of any kind, the novel pours scorn and 
mockery on conventional notions of sanity and health in 
the aftermath of an apocalyptic event like the Holocaust, 
but finally acknowledges, with Schiller, that " 'not 
everyone who laughs at his chains is free of them.' " This is 
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especially the case with Kaniuk's treatment of religion. He 
is skeptical of it yet recognizes it as an organic element of 
human experience that can be discarded only at the cost of 
greatly diminished life. The novel's openness to 
metaphysical speculation and religious emotion vastly 
enriches Kaniuk's exploration of a subject that cannot 
easily be contained within the banal and pedestrian 
categories of monism and naturalism. 
Kaniuk has created a fable by means of which he can test 
the hypothesis that Israel exists not only to rescue the 
survivors of the Holocaust but to heal them, in soul as in 
body. Most of the book's action takes place in the desert 
town of Arad, Israel, at the Institution for Rehabilitation 
and Therapy, which ministers primarily to European 
refugees from the Holocaust who have been unable to 
recover from the horrors of their experience. This mental 
hospital was founded in 1960 by an American millionaire 
from Cleveland named Mrs. Seizling under the influence of 
a survivor named Schwester, who, when they met in Tel 
Aviv, convinced her that the main task of the new state was 
to bring the Messiah. According to this woman, a pas­
sionate mystic, God has spoken only with psychotics, a 
commodity with which no land is so richly endowed as 
Israel. Her theory of the Holocaust is that the Jews were 
punished for betraying their God by being turned into 
"smoke and ashes." Israel, which gave refuge to the fools 
and heroes among the Jewish people—"the clever Jews 
immigrated to America or died in Europe"—has become a 
land of mystified and humiliated survivors who fill the 
night with their shrieks. Although from one point of view it 
may seem a misfortune that the Holocaust survivors "have 
turned this country into the largest insane asylum on 
earth," it is also an opportunity, for only through these 
lunatics will the nation achieve reunion with God. The 
Institute will have the dual function, therefore, of healing 
those whose bodies have been rescued, but whose souls 
" 'are still in the furnaces,' "and of initiating conversations 
with God. 
The chief candidate for messiahship is the consummate 
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lunatic and resident genius among the Institute's patients, 
Adam Stein. Adam had been a circus clown of great renown 
and wealth in prewar Germany whose dubious good fortune 
it had been to be recognized by the commandant of the 
death camp to which he was transported as the agent, years 
earlier, of his own salvation. For S.S. Commandant Klein of 
Auchhausen had, as a young man, been on the verge of 
suicide when he was saved from himself by Adam's 
clowning. Now that he occupied the God-like position of 
death-camp commandant, Klein elected to show his 
gratitude by offering Adam a "contract" whereby he could 
save his life by becoming (literally) Klein's dog and the 
camp clown. In the latter capacity, he would entertain (and 
thus deceive) the Jewish victims, including his own wife 
and daughters, as they were being led to the gas chambers. 
(Klein very much wanted his victims to die in peace, for 
"there was something unaesthetic, unclean, about the 
shrieks of the dying who want to go on living.") Thus was 
Adam saved by his peculiar gift, but also victimized by it, 
for henceforth he could only protect himself from the shame 
and guilt of his crime by blotting out the memory of 
Gretchen and Lotta, who had gone to their death trustingly 
and peacefully, thanks to the reassurance conveyed by 
Germany's greatest clown, their husband and father. 
Although his extrasensory powers and gifts of 
prestidigitation make Adam Schwester's primary can­
didate for the Messiah, his own experiences and resultant 
convictions make him the worst. Having once been a dog, he 
can no longer be a Jew. Deranged he may be, but the Jewish 
derangement is not for him. By his experiences, he is 
"estranged from the Messianic vision, from the Jewish 
madness, from the incomprehensibility woven during more 
than a thousand years into a compendium of pining and 
expectation that finally brought about the creation in the 
East of a nation of Blue Numbers." Not only the messianic 
impulse but the impulse toward national rebirth is alien to 
Adam's mind when the war ends. "Palestine," he thinks, "is 
nothing but a joke. Refugees, escapees, bits and pieces of 
humanity, chaff tossed in the wind, they cannot establish a 
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homeland for themselves and are not worthy, perhaps, of 
having one." Klein has fulfilled his promise of financial 
compensation and escape for his dog-clown, and Adam has 
also received a half-million dollars for his circus, which had 
functioned in his absence all through the war. He returns to 
Berlin, invests in Germany's economic miracle (which is 
treated with the withering scorn characteristic of Israeli 
Holocaust writing on this subject), and becomes a mil­
lionaire. His composure, deathlike yet luxurious, is shat­
tered only by the news that his daughter Ruth, whom he 
had thought dead, is still alive in Israel. For the first time, 
he thinks about his relation to Germany, both in his 
formative years and now. Was he not, like the camps, a 
product of German culture? What was the camp itself but 
the apotheosis of that culture? "Grimm fairy tales and 
Luther's essays and the inner thoughts of every proper 
German were fulfilled in Auchhausen." True, he was treated 
regally in postwar Berlin after returning from the furnaces 
Berliners had built for him. But, as the great clown who had 
freely chosen to live again among his persecutors, what was 
he other than the Germans' "insurance policy against Hell, 
in case there was anything more terrible than the things 
they had created with their own hands?" 
Adam returns to Israel in 1958, only to find that Ruth has 
died in childbirth shortly before his arrival. Her husband, 
bitter against Adam for what he had done in the camp, 
takes the clown to the cemetery and dares him to make his 
daughter laugh now. In the attempt, Adam reverts to his 
dog-character of the war years and is institutionalized. The 
director of the Institute for Rehabilitation and Therapy in 
Arad is Dr. Nathan Gross, whose folly is the "ardent 
liberalism" that insists on believing in the possibility of 
curing and rescuing victims of the Holocaust without 
recognizing that the Holocaust was not just a historic but 
an apocalyptic event, which has created a new world in 
which everything must be learned through suffering or with 
the help of those who suffered. Dr. Gross thinks that 
forgetting the atrocity is the beginning of recovery for his 
patients, but the patients think otherwise and persistently 
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return to the Holocaust inferno. This Jerusalem-born 
disciple of Freud is sympathetically presented, however, 
because although he has spent his entire life searching for 
sanity, his experience with the survivors has unsettled his 
faith in the superiority of sanity. 
If the citizens of Israel want health and sanity in their 
society, if they want a decisive break with that miserable 
past which culminated in the Holocaust, they should never 
have promulgated the Law of Return. Building a homeland 
out of committed idealists is one thing; building it out of 
shattered survivors is another. " 'You accepted us,' "Adam 
chides, " 'with open arms, like a fool. That was a fatal error, 
the Law of Return will beget the end, we shall cause the soil 
to rot, pollute the atmosphere. We shall remember. We shall 
be like frontlets between your eyes.' " Yet in the central 
action of the novel, we see Adam as the agent not of 
pollution but of health, for it is he who presides over the 
recovery of an Israeli boy whose schizophrenia is Adam's 
own: he has become a dog, and lives on all fours just as 
Adam had done in the camp and often still does. Dr. Gross, 
less rigid in his naturalism than his fellow doctors, who 
have completely given up hope for returning the dog-child to 
his human self, allows Adam to take charge of the child. The 
true physician reluctantly admits that those who have 
never been sick cannot understand, much less bestow, 
health; only the sick can. " 'We,' " says Dr. Gross to his 
angry Israeli medical colleagues, " 'are ants on the surface 
of the Earth trying to understand the pains of Mars men.' " 
Men like Adam have come not from another continent but 
from another planet. Bereft of his own daughter, and 
reminded by the boy's howling of the wails of children in the 
death camps whose mothers had already disappeared and 
who were awaiting their own death, Adam finds a reason to 
live in helping the child to recover. By presiding over the 
evolution of a dog into a child, a process usually requiring 
millions of years, Adam has in effect become a sort of God, 
though hardly the one for whom Schwester had hoped. His 
miracle takes the form not of a messianic revelation but of a 
healing process in which two sick people cure each other. 
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If the way in which Adam Stein cures, and is cured by, the 
dog-child who is reborn as David, king of Israel, represents 
the zenith of fulfillment in the novel, then Adam's failure to 
realize the messianic expectations of Schwester is the nadir 
of disappointment and desolation. The question of exactly 
how the God of Israel was related to the Holocaust is the 
pervasive quandary of the novel, announced in the opening 
epigraph from Josephus that asks, of an earlier Jewish 
disaster, why God was absent, "so totally absent, during the 
Great Destruction." Schwester's reply to this question is 
that God's logic and man's are not the same, and that even 
the Holocaust reenforces the continuity of the cosmic 
dramatic struggle between God and His people, who chose 
each other and remain mutually responsible. Ranged 
against this childless woman, however, are the voices of 
inmates whose children have been killed or hideously 
disfigured in the Holocaust and who are in Mrs. Seizling's 
institute precisely because they cannot live with the 
knowledge that the God of Israel can sanctify His chosen 
people only by burning and mutilating them, and making 
Satan the instrument of His purpose. Thus Arthur Fine has 
become a compulsive arsonist who burns not only buildings 
but people (including his own child) because he wishes to 
imitate the actions of the divine father who sanctifies His 
children by burning them. "I wanted to sanctify her," he 
says of a woman he fell in love with in Israel, "but she didn't 
understand and fled, not knowing how much I loved her. If 
she had known, she would have sung in the fire " Another 
inmate named Wolfovitz, whose Thersites voice rever­
berates through the novel, writes a letter to God (for to 
whom but the Master of the Universe should he address 
his complaints?) in which the Nazis are called "your 
messengers . . . your boys." Adam, in whose brain con­
gregate all the terrible stories and derangements of the 
other inmates, fluctuates between despair over the absence 
and feebleness of the Jewish God, who is a bully in His 
neighborhood but "scared
 stiff" among the other nations, 
and resentment of the horrible implications of His om­
nipresence and omnipotence. The difference between the 
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Germans and the Jews, says Adam, is the difference 
between "the nation that thought God chose them and 
consequently chose God who abandoned them, and a nation 
that thought God would not choose them and consequently 
attempted to escape from God but God chose them as a 
scourge against the believers." 
Eventually, despite his contempt for the Schwester 
woman and her messianic schemes, Adam allows himself to 
be caught up by them and by the expectant eagerness of 
Wolfovitz and Arthur Fine, which he would like in some 
way to satisfy. Adam therefore organizes an escape from 
the Institute into the desert that surrounds it. In the course 
of the expedition, Adam becomes convinced that he is, after 
all, the prophet and messenger long sought by Schwester, 
and that he is truly leading them toward God. The 
conviction is all the more irresistible because he wants to 
believe, always has believed, just the opposite: namely, that 
no God will speak to him and that he then will have to reveal 
the terrible truth of His absence to them. In fact, a God does 
speak to Adam, but he chooses to reveal nothing of Him to 
the "nation" of inmates that has come to seek Him, for the 
voice he hears is none other than that of Commandant 
Klein. The Germans' oft-repeated claim that if there were 
another world, they would rule it as totally as they did this 
one,21 is confirmed. " 'I'm waiting,' " Klein tells his former 
dog and clown Adam, " 'and I'll always be waiting for you 
at the end of the road.' " Invited to kill his Commandant-
God, Adam declines, because without this mocking and 
hateful God, there would be no one to talk to: " 'In these 
synthetic, beheaded days, that is the only dialogue that 
makes sense.' " In a kind of reenactment of his role as 
deceiver and purveyor of false security in the camp, Adam 
tells the "nation" of his followers that there was nothing in 
the desert, consequently nothing to look forward to. 
" 'You've built a house for nothing. Waited for nothing. He 
won't come.' " 
Adam conceals his vision of God because he does not 
believe the others could go on living if they shared it with 
him. He also wants the Institute to resign its religious 
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mission—no salvation for the Jews in that direction!—and 
content itself with its healing function, however ineptly 
performed it may be. Adam's encounter with God in the 
form of an S.S. commandant convinces him that " 'Jewish 
history is over, or maybe it's just beginning.' " When he first 
met the dog-child, he knew "neither what to give, nor what 
to say, nor how to rescue." For he himself was then "seeking 
a savior." Having now carried that quest to its terrible but, 
given the Holocaust, logical conclusion, Adam is at last able 
to rescue the child and thereby himself. This is the best 
bargain the Jews can now strike with history: not joy but 
peace, not greatness but sanity, not God but man. This is a 
vast diminution. "Life is so sad without God!" exclaims 
Adam. "Still, man is left. I am here, and I have a 
child. . . ."Once Adam has recovered, he becomes blank 
and dull in a way, and his lover, the chief nurse of the 
Institute, loses all interest in Adam Stein, whose old self 
had to die before he could be reborn. "Sanity is sad. Nothing 
happens. I live today in a lovely, good valley, The heights 
are gone forever. There are no more frightful deserts, and I 
no longer leap into the fire, I'm afraid I'll get burned." 
Besides, the God who offers sanctification only through 
burning has been unmasked for what He truly is. 
The bizarre quality of many of the incidents and 
characters in Adam Resurrected serves to underscore 
Kaniuk's understanding both of the Holocaust and of 
Israel, the two events of modern Jewish history that 
compete in incredibility. The metamorphosis of human 
beings, erect and tall, into four-legged animals is an old 
literary metaphor that was given a new force once the 
Germans arranged to exterminate the Jews as if they were 
bedbugs, with poison gas. Even the specific metaphor here 
employed by Kaniuk was a literal reality in one camp in 
Rumania, in which arriving Jews were told: "You have 
come in on two feet, and if you do not end your lives here, you 
will be allowed to leave on four feet only." (In this camp the 
Jews were fed on a diet which resulted in paralysis, so that 
when the trial of war criminals opened in Bucharest after 
the war, many of the Jewish witnesses "were indeed able to 
114 The Resonance of Dust 
walk on all fours only.")22 The Arad Institute, at once a 
house for the treatment of those disfigured by the Holocaust 
and a gateway into the messianic era, is symbolic of Israel 
itself. Thus, when Mrs. Seizling endowed it, she stipulated 
that its architecture be aggressively ugly so that it would be 
the appropriate symbol of a nation "hastening to set up 
house for a transient generation in a place where you must 
strike root upside down, a location to which old people were 
coming in order to be born anew in the womb of their 
ancient mother whose loins were clogged with holy dust." 
Even the skeptical Adam must confess his grudging 
admiration for those who have discovered that their 
sanctuary was also their homeland, and contained not only 
their future but also their remote past. "They have guts, 
their blue numbers can be rubbed off. At night they may 
weep, but in the daytime they stomp across any limitation, 
across the wasteland, taming everything, omitting any fun, 
any beauty, any charm." 
Adam's way is different. He cannot keep his waking and 
sleeping life, his work and his suffering, his past and his 
present, in separate compartments. Arrested by his own 
conscience as much as by those who confine him in the 
Institute, he can work his way back to health only through 
his past suffering, shame, and guilt. In the process, he 
becomes Kaniuk's symbol for Israel's right moral relation 
to its Diaspora inheritance. Israel can serve as a healer to 
the survivors, but only if it recognizes that in the depths of 
their experience, the very experience that has made them ill, 
they may themselves have found a capacity to heal others. 
Israel cannot recover the Messiah from the wreckage of the 
Holocaust, because He was never there. The novel endorses 
the sentiment of those sages of the third and fourth 
centuries alleged by the Talmud to have said of the long-
awaited Messiah: "May he come, but I do not want to see 
him." When Adam does see him, and declares to this 
Commandant-God that Jewish history is either over with or 
just beginning, he appears to express his creator's convic­
tion that Israelis will be either the last Jews on earth or the 
beginning of a new nation. 
The Holocaust exploded many assumptions about West­
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em civilization and many theories about the nature and 
future of Jewish existence. It offered grim confirmation 
of only one ideology: Zionism. Zionism had from its 
beginnings maintained that in the post-Enlightenment era 
Judaism in the Diaspora was doomed. The Enlightenment 
attack on all religion had brought down the old barriers: to 
assimilation and to barbarism. Once the Enlightenment 
had destroyed the Christian structures of the old Europe, 
Jews could assimilate into the larger society without going 
through the trauma of conversion. But when secular 
antisemitism arose, it could not be confined within the old 
limits of religious Jew-hatred, which had condoned the 
humiliation of Jews but proscribed their murder. The 
Zionists would have been wholly justified in saying, to non-
Zionist Jews, after the Holocaust: "We told you so." 
The finality of the destruction wrought by the Holocaust, 
both in literal actuality and in the minds of the Jewish 
survivors, cannot be too much stressed. One of the most 
striking depictions of it may be found in a collective journal 
written by a group of young survivors of Buchenwald, who 
formed an agricultural commune on German soil just after 
the war with the aim of training themselves for a new life in 
Palestine. They could have lived fairly comfortably in the 
D.P. camps on charity, but chose instead to found "Kibbutz 
Buchenwald" because of their conviction that for Jews the 
European experience was conclusively at an end. They were 
warned by authorities that "all Jews who did not wish to go 
back to their homelands would be listed as stateless. . . .  " 
But they soon learned of the fate of those who did return 
to their "homelands." One of their group had returned to 
Poland, only to encounter a murderous Jew-hatred. "The 
majority of the Polish people, Moshe declared, have only 
one idea: to eliminate the Jews." But the other members of 
Kibbutz Buchenwald no longer needed the prod of Jew-
hatred to turn them toward Palestine. During the suffering 
in the German camps, "all that kept us interested in life was 
the hope that we could tear ourselves out of Europe at the 
earliest possible moment, and go to Palestine to live and 
work in the interests of our people."23 
In view of all this, it is remarkable that the body of Israeli 
Holocaust fiction that we have been examining should see 
116 The Resonance of Dust 
in the Holocaust a summons to critical self-examination 
rather than an occasion for self-congratulation. If, as has 
often been alleged by its enemies, Zionism has a propensity 
for polemic and propaganda, it is certainly in abeyance in 
these novels, which if anything show an overly refined 
sensitivity to anything resembling Zionist self-satisfaction. 
Yet who offered help to the survivors of the death camps 
more than the Zionists? More important, what offered hope 
to these survivors but the promise of Zion, the last 
remaining possibility for the continuation of the historic 
Jewish civilization that had just been destroyed in Europe? 
If, in treating the Holocaust, Israeli novelists have 
preferred the path of national self-criticism to that of 
national self-satisfaction, this is less a tribute to their 
modesty than to their caution. They all know that the 
Jewish people has passed through a crisis unprecedented in 
its history; they are by no means certain that the crisis is 
over, or that the second half of the twentieth century will 
deal more gently with the Jews than the first half did; they 
feel too close to the terrible event to be sure that anything of 
permanent value has survived the storm or been built in its 
wake. Gershom Scholem speaks for them all when he says: 
"It is not surprising that there are as yet no signs of a 
reaction, of one kind or another, to the profound shock of the 
Holocaust. Such a reaction, when it comes, could be either 
deadly or productive. We hope it will be productive; that is 
why we are living here, in this Land."24 
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Half of his people had been tortured and murdered, and the 
other half were giving parties.—Isaac Bashevis Singer, 
Enemies 
chapter 4 
The Holocaust in American Jewish 
Fiction: A Slow Awakening 
During World War II, American policy toward rescuing 
Jews from Europe could have been the occasion of a tragic 
conflict of loyalties for the American Jewish community. 
Yehuda Bauer has succinctly described that policy as 
follows: "Every humanitarian consideration was dropped, 
and the slogan 'rescue through victory' became the 
statement of official policy. This policy did not take into 
account that few Jews would remain to be rescued after 
victory."1 The conflict never occurred: the Jews of Europe 
were left to be murdered, and their brethren in the United 
States, who barely thought of allowing their Jewish 
loyalties to "interfere" with the war effort, remained largely 
undisturbed by tragedy or divided loyalties. 
If one large segment of American Jews, descended either 
actually or spiritually from the German Reform movement, 
had always believed that they were Americans of the 
Jewish persuasion rather than members of the Jewish 
people, another large and vocal group, those descended 
from Eastern Europe and imbued with the ethos of Jewish 
radicalism and socialism, believed themselves to be, not 
Americans of course, but internationalists first, and Jews 
second (if Jews at all). Irving Howe has pointed out the way 
in which Eastern European Jewish socialists, from the 
beginning of their life in America, "yearned to bleach away 
their past and become men without, or above, a country." 
They stubbornly denied that there could be any problems 
peculiar to Jews as a people and worth addressing as such. 
To admit this possibility was for them particularism, 
provincialism, nationalism. "Rebelling against the paro­
chialism of traditional Jewish life," says Howe, "the 
Jewish radicals improvised a parochialism of their own— 
but with this difference: they called it 'universalism.' "2 By 
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the time of the Holocaust, socialism no longer held so 
compelling a sway over American Jews as it once did. Yet 
their loyalty to, and enthusiasm for, President Roosevelt 
derived largely from a belief that, even though he retained 
the capitalist structure of American society, he had done 
much to realize their old socialist program through 
piecemeal reform. At the very time, therefore, that Franklin 
Roosevelt was, by doing nothing to admit Jewish refugees 
to the United States, sending hundreds of thousands of 
Jews to their death, American Jews were his most fervent, 
uncritical, and reliable bloc of supporters. Even when the 
war was over and the full extent of Roosevelt's shameful 
guilt became known, the long-standing conviction of the 
American Jewish community that the best way to ame­
liorate the condition of Jews was to ameliorate American 
society at large was unshaken. 
Not long after the war, a generation of American Jewish 
writers* arose who purported to satirize every aspect of 
American Jewish life. Every American Jewish malady, still 
more any American malady that could with any plausi­
bility be labeled Jewish—suffocating maternal affection, 
suburban vulgarity, materialism, kitchen religion—was 
mercilessly pilloried. But the fact that the most powerful, or 
at any rate, least powerless, Jewish community in the world 
had abnegated responsibility for its helpless brethren 
during their hour of utmost need did not, apart from a few 
isolated instances, provoke moral satire. Another malady 
from which the Jewish satirists studiously withheld their 
irony was the Jewish infatuation with leftist political 
movements, a delusion that gives every indication of being 
the most damaging to Jewish existence, the most perma­
nent in its destructiveness, since the seventeenth-century 
delusion with Sabbatai Zevi. 
These two great avoidances were connected with each 
*I include in this group not only American Jewish writers who accept the
label calmly but also those, like Philip Roth, who protest that "I am not a
Jewish writer; I am a writer who is a Jew." I do not include American 
Yiddish writers or someone like Wiesel, who writes in French. American 
Jewish poets who have dealt seriously with the Holocaust include Irving
Feldman, Anthony Hecht, Charles Reznikoff, and Shirley Kaufman. 
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other in more than an accidental way. It is not the fashion of 
any satirist to select as his primary subject precisely those 
moral evasions of which he has himself been guilty or those 
false idols after which he has himself been lusting. It is a 
hero and not a clod who declares for himself and his author 
Norman Mailer that " 'the massacres and pogroms, the gas 
chambers, the lime kilns—all of it touched no one, all of it 
was lost.' " The imagination of American Jewish writers 
was not effectively touched by the Holocaust either during 
its occurrence or for two decades afterward (this despite the 
fact that detailed information about the massacres was 
available to those who could read newspapers from 
December 1942). One of Saul Bellow's characters in his 1944 
novel Dangling Man provides the exception that tests the 
rule. Awaiting induction into the army, the hero Joseph 
dreams that he is in a low chamber surrounded by rows of 
murdered people, one of whom he has been charged with 
identifying and reclaiming. His charnel-house guide reads 
from an identity tag a place name which reminds Joseph 
that "in Bucharest . . . those slain by the Iron Guard were 
slung from hooks in a slaughterhouse. I have seen the 
pictures." In horror, he jumps back "in the clear," and 
claims that "I was not personally acquainted with the 
deceased. I had merely been asked, as an outsider." He 
wonders why he and his friends have so easily accustomed 
themselves to the slaughter in Europe and why they have so 
little pity for the victims. But his answer does not venture 
beyond the most charitable of explanations: "I do not like to 
think what we are governed by. I do not like to think about 
it. It is not easy work, and it is not safe. Its kindest 
revelation is that our senses and our imaginations are 
somehow incompetent." 
The causative link that, in my view, exists between the 
absence of the Holocaust and the absence of satire of the 
American Jew's love of leftist humanitarianism from 
American Jewish fiction is also hinted at in this literally 
exceptional novel. The eventual induction of Bellow's hero 
into the army not only takes him away from the 
dreamworld of American freedom back to the European 
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world of limited choice and unlimited bloodshed; it also 
forces him to give up his scholarly work on the Enlighten­
ment. In fact, however, his fascination with this subject had 
already begun to wane, for reasons that are evident in his 
explanation of why he quit the Communist party: " 'You 
see, I thought those people were different. I haven't 
forgotten that I believed they were devoted to the service of 
some grand flapdoodle, the Race, le genre humain. Oh, yes, 
they were! By the time I got out, I realized that any hospital 
nurse did more with one bedpan for le genre humain than 
they did with their entire organization. It's odd to think that 
there was a time when to hear that would have filled me 
with horror.' " 
The Enlightenment and the French Revolution granted 
Jews equal rights simply because they belonged to le genre 
humain. Despite the Enlightenment's unconcealed hatred 
of Judaism (and often of Jews), no group believed more 
fervently than the Jews that the Christian Trinity had been 
supplanted as a motive force in the European mind by the 
new Trinity of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. The 
revolutionists would grant everything to the Jews as 
individuals, but nothing to them as a people or a distinct 
group. Jews impressed by the new dispensation came to 
believe that they must relinquish their national character 
in order to assimilate with "humanity." They were not 
noticeably disturbed by the fact that in practice their 
assimilation was not with all humanity but with the 
particular people among whom they lived. Thus, while the 
People Israel was rapidly improving itself out of existence, 
the other peoples—the French, the Poles, the Germans-
were asserting their national rights more boldly than ever. 
But no conviction has ever been more resistant to 
negative evidence than the belief of the Jewish leftist in the 
promises held out to him by declarations of human rights. 
The leftist-supported pogroms in Russia in the 1880s; the 
espousal by every left-wing party in nineteenth-century 
France of antisemitism; the Dreyfus Affair; the refusal of 
the German Socialists to condemn antisemitism during the 
1930s; the destruction of European Jewry amidst worldwide 
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indifference: such an accumulation of horrors might have 
been thought finally destructive of the delusory belief in 
emancipation, equality, assimilation, and enlightenment. 
A non-Jewish observer like Francois Mauriac, when he 
witnessed trainloads of Jewish children standing at 
Austerlitz station in Paris awaiting deportation to the 
death camps, knew that "the dream which Western man 
conceived in the eighteenth century, whose dawn he 
thought he saw in 1789, and which . . . had grown 
stronger with the progress of enlightenment and the dis­
coveries of science—this dream vanished finally . . . 
before those trainloads of little children."3 But the faith of 
the Jewish universalist has proved more immune to the 
evidence of mere experience than that of the French 
Catholic; and everything we know of Jewish life in the 
United States shows that this faith has survived the Holo­
caust itself. Here a majority of Jews do not merely look 
upon the varied offspring of Enlightenment universalism 
as conducive to Jewish existence but actually believe 
Judaism itself to be coextensive with them. 
The persistence of the universalist-humanist delusion 
among American Jews even in the wake of the Holocaust is 
nowhere represented with more symbolic force than in 
Bernard Malamud's story "The Lady of the Lake" (1958), 
one of but two stories in his work dealing directly with the 
Holocaust.4 The protagonist comes into a small inheritance 
and decides to go abroad "seeking romance." In the States, 
where "a man's past was . . . expendable," he was Henry 
Levin, but once in Europe Levin takes to calling himself 
Henry Freeman, thus symbolically severing his Jewish ties. 
When he meets an attractive Italian girl named Isabella he 
identifies himself as an American but denies his Jewish 
identity. He wonders, since "he absolutely did not look 
Jewish," why she should ask the question of him, but 
quickly dismisses it as a quirk. "With ancient history why 
bother?" One of her attractions, to be sure, is precisely a face 
that carries "the mark of history," that is, of "civilized" 
Italian history. But at the crucial moment, when he comes 
to propose marriage to Isabella, she reveals her breasts, on 
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whose "softened tender flesh" he recognizes the tattooed 
blue numbers of the concentration-camp inmate that show 
her Jewish identity. " 'I can't marry you. We are Jews. My 
past is meaningful to me. I treasure what I suffered for.' " 
Levin-Freeman suddenly discovers the emptiness of his 
freedom and, having deprived himself by his deception of 
what he most desired, can only stammer, " 'listen, I­
I am—.' " But before he can supply the missing label, Isa­
bella disappears into the night. In the aftermath of the 
Holocaust, it is not enough for the American Jew simply to 
be an American, or even simply "to be." To embrace the 
fullness of life that Isabella here represents, he must 
embrace the particularity of his Jewish identity, an identity 
that is forevermore inseparable from the experience of the 
Holocaust. 
Levin-Freeman is symbolic not only of the American Jew 
who has evaded his moral responsibility and impoverished 
his life by cutting himself off from the Jewish past. He may 
also be taken as a symbol of the American Jewish writer 
who, in embracing what Cynthia Ozick has called the 
"Diaspora of freedom," has doomed himself to the obscurity 
of a perpetual involvement "with shadow, with futility, 
with vanity, frivolity, and waste."5 He has denied the 
novelist's responsibility to engage and extend his readers' 
imaginative sympathy, and he has impoverished his own 
art by separating his Jewish characters from their history, 
which could have provided him with that norm of behavior 
without which satire becomes sterile. 
Thus the "silence" of most American Jewish writers on 
the Holocaust was not (as has sometimes been urged in their 
defence) an awed acknowledgement of the unspeakable and 
unimaginable character of the evil that occurred, or the 
implicit admission that what is absolutely unprecedented 
in human affairs cannot be imitated in a literary action. 
American Jewish writers have hardly been struck dumb in 
the face of various evils that (however mistakenly) they 
consider on a par with Auschwitz and Treblinka. Carlyle 
once spoke of the unique eloquence of "the SILENCE of 
deep Eternities, of Worlds from beyond the morning-stars." 
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But the long silence of American Jewish literature on the 
Holocaust was eloquent only of its own failure to shake off 
the incubus-like ideological superstitions of modern Jewry 
and grasp its proper subject—even though to do so would 
have been to admit that Jewish suffering had been not 
merely an indiscriminate part of man's inhumanity toman 
but unique, and that the human rights granted to Jews as 
"freemen" and individuals had been an invitation to self-
destruction. As Norma Rosen recently wrote, "The Holo­
caust is the central occurrence of the Twentieth century. 
It is the central human occurrence. It cannot therefore 
be more so for Jews and Jewish writers. But it ought, at 
least, to be that."6 
Among the best-known American Jewish writers, with 
the exception (again) of Saul Bellow, this silence even today 
has not been broken. But if we now turn from speculation 
about why we have not had, in America, a substantial 
literature of the Holocaust to evaluation of what we do have, 
we will notice a gradual awakening in our literary culture 
that seems to have been spurred by the Eichmann trial and 
the Six-Day War. Since the sixties, a number of American 
Jewish writers, including some of the most gifted, have 
sought to rediscover for us in the Holocaust our own buried 
life. 
We still frequently notice, in this literature, the deep-
seated reluctance to conceive of specifically Jewish suffer­
ing, as well as a compulsive desire for discovering analogies 
between Jewish suffering and that of whatever oppressed 
and allegedly oppressed group (not excluding the Arabs) is 
at the time of writing the special beneficiary of liberal-left 
benevolence. The most hideous example of this tendency is 
probably Richard Elman's pseudo-documentary novel The 
28th Day of Elul (1967). The novel's hero is a survivor who 
writes from Israel to the lawyer of a deceased American 
uncle to prove that he is truly a Jew and therefore deserving 
of his uncle's legacy. By way of explaining to the lawyer 
what Hitler's victims endured, the best he can do is say 
"they were treated like niggers." The worst he can think to 
say of the German murderers themselves is that they are 
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like Americans, who are "just as guilty" because they 
dropped bombs on Hamburg and Dresden—or like (to this 
point does egalitarian nihilism invariably lead us) Israeli 
army officers. The German organizers of mass killing were, 
according to the moral and historical perspective of this 
writer who is all knowingness and no knowledge, just like 
bourgeois functionaries everywhere. " 'We even have them 
in Israel . . . with patches over their eyes.' " This book, 
whose narrator-hero says he is no more a conscious member 
of the Jewish religion than of the "human race," bears out 
in a truly remarkable way Cynthia Ozick's further 
observation that "whoever thinks it necessary to declare 
the Jews members of 'mankind' is not quite sure of the very 
proposition he finds it necessary to declare; and, like 
Shakespeare, he can end by confusing the victim with the 
victimizer."7 
Even in works infinitely superior to Elman's in literary 
tact and moral imagination, we often encounter the desire 
to make the Jew into "an archetype of the eternal 
oppressed."8 This may begin with the understandable 
intention to relate the Holocaust to what is readily available 
in the experience of the author and his imagined audience. 
But it can end by transfusing the blood of Jewish culture 
and Jewish experience into the caput mortuum of univer­
salist ethical demonstrations. 
In Edward Wallant's The Pawnbroker (1962), the hero is 
Sol Nazerman, who lost his wife and children during the 
Holocaust and himself suffered mutilation through medical 
experimentation. Formerly a professor in Poland, in his 
American incarnation he is a pawnbroker whose shop 
exists to subserve the interests of a Mafia gangster. He 
believes that all life has been gassed and burned in those 
crematoriums where he had himself been forced to work. 
His hopes amputated long ago, his greatest wish now is to 
be free of human relationships beyond the formal ones 
required by his home life with the shallow, assimilated 
"American" family of his sister, and by his business 
transactions with the derelicts who frequent his shop. To 
satisfy his biological needs, he occasionally sleeps with a 
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survivor named Tessie Rubin. The act is a form of 
necrophilia, a consummation not of tenderness or love but 
of the desperation and anguish of people who have lost the 
will to live. He resents the attempted intrusion upon his 
privacy and unfeelingness by a well-intentioned social 
worker, Miss Birchfield. His true life is among the dead, and 
comes to him in dreams of his murdered family and people. 
Wallant conveys very powerfully the spiritual distance 
that separates Nazerman from his mindless relatives, his 
hostile black and Puerto Rican customers, and the woman 
who loves him yet wishes the blue numbers on his arm and 
the memories they represent would disappear altogether. 
" 'There is,' "he tells Miss Birchfield," 'a world so different 
in scale that its emotions bear no resemblance to yours; it 
has emotions so different in degree that they have become a 
different species]' " 
Finally, however, Wallant proves as unwilling to accept 
this wall of separation and distinction as the naïvely well-
intentioned social worker, who hopes to "cure" Sol of his 
"bitterness" and make him a "human being" again. Sol has 
refused emotional relationship not only with her but also 
with his black Puerto Rican assistant, Jesus Ortiz, who 
emulates Sol in what he takes to be the peculiarly Jewish 
magical power of pawnbrokerism. When Jesus asks about 
those same blue numbers, " 'Hey, what kind of tattoo you 
call that?' " Sol replies, " 'It's a secret society I belong 
to. . .  . You could never belong. You have to be able to walk 
on the water.' " Jesus has some vague sense of, and 
curiosity about, the suffering that is evident in Sol's face 
and manner: " 'Niggers,' " he complains, " 'suffer like 
animals. They ain't caught on. Oh, yeah, Jews suffer. But 
they do it big, they shake up the worl' with their sufferin'.' " 
But Jesus is entirely ignorant of the specific sources ofthat 
suffering, the Holocaust not being one of those irritants to 
the feelings of minorities for the alleviation of which the 
American educational system offers its famed "sensitivity" 
training. Sol has no desire to enlighten Jesus, and neither 
does Wallant himself. Indeed, it is characteristic of 
American Jewish writing, drawn compulsively to the 
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relationship between blacks and Jews, invariably to 
assume that although Jews are under the most compelling 
of obligations to fathom black suffering, blacks are under 
no obligation whatever to fathom Jewish suffering, much 
less to have heard about it. (It is truly a wonderful example 
of liberal condescension which assumes that blacks may be 
complete human beings without achieving imaginative 
sympathy with their neighbors, whereas their neighbors 
are absolutely required to identify with the plight of blacks 
if they are to live lives that are both moral and fully 
integrated.) 
It is only when Sol can be made to suffer for Jesus that 
Sol's icy encasement will melt away, that his rehabilita­
tion will be possible, and that his own suffering will be 
subsumed within the general suffering of humanity. The 
curative process begins when he discovers that his Mafia 
employer also runs the house of prostitution where one of 
his black customers works. He remembers the sexual en­
slavement of his wife by the Gestapo, and, even though 
he has always taught Jesus that belief in money is the only 
absolute in this world, he now refuses to be paid with money 
from the whorehouse and is brutally beaten for his new 
finickiness. The barriers to memory are now down, and 
Sol's nightmare visions begin to penetrate his waking life 
and crack his unfeeling armor. 
Heavy symbolic operations now come into play, all of 
them intended to validate Jewish suffering by linking it, 
through Christian Symbolism, with the plight of dark-
skinned Americans. Jesus, who has been conspiring with a 
gang of black hoodlums to rob the shop of his employer, 
goes into a church before joining his comrades. Looking at a 
statue of Jesus Christ, he is struck by the vague recognition 
that this savior of his was not only a white man and 
therefore incapable of knowing what blacks must endure, 
but also a Jew and therefore linked with the pawnbroker. 
"And He was a Jew, too, like the Pawnbroker; there's a 
laugh for you. He tried to imagine the Pawnbroker in a 
position like that, nailed up on a cross. . . . He began to 
chuckle, harshly. Wouldn't everybody be shocked to see Sol 
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Nazerman up there, his arm with the blue numbers 
stretched out to the transfixed hand?" At last illumination 
has come to Jesus Ortiz on this little matter of the blue 
numbers; it is in truth a property of crucified humanity. Sol 
Nazerman, whom Ortiz knows to be a possible, albeit not 
intended, casualty of the armed robbery, becomes fixed in 
his mind's eye as Jesus Christ crucified. The old literary-
psychological device of the "double" asserts the interdepen­
dent existence of the Puerto Rican and the Jewish Jesus, 
whose surname, it now dawns on us, bears a strong 
resemblance to "Nazarene." In the robbery, it is Jesus Ortiz 
who literally "dies for" Sol Nazerman by stepping in the 
line of a bullet. With his death, Sol's long-dead emotions 
burst into life. 
The symbolism may at first seem imprecise, working to 
conceal rather than reveal meaning. But in truth the 
symbolism of the doubling has its own logic, however 
unappealing. Jesus Ortiz has been sacrificed on behalf of 
Sol Nazerman, in that his death serves to bring Sol back to 
life. But Sol too has been sacrificed, not so much for Ortiz as 
for the suffering humanity he represents, not so much in his 
body as in the uniqueness of his memories and of the Jewish 
people's suffering. In his final dream, Sol walks over the 
desolate grounds of the death camp, "monument to a 
forgotten race." He meets an S.S. officer who turns out to be 
the Mafia gangster, and informs Sol, " 'Your dead are not 
buried here.' " The tears that signify Sol's return to life are 
at first mysterious to him, "until he realized he was crying 
for loss of one irreplaceable Negro who had been his 
assistant and who had tried to kill him but who had ended 
by saving him." The dilution of the Jewish literary 
imagination brings even a fine writer like Wallant to the 
point where the Jews are asked not merely to give up their 
lives for the benefit of downtrodden minorities but their 
deaths as well. 
Touching Evil (1969), by Norma Rosen, is a novel whose 
reach far exceeds its grasp. It tries to imagine how 
Americans, specifically non-Jewish American women, who 
have been touched by the evil of the Holocaust might try to 
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think and feel and imagine their way into the lives of those 
who had been tortured and killed. The two crucial dates of 
the story are 1944, when the older of the two women central 
to the story, having been shown photographs of the death 
camps at the very moment when she is being seduced, vows 
she " 'will never marry or have children,' " and 1961, when 
the younger woman, Hattie, dutifully follows the Eichmann 
trial on television during her pregnancy. She too has 
misgivings about propagating the species because, in her 
view, the Germans have poisoned the very process of 
generation. But her burgeoning into motherhood is vital to 
her spiritual existence because it is the path by which she 
enters into the lives of those whose blood will otherwise be 
covered by the earth. She suspends her personal rhythms of 
existence and identifies herself with those "far-gone 
pregnant women in their forced march; the woman giving 
birth in the typhus-lice-infested straw; the woman who was 
shot but did not die, and who dug her way from under a 
mountain of corpses that spouted blood. . . .  " 
Unfortunately, Norma Rosen has not pursued this 
striking central idea with sufficient concentration. She too 
allows herself to be diverted by the temptations of analogy, 
of heavy symbolism, and feminist topicality. In fact, the 
book concludes with the older woman "looking for Jesus," 
who, precisely like Wallant's character of the same name, is 
a Puerto Rican misled by his evil friends into criminal 
actions, and aspiring to take him in as Hattie has taken in 
the pregnant Jewish woman of the Holocaust during the 
process of childbirth. Even the crucial scenes in which the 
hysterical Hattie compares the labor room of a New York 
hospital to a concentration camp are so enveloped in 
feminist rhetoric that many a reader (especially today) will 
forget that their point (as the author herself has felt obliged 
to explain)9 is to finalize the identification between Hattie 
and the women whose stories she has heard in the 
Eichmann trial, not to present women as the oppressed 
race. 
Daring, even brilliant, as is the central idea of Touching 
Evil, it would have been far more daring if Rosen had made 
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the heroine who seeks to identify with the Jewish victims of 
Hitler through the shared burden of motherhood a Jew 
herself. For in no respect has the refusal of most American 
Jewish writers to allow their awareness of Jewish history 
and of the Holocaust to impinge on their depiction of 
American Jewish life shown itself so glaringly as in their 
relentless attack upon "the Jewish mother." This well-
known monster of American fiction, who suffocates her 
offspring with egoism parading as affection, was created 
not merely in willful ignorance of what Singer calls "the 
generations-old dolor of the Jewish mother . . . who bled 
and suffered so that murderers should have victims of their 
knives," but with a stolid, almost stupid refusal to consider 
that the paralyzing dilemmas faced by hundreds of 
thousands of Jewish mothers in Hitler's Europe might just 
possibly have touched the consciousness and affected the 
behavior of at least a few of their American counterparts. 
Just how great was the failure of awareness, how 
monstrous the thoughtlessness, of the Jewish writers who 
invented this caricature should be evident tojanyone who 
reads Anya (1974), by Susan F. Schaeffer. *The extraor­
dinary achievement of this novel, probably the best 
American literary work on the Holocaust, cannot be 
conveyed by a description of just one of its themes; but 
nowhere is its special power to convey the enormity of 
Jewish suffering during the destruction process more evi­
dent than in its depiction of the agony of Jewish mothers. 
Susan Schaeffer has given to all those nameless and 
unremembered women who were forced to choose between 
life and a mother's loyalty to her child, or—more horrible 
yet—between the relatively "easy" death of the gas 
chamber and that death in the burning pit which she would 
share with her child if she did not abandon him, "a 
monument and a memorial." 
Anya is a historical novel in the form of a memoir written 
by Anya Savikin some years after she is brought to New 
York from the D.P. camps. It is truly historical—and 
uniquely dignified—in that the author refuses to distance 
herself from the woman who tells the story through irony or 
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the wisdom of hindsight. Rather, she tries to view the events 
of the Holocaust cataclysm as they would have appeared to 
an ordinarily intelligent person caught up in them. In fact, 
not only Susan Schaeffer, but thefifty-two-year-old woman 
who tells her own story, in 1973, resists the temptation to 
separate herself from the young woman who endures the 
war years. We are made to feel how an eighteen-year-old 
assimilated Jewish girl spending her summers at elegant 
resorts and reading Mein Kampf m. a hammock might very 
well dismiss it, as Anya does, as "a fairy tale." The novel 
takes us over much of the familiar Holocaust terrain-J 
prewar pogroms in Poland, the invasion and bombardment 
of Warsaw, selections, killing by shooting and killing by 
gas/yet invariably the writer makes us feel that we are 
experiencing these things afresh, seeing them with new 
eyes. She tells, with a wealth of detail that is part of the 
novel's meaning, of the life of her wealthy, assimilated 
family in Poland before the war, of the arrest, torture, and 
murder of her father, sister, brothers, husband, and, finally, 
mother; of her own suffering in the camps, and of her 
miraculous escapes and survival, made possible by her 
determination to save her daughter^ 
The novel is as much about memory as about the 
Holocaust. Anya tells us that her great wish had always 
been to be taken over by "the continuity of life": to marry, to 
bear children, to accumulate the physical record of family 
memory in pictures and furniture and jewelry; then, at the 
last, to die a normal death. Perhaps no writer since Thomas 
Hardy (as poet) has expressed so well as Schaeffer the 
paradoxical way in which material possessions form the 
texture of a life, and make us human. When she and her 
family are brought to the killing center at Ponary, Anya 
feels that their lives depend most of all on her ability to 
retain through memory the worldj-only ten blocks away in 
their apartment in Vilna—from which they are now 
separated by what seem "huge deep cliffs filled with violent 
water." "I started to picture the stove. It seemed very 
important that I remember every detail, as if all our lives 
depended on it." That in some sense they do depend on it is 
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recognized by the Germans as well. Thus, when Any a visits 
a ravaged Warsaw much later in the story, a Polish cart-
driver tells her how the Germans killed not only people, but 
the trees and the furniture. " 'Kill all the furniture?' I echoed 
helplessly. 'You know, couches, chairs, credenzas, kill them. 
There should be nothing left for anyone to come back to.' " 
When you are living in what Any a's mother taught her to 
call "biblical times," the boundaries between what is living 
and what is dead are obliterated. For Anya, at the end of the 
war, the dead are more real than the living, and memory 
serves not to retain that which still exists but to recover that 
which is no more. It is a dangerous but indispensable 
faculty: "Then I opened the box: There was Momma's big 
diamond ring, and Poppa's diamond ring, and her pin, my 
diploma, my index from medical school, the pictures of 
Stajoe and me near the rock at Druzgeniekie. . . . But 
something had escaped from the box like a dangerous gas. 
It was time, old time. I had to take care not to breathe it in." 
That massive infusion of the details of everyday life that 
has characterized the realistic novel since Thackeray finds 
in this novel its true justification. By conveying so richly the 
fullness of an individual life, Schaeffer, without more than 
glancing at the dimensions of the Holocaust, makes us see 
how far beyond imagining is the loss of six million lives, 
each of them a treasure house of association and memory. 
When she has lost almost everything and everyone, Anya 
must be taught by her mother how and why to survive. The 
elder Mrs. Savikin, a splendid character who both un­
derstands and embodies the naturalness of custom, insists 
that even in the Vilna ghetto her daughter must comb and 
wash and put on lipstick if she wants to retain the human 
image and survive. When the ghetto is being liquidated, the 
order goes out that all women with children are to be killed. 
"Some of the women heard it and ran away from their 
children. 'How could they do it?' I asked Momma. 
'Everything for life,' she answered dully; 'everything to 
live.' " Then Anya and her mother are sent in opposite 
directions at the segregation point, the younger to live, for a 
while, the older to die at once. Anya tries to stay with her 
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mother, but to no avail; and the last words of the mother 
whom she will never see again are: " 'You will live! You 
have someone for whom to live!' " This is her way of 
reminding Anya of what she has already taught her by 
example: that the continuity of life for which she had hoped 
now resides in the daughter Ninka, who has been hidden 
with a Christian family. The little girl has become the repos­
itory of all those destroyed lives. " 'She is the photograph 
album,' I thought, seeing myself turn the pages with 
Momushka." 
The last segment of the novel takes place in the United 
States, where Anya has settled with her second husband, a 
survivor of Auschwitz. When the war ended, she had 
decided at once: " 'I am going to Palestine, or America.' " 
But her choice was made for her by the Communists, NKVD 
parading as Zionists, who arrested her and so blocked her 
way to Palestine. America threatens, actually and sym­
bolically, the desecration of her experience and the 
spoliation of her memories. Having escaped the European 
inferno, she must now be plagued by the predators on the 
streets of New York. On Yom Kippur, the family's 
apartment is burglarized and the treasured family photos 
stolen: "It was a tragedy for me, a real tragedy. I had so little 
of them left." Worse still, she is disappointed in the 
daughter, the recipient of all her love who now turns out to 
be herself unloving. But the memories are by now fixed in 
her mind, independently of the photos. Her dismay over her 
daughter is lessened when she recalls two women living in 
California who had saved themselves by hiding when 
Gestapo officers held up their children and asked the 
mothers to step forward. She cannot understand mothers 
who could abandon their children, but she does not 
condemn them, for "there were no normal lives during the 
war, no ethical lives." Nevertheless, when she says that 
even now, in the safe haven of the United States, "I cannot 
even leave my living child alone for one second," Susan 
Schaeffer does not invite us to sneer but to see and 
understand. 
It is in the United States that Anya reflects (virtually for 
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the last time) on the meaning of all that has happened, to 
her and to the Jewish people. Although her Jewish illiteracy 
ran deep, she had begun to feel her way toward a belief in 
God from the time when, as a girl in medical school, she had 
been saved by an accident of fate from a horrible pogrom 
perpetrated against Jewish girls by the other medical 
students. She sat in perplexity with her mother after the 
event, thinking " 'What for, the chosen people, what for? 
Chosen for what? For this, to be endlessly persecuted, just 
because we are Jewish?' And it was then I began to believe. 
Even the endless persecution was a form of being chosen." 
Why, she now asks, was she saved when all the rest of her 
family went under? "Always I felt this hand over me. 
Always, I was the lucky one." But her world was obliterated, 
"destroyed, erased, as if it were less than a spelling lesson 
on the blackboard," and now the Jews are reduced to the 
humiliation of accepting reparation money, as if one could 
offer compensation for a whole world, "nothing less than 
the globe my father's hand rested on." 
If her own survival remains a mystery to her, the 
Holocaust itself remains a greater one. Was the Holocaust 
perhaps a punishment for intermarriage? "Sometimes I 
think it is a payment for our new country, for Israel." Anya 
can never come to any definite conclusions. Her reflections 
are presented not for their profundity but for their 
conformity to her experience, with which they keep pace. 
She has no interest whatever in finding out what "other, 
wiser people" think it all meant, for "Who can know what it 
meant? I don't believe anyone can. So I satisfy myself with 
simple answers that suit the weather of the day." Anya's 
impulse to understand her experience comes to rest not with 
what Bellow's Mr. Sammler contemptuously refers to as 
"explanations" but with her sitting down to put her feelings 
on paper. In the last page of the book, she re-creates and 
recovers her destroyed family in a dream, in a new house, 
which will not vanish, and which in fact comprises the 
novel that stands before us, a triumph over time. 
American Jewish Holocaust writing concentrates most of 
its attention on the problems of individuals, whether they 
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are survivors, like Anya or like Bellow's Artur Sammler, or 
American Jews who belatedly react to what they had 
watched from a distance, or perhaps not watched at all. For 
the most part, its characters are not participants in a 
process of rebirth and recovery that involves them with the 
Jewish people as a whole or even with the Jews of their own 
country. When the hero of Bellow's Mr. Sammler's Planet 
(1970), upon hearing news of the outbreak of the war in 1967, 
hastens to secure a journalistic assignment that will take 
him to Israel, he is fleeing what suddenly strikes him as the 
historical irrelevance of Jewish America. The contrast here 
with the literature of Israel may seem unsurprising. Yet it 
requires some explanation if we take at all seriously the 
claims made by American Jewry, usually implicitly but 
sometimes explicitly, that the American Jewish communi­
ty, by far the largest in the world in numbers since the 
destruction of European Jewry, is a continuator and an 
inheritor of that ravaged civilization as much as Israel is, 
and has if not an equal then at least a unique role to play in 
the Jewish future. Only two American Jewish writers have 
tried to grapple with this question, and to imagine a 
communal response to the Holocaust that is creative and 
that does not consist of the answer: Israel. The alternative 
answers can also be identified by place-names: Yavneh and 
Bene Brak. 
In 1969 and 1970, Cynthia Ozick published, within a 
period of a few months, a short story and an essay that 
denned two American Jewish responses to the Holocaust 
and the relation between them. The story, a small 
masterpiece, was entitled "Envy; or, Yiddish in America."10 
In it she ironically but affectionately re-created the 
ambience of American Yiddish writers, for whom continua­
tion of Yiddish, the language of the majority of the vic­
tims of the Holocaust, constitutes the most meaningful 
form of Jewish survival. "A little while ago," writes one 
of the story's characters, "there were twelve million 
people . . . who lived inside this tongue, and now what is 
left? A language that never had a territory except Jewish 
mouths, and half the Jewish mouths on earth already 
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stopped up with German worms. The rest jabber Russian, 
English, Spanish, God knows what. . .  . In Israel they 
give the language of Solomon to machinists. Rejoice—in 
Solomon's time what else did the mechanics speak? Yet 
whoever forgets Yiddish courts amnesia of history." The 
story conveys its author's profound dissatisfaction with 
what one of the characters archly refers to as "so-called 
Amer.-Jewish writers." It conveys too the sense that 
Yiddish and Hebrew have now, because of the Holocaust 
and the establishment of the State of Israel, exchanged 
their traditional roles within Jewish life, with Yiddish, now 
the language of martyrdom, acquiring a sacred status, and 
Hebrew, used (often badly) by bus-drivers and peddlers of 
unkosher meat in Tel Aviv, becoming the language of the 
folk and the street. Yet this very transformation and 
elevation of Yiddish into the language of a coterie, who seek 
meaning and salvation through continuing to write in it, 
would itself seem the final confirmation that Yiddish 
language and literature, which for centuries actually did 
perform many of the functions of a homeland for people who 
had none, can no longer do so. The elegiac note in this 
mainly comic story can be deeply moving: " 'In Talmud if 
you save a single life it's as if you saved the world. And if 
you save a language? Worlds maybe. Galaxies. The whole 
universe.' " But how can a language itself in need of 
salvation save others? 
Cynthia Ozick sought an answer to this question in her 
lecture/essay of 1970 entitled "America: Toward Yav­
neh."11 Yavneh traditionally and literally, of course, 
refers to the place in which, in the year 70, following the fall 
of Jerusalem to the Romans, the sage Yohanan ben Zakkai 
established an academy that became the spiritual center of 
Judaism after the nation ceased to be an independent 
political entity. Yavneh continued to flourish as a religious 
center: in it the canon of the Bible was formulated and the 
Mishnah was begun. Thus Judaism could be said to have 
survived and, in one sense, flourished even after the Jewish 
Commonwealth was no more. 
By applying, however tentatively, the term Yavneh to 
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America, Ozick does not, like some subsequent exploiters of 
this metaphor, intend to congratulate American Jewry on a 
moral or intellectual character superior to that of Israeli 
Jews. On the contrary, she makes clear that American Jews 
for the most part remain in their corner of the Exile because 
they love to be nattered for having those very traits that are 
so easily (and often fraudulently) claimed by people without 
power or responsibility, their devotion to "Mankind" 
(rather than to Jews), their pacific character, their wide-
spreading, indiscriminate philanthropy. "In America . . . 
the fleshpots are spiritual. The reason we do not Ingather 
is not because of our material comforts, but because of our 
spiritual self-centeredness." Indeed, her whole thrust up 
to this point in her essay is that when the Jews went into 
Exile their capacity for literature seemed to abandon 
them, especially when they chose to address, as most 
American Jewish writers still do address, the principle 
of "Mankind" rather than the culture and problems of 
their own people. Nevertheless, she finally expresses the 
hope that just as Spain was for a time in the Middle Ages a 
sort of Jerusalem Displaced, so can America be. 
" 'Yavneh,' " she says, "is an impressionistic term, a 
metaphor suggesting renewal. The original Academy at 
Yavneh was founded after the destruction of the Temple; 
the new one in prospect coincides with the restoration of 
Zion." She expresses the hope that the Yavneh of America 
can share responsibility for Jewish destiny with the Jews of 
Israel. In a kind of division of labor scheme for the 
reconstruction of a shattered people, she envisions 
Jerusalem as the healer of wounds, the bringer of health, 
the safekeeper, and Yavneh America as "the Aggadists, the 
makers-of-literature." Although most of her essay has 
demonstrated, rather conclusively, that Diaspora culture 
has been largely a disaster, and that "there are no major 
works of Jewish imaginative genius written in any Gentile 
language, sprung out of any Gentile culture," she now 
makes a declaration of faith in the ability of American 
Jewry to preserve itself by making a new culture. This 
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culture will itself be partly the result of the restoration of 
Israel, partly the result of the Holocaust, and yet it will have 
its own character, its own principle of life. 
The main instrument of this reconstruction will be a 
creative union between Yiddish and English that Ozick 
labels New Yiddish, and that she hopes will become, just 
as "old" Yiddish was, "the language of multitudes of Jews, 
spoken to Jews by Jews, written by Jews for Jews." If 
doubters ask who is to invent such a language, her answer is 
that it has already been invented, that her essay itself is 
written in it, that Norma Rosen's Touching Evil and Saul 
Bellow's Mr. Sammler's Planet are novelistic examples of it. 
Just as a dialect of Middle High German was once changed 
into Yiddish by being made the instrument of Jewish 
peoplehood, Jewish necessities, so too can English be 
transformed into New Yiddish by Jewish writers who have 
found their proper subject—the Holocaust and Jewish 
fate—and can transmute the characteristic rhythms and 
intonations of Yiddish into English.12 
Although few readers have failed to be impressed by 
Cynthia Ozick's brilliance of mind and style, many come 
away from the essay feeling that she is something like the 
magician who puts eggs into a hat and brings forth—eggs.13 
Her procedure is similar to that of the Gothic revivalists of 
the nineteenth century who thought to recreate the 
civilization of the Middle Ages by imitating its architecture, 
even as they maintained that all architecture was in­
evitably an index of the ethical values of the civilization 
that produced it. But if criticism cannot create a new 
culture, perhaps it can, as Matthew Arnold believed, create 
a new literature. Cynthia Ozick's call for American Jewish 
culture to assume, alongside Israeli Jewish culture, respon­
sibility for the reconstruction of Jewish life, has already 
stirred a response among younger writers, most notably in 
Arthur A. Cohen's In the Days of Simon Stern (1973). This 
novel, garrulous, pedantic, and badly structured, is never­
theless rich in idea and imaginative power, and unique 
among the works of American fiction we have surveyed 
142 The Resonance of Dust 
in two respects. It views the Holocaust from the perspec­
tive of Jewish religion, and it attempts to imagine, in 
America, a collective rather than individual response to 
the destruction of European Jewry. 
The novel's narrator is blind Nathan Gaza, a survivor of 
Auschwitz whose name calls up that of the prophet of 
Sabbatai Zevi, the false messiah of the seventeenth century 
who appealed to the desperate hopes of masses of Jews in 
the aftermath of unprecedented massacre. Nathan tells his 
story in English, but deplores its inadequacy as a language 
of prophecy and says he uses it only because Simon Stern, 
who thought English second only to Hebrew, demanded it. 
Nathan tells the story of Simon Stern, whose parents were 
informed, before his birth in 1899, that their son would be 
the Messiah, but that his emergence would be contingent on 
their own death. Simon does not learn of his identity until 
much later, in fact, just after he learns from the modern 
Elijah, Chaim Weizmann, in his Madison Square Garden 
speech of 1943, that two million Jews have already been 
killed. No sooner does Weizmann say that " 'we are being 
destroyed by a conspiracy of silence' " than Simon is 
stricken with impotence, forever incapable of physical love 
because his creative destiny must be fulfilled in other 
realms. He now receives the letter that his father had 
written him in 1899 telling him that he is the Messiah. The 
linkage between the death of his parents by fire in the 
previous year and the death of two million Jews quickens 
his sense of mission. "Why is it always so," asked Simon's 
father in his revelatory letter, "that good should come out of 
evil?" Up to this time in his life, Simon's messianic energies 
have gone into the accumulation of sixty million dollars' 
worth of real estate. But the simultaneous revelation of his 
messianic destiny and of the destruction of the Jews of 
Europe raises the question of whether what the Book of 
Daniel calls "the time of beating wings" is at hand. Nathan, 
true to his prophetic role, reflects: "The world, it is said, will 
be saved either when it has become so transparently 
magnificent that the Messiah appears as a reward or when 
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it aches so from misery that the Messiah comes like a 
medicine. But there's a third way. The Messiah comes into 
our midst when men are speechless." 
Although Simon and his friends do place advertisements 
in the New York Times informing the nation of the details 
and magnitude of the slaughter and urging the Allies to 
bomb the death camps, they do not undertake political 
action. Simon dreams of confronting Roosevelt over his 
callous refusal to ransom the Jews and take them in, but his 
dream is not translated into action. Simon gives five million 
dollars to endow a Society for the Rescue and Resurrection 
of the Jews, whose actions during the war are fictional 
confirmation of the accusation (made by Hilberg and 
others) that in the midst of the slaughter American Jews 
thought, when they thought at all, not of political action to 
effect rescue but of postwar salvage operations. Simon's 
society has as its primary purpose the preparation of 
centers and domiciles for the restoration to the remnant— 
for, as the Bible says, there always is a remnant—of their 
souls as well as their bodies. 
Cohen himself is more interested in pursuing the idea of a 
separate destiny for post-Holocaust American Jewry than 
in a political critique of the American Jewish community 
during the war. Whereas in Anya the heroine ends up in 
America purely by accident, here the decision to go to 
America rather than to Eretz Israel is a conscious one, 
forced by Simon Stern. Simon actually goes to the D.P. 
camps to select the choice survivors and urge them to go to 
New York with him rather than to Palestine. " 'Some will 
want to go and cannot. Others will not want to go and I will 
persuade you to come.' " As if to emphasize the competitive 
character of the choice, Cohen shows Simon's speech to the 
survivors precipitating a battle between the two factions. 
"There was a momentary silence as the assembly con­
sidered his invitation and then a cry went up: 'To America. 
To America.' And others replied, 'To the Land. To the Land. 
Eretz Yisrael.' Fists hit against the air and arms struck out 
against others." 
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Eventually the refugees are brought to New York, and the 
process of rehabilitation begins. Simon Stern envisions, not 
exactly a Yavneh, but "a small Bene Brak as in the days 
after the destruction of the ancient temple," a Bene Brak in 
New York City that will bear witness that " 'despite all, 
everything, Jews will endure.' " The original Bene Brak, 
like the original Yavneh, became important only in the first 
century of this era, when, following the destruction in 
Jerusalem, a group of sages moved there and made it into a 
famous seat of learning, where Rabbi Akiva established his 
great academy. The very idea that a Bene Brak could arise 
in New York City after the Holocaust constitutes an 
audacious challenge to modern Israel's role as the rightful 
inheritor of the destroyed Jewish civilization of Europe. 
The task of giving a semblance of civility to a community 
of survivors of bestiality is engaged with energy. Simon is 
proclaimed Messiah at a meeting of the Society, and the 
"endurers" begin to rebuild a Temple replica as well as to 
regain the pride, courage, and tenacity of the Jews who built 
the original. But from this high point all is decline and 
dissolution: we have had no more than what Nathan calls 
"a fulfilled moment." The same may be said of the 
novel itself, for the idea of building a restored Jewish civili­
zation in New York City is even more quixotic than that of 
building it on a new literary language. Cohen is prepared 
for this objection, which is met by one of his characters, who 
says that really there is "no difference between Simon Stern 
and David Ben-Gurion. He drew none of the haughty dis­
tinctions between those who build castles in the sky and 
those who build castles in the sand." Once again, we meet 
the notion of a division of labor between the two inheritors 
of the Jewish remnant, Israel and Diaspora. But here the 
idea has an enormous arrogance absent from Cynthia 
Ozick's formulation. For in truth the speaker asserts not 
equality between the partners but the superior spirituality 
of the partner whose castles are built only in the air. True, 
the castles in the sky built in New York and those in sand 
built in Eretz Israel are both shaky and unstable, but "the 
former were the constructions of visionaries and the latter 
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the constructions of unskilled engineers. The fact that the 
visionaries had kept the People alive for thousands of years 
was proof enough that the engineers would in time learn 
their trade." There could be no more stunning illustration 
than this of what Hillel Halkin has called the tendency of 
some American Jewish intellectuals to imagine the entire 
Jewish people "with its body in the East and its soul in the 
West."14 
Despite its shortcomings, In the Days of Simon Stern 
asks important questions about the political and 
theological implications15 of the Holocaust, questions either 
prohibited or tacitly avoided by most American Jewish 
writing. It forces us to look back at the conduct of American 
Jewry and of Jewry's favorite senators and president 
during the Holocaust and to ask whether, in Simon's words, 
"the murderers are . . . the ones who do not pay atten­
tion." It also explores, with more audacity than perhaps 
any work except Moshe Flinker's diary and Nelly Sachs's 
poetry the bearing of the Holocaust upon the ancient Jewish 
idea that messianic redemption will come through 
historical catastrophe. Above all, it suggests a new future 
for American Jewish writing by opening the question of 
how to reorganize Judaism in the Diaspora after the 
European Diaspora has been destroyed, and of how 
American Jewish culture can assume, alongside Israeli 
Jewish culture, responsibility for the reconstruction of 
Jewish life. 
The Holocaust has, then, finally become a subject of 
American Jewish fiction, finally made itself felt as an event 
of Jewish history and significance. This ought to be a cause 
of satisfaction, even if it is a strange satisfaction that comes 
from assimilating to the imagination a catastrophe that 
befell us over three decades ago. But, alas, we have no time 
to enjoy even this qualified satisfaction, for the Jews do not 
seem able to extricate themselves from the storm center of 
modern history. If world events and American policy 
continue on their present course, American Jews may once 
again find themselves faced with a tragic choice between 
their identity as members of the Jewish people and their 
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identity as American citizens. If our writers have at last 
begun to equip us for tragedy, they will at least have saved 
us from the worst calamity. 
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With an effort which up till now has never been repeated I 
managed to reach the cultural level of an average Euro­
pean. In itself that might be nothing to speak of, but it is 
something insofar as it has helped me out of my cage and 
opened a special way out for me, the way of humanity.—The 
ape in Kafka's "A Report to an Academy" 
chapter 5 
The Destruction and Resurrection of the Jews 
In the Fiction of Isaac Bashevis Singer 
The best-known utterance about the Holocaust in the 
writings of Isaac Bashevis Singer is the concluding 
statement of the English version of The Family Moskat: 
"Death is the Messiah. That's the real truth." The setting is 
Warsaw at the time of the Nazi bombardment and invasion 
in 1939; the speaker is Hertz Yanovar (a Jew who has 
substituted psychic research for religion). The statement 
gains its tremendous force less from the events within the 
novel than from the reader's knowledge of what will befall 
the Jews after the novel ends, not only in Poland but 
everywhere in Europe. But it is also intended to pass 
adverse judgment upon the Jewish impatience for redemp­
tion, an impatience that expresses itself still to some extent 
in the religious longing of the traditional Jew but primarily 
in the developmental superstitions of the modern secular 
Jew. The novel shows how the Russian Revolution of 1905, 
which had accelerated the break-up of the Jewish world, 
had, paradoxically, quickened the messianic expectations 
both of the Chassidim who deplored this disintegration and 
of the maskilim (enlighteners) and leftists who welcomed it. 
The Family Moskat is a study of the prospective victims 
of the Holocaust and of the reasons for their victimization. 
That Singer should, both in this novel and elsewhere, 
assume that the Holocaust is to be understood, insofar as it 
can be understood, primarily as an event in Jewish history, 
represents both an advantage and a shortcoming of his 
method. Singer never accepts the implications of the old 
joke told by liberals about the antisémite who claims that 
the Jews had caused World War I and gets the reply: Yes, the 
Jews and the bicyclists. Why the bicyclists? asks the 
antisémite. Why the Jews? asks the other. On the contrary, 
Singer sees the major catastrophes of Jewish history in the 
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Diaspora as so many announcements of the Holocaust, of 
which they are the prototypes. Nowhere in his fiction does 
Singer assume that the Jews were the accidental victims of 
the Holocaust, or that the disaster might just as well have 
befallen another people. When Reb Dan Katzenellenbogen 
ponders the relationship between the pacific ethos of the 
Jews and the orgiastic violence of the gentiles, and asks of 
the latter: "What were they seeking? What would be the 
outcome of their endless wars?" we know what the answer 
is: the destruction of the Jews. A Europe for which the 
prospect of murdering Jews had become, in the late 
nineteenth century, a primary principle of social unity, 
cannot be said to have stumbled accidentally upon the Jews 
as victims. But if Singer avoids the pitfalls of the approach 
which assumes the perfect innocence of the Jews and the 
accidental nature of their victimization, he may be said to 
go to the other extreme in that he tends to view the Nazis as 
only the latest in the long succession of those murderous 
outsiders who have obtruded themselves upon Jewish 
history again and again. "Yes," sighs the narrator of 
Family Moskat, "every generation had its Pharaohs and 
Hamans and Chmielnickis. Now it was Hitler." 
In The Slave, a novel ostensibly dealing with the plight of 
Jews in seventeenth-century Poland in the aftermath of the 
fearful massacres perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish 
people by the Polish peasant-revolutionary Chmielnicki, 
Singer is clearly writing about the Holocaust. Virtually all 
the questions that Singer's explicit Holocaust literature 
characteristically asks are posed in this novel. " 'Why did 
this happen to us?' " one of the men asked. " 'Josefov was a 
home of Torah.' " " 'It was God's will,' " a second 
answered. " 'But why? What sins did the small children 
commit? They were buried alive.' " How, the novel's hero 
asks, can the mind grasp such a quantity of horrors? "There 
was a limit to what the human mind could accept. It was 
beyond the power of any man to contemplate all these 
atrocities and mourn them adequately." What was the role 
of God in all this? Could so much evil really be explained as 
a test of man's faith, of his free will? "Did the Creator 
require the assistance of Cossacks to reveal His nature?" 
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Could Chmielnicki really be a part of the godhead or was it 
perhaps true that this massacre of the Jews revealed the 
existence of a radical evil in the universe, a devil who had no 
celestial origins? The Slave also shows us Jews who are 
forced to dig their own graves before they are executed, 
berates the Jewish community for its shameful failure to 
offer forceful resistance to the murders, and preaches the 
sacred duty of remembering forever those who were 
slaughtered. "Through forgetfulness," Jacob says of 
himself, "he had also been guilty of murder." In its dwelling 
upon the physical obscenities of the mass murders, The 
Slave may even be said to deal more concretely with the 
Holocaust than those novels and stories that approach it 
frontally. 
Our reaction to Singer's tendency to generalize the 
Holocaust in this way will depend in part on whether we 
view antisemitism as a phenomenon deeply embedded in 
Western culture or as a movement quite distinct from 
religious Jew hatred, a movement that grew up only in the 
nineteenth century. Since a novelist ordinarily writes about 
what he knows, which in Singer's case is the Jews and the 
Christians of Poland, we can hardly expect him to give us a 
portrayal of the German murderers of Polish Jewry. Yet we 
might reasonably expect that a writer who in treating the 
Holocaust recognizes the centrality of the question "Why 
the Jews?" should at least not preclude us from asking the 
question, although he cannot ask it himself,"Why the 
Germans?" That Singer should implicitly short-circuit this 
question is the more disturbing in view of the fact that he 
cannot finally convince us or himself that the Holocaust is 
no different in kind from the long series of disasters that 
have befallen the Jews since the seventeenth century. The 
Slave celebrates survival and recovery; the characters of 
Enemies who have survived the camps never recover and 
cannot return to life. 
Singer is not only not discriminating in his treatment of 
the murderers of the Jews; he at times comes close to 
viewing them as merely a function of the Jews' failure to be 
true to themselves and to their best traditions. The difficult 
and painful question of the Jews' co-responsibility for the 
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disaster that was to engulf them is raised often in The 
Family Moskat, both by Jews and gentiles. At a political 
discussion early in the book, one of those overheated 
conspiratorial gatherings of Jews that Singer loves to 
recall, a man named Lapidus upbraids his leftist friends 
with this classic utterance: " 'We dance at everybody's 
wedding but our own.' " Leftist Jews, ready, even eager, to 
spill their ink and their blood lavishly for the liberation of 
every other oppressed group, have called into question the 
very existence of the Jews as a people. The Bialodrevna 
rabbi, for his part, charges that the enlightened Jews are 
"lead[ing] their own children to the slaughterhouse," a 
remark that gains in impact from the later description, 
filled with Singer's vegetarian zeal, of the actual 
slaughterhouse that Asa Heshel and Hadassah visit. A 
Polish inspector adds his sinister voice to this chorus of 
accusers when he tells Hertz Yanovar, who has been 
arrested (mistakenly) on charges of Communist activity, 
that the massive Jewish involvement in Bolshevism 
exacerbates antisemitism and "puts the very existence of 
the Jewish race in danger." 
If we suspect Singer of stacking the evidence against his 
left-leaning Jewish characters, we should remember that 
his accusation of self-destructive zealousness can be amply 
confirmed by external sources, and particularly by the 
testimony of two of the most astute Jewish leaders of the 
early part of this century. Chaim Weizmann said that 
hundreds of thousands of young Jews in early twentieth-
century Russia were convinced revolutionaries "offering 
themselves for sacrifice as though seized by a fever." 
Yitzchok Leibush Peretz wrote of the 1905 Revolution, 
which roused the hopes of so many leftist Jews, that the 
pogroms that accompanied it demonstrated a painful truth 
that the Jews would ignore at their peril: "In the hands of 
the Jew, the reddest of all flags has been placed forcibly and 
he has been told: 'Go, go on and on, with all liberators, with 
all fighters for a better tomorrow, with all destroyers of 
Sodoms. But never may you rest with them. The earth will 
burn under your feet. Pay everywhere the bloodiest costs of 
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the process of liberation, but be unnamed in all emancipa­
tion proclamations, . . . You are the weakest and the least 
of the nations and you will be the last for redemption."1 
Although it has been frequently and correctly observed, 
sometimes by Singer himself,2 that his literary roots lie 
outside the Yiddish tradition, although within the Jewish 
tradition, there is one important respect in which he is a 
continuator of Abramovitch, Sholom Aleichem, andPeretz. 
like them, he looks upon the Jews, with a rare exception 
here and there (usually, in Singer, a Zionist exception), as 
political imbeciles, incapable of recognizing not just 
political actualities, but the most fundamental political and 
human necessity—that of self-preservation. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that the verdict of his fiction should go 
clearly against those Jews who undermined first their right 
to exist as a people and then, inevitably, their right to exist 
at all by embracing the Socialist distinction between the 
Jews as a people—a particularly reactionary and obscuran­
tist people— and individual Jews who enlisted in the party 
of humanity. The running argument in Singer's novels of 
modern life, over whether the hatred of Jews is increased by 
those Jews who retain their Yiddish and their caftan and 
their sidelocks or by those who assimilate themselves
 to the 
host culture by speaking Polish and shortening their 
jackets and their hair and their memory, was settled by 
history itself, for the plan to eliminate Jews from the face of 
the earth originated in a country where Jews aped the 
manners and the culture and often the religion of their 
prospective murderers. (To be sure, the German grand­
children, or at least great-grandchildren, of those Jews who 
had repudiated their faith would not have been among the 
murdered of Auschwitz; but they might have been among 
the murderers. " 'If we don't want to become like the 
Nazis,' " says Herman Broder in Enemies, " 'we must be 
Jews.' ") 
But this application of the wisdom of hindsight (which, 
we should add, is better than the stupidity of hindsight) 
is not the core of Singer's analysis of the Jews' core­
sponsibility for the terrible fate that befell them. The hero 
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of Enemies, looking back upon the destruction of his people, 
believes that the Holocaust will have had one (and only one) 
salutary effect if it has discredited the delusion of progress: 
"Phrases like a 'better world' and a 'brighter tomorrow' 
seemed to him a blasphemy on the ashes of the tormented." 
It was precisely the belief in progress, whether defined by 
Darwin or by Marx, that implicated Jewish maskilim and 
Jewish socialists in the deluge that eventually overwhelm­
ed them and their brethren. First, it was this belief that 
sanctioned the elimination of biologically inferior species 
and socially backward classes; second, it intensified secular 
messianism and so prepared the arrival of the latest in the 
long line of false messiahs who have been a curse upon the 
history of the Jews. 
In her brilliant essay on The Manor,3 Mary Ellmann has 
shown how pervasive is the influence of Darwinian 
evolutionism on that novel's "emancipated" characters. 
According to her, Singer's critique of Darwinism dwells 
upon its tendency to blur distinctions between man and 
animal, Jew and gentile, piety and impiety. My own view is 
that the main thrust of Singer's attack is directed against 
the evolutionist belief in perpetual and progressive motion 
because, as historians have often argued, it is analogous to 
the Marxist belief in the infallibility of the historical 
process: 
The conversation turned to religion. Zipkin said straight out
that he was an atheist. . . . Man, as Darwin had proved, was 
descended from the apes. He was just another animal: homo 
sapiens. Zipkin began discussing the doctrines of Marx, 
Lassalle, and Lavrov. The Polish Jew, he said, had once had a 
real place in society. Before the liberation of the serfs, he had
acted as an intermediary between the landowners and the 
peasantry. He had outlived his role and become little more than 
a parasite. He wasn't productive, didn't speak the language of 
the country in which he lived, and sent his children to cheders. 
How long was the Jew going to wash himself in ritual baths
and walk around in tzizis? 
Darwin's Nature and Marx's History, hypostatized, speak 
with one voice on the Jewish people: they are the chief 
impediment to the removal of inferior races and backward 
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classes that biology and history demand. When Ezriel 
Babad asks Zipkin whether all the Jews, including their 
own parents, must be destroyed because they are not 
peasants, his sister screams: " 'Leave our parents and the 
Jews out of it. . . . A parasite is a parasite, even if he's your 
father.' " 
In The Estate, which continues the story of The Manor, 
the most articulate exponent of the view that both history 
and nature use mankind merely as raw material for the 
fulfillment of their high purposes is Zadok, the wayward 
son of the Chassid Jochanan. Zadok believes the moral 
laws of the Jews are confuted by the laws of biology that 
sanction, and indeed require, the Malthusian struggle for 
existence and catastrophic wars. " ' It's the same to nature 
who kills whom. For thousands of years bulls have been 
slaughtered and nature has kept quiet. . . . Why should a 
human life be so dear to Nature?' " 
Zadok's reference to the slaughter of bulls as a model for 
the slaughter of men serves to remind us that Singer's 
vegetarianism, which he has called his only dogma,4 
however embarrassing it may be to some of his admirers, is 
crucial to his understanding of the Holocaust. For Herman 
Broder, "what the Nazis had done to the Jews, man was 
doing to animals." Singer believes that acceptance in any 
form whatever of the theory that might makes right must 
eventually victimize the Jews. Hence, in the dreams of 
Yoineh Meir, the slaughterer who in the story ofthat name 
forsakes his calling because he comes to believe that 
injustice to dumb beasts retards messianic redemption, 
"cows assumed human shape, with beards and side locks, 
and skullcaps over their horns." Singer's saints, like 
Jochanan, whose son will welcome the killing of bulls and 
of men, are not only troubled by the slaughter of animals 
but express tenderness over flies and bugs, as if they could 
feel that it was to be but a short step from the metaphorical 
depiction of Jews as parasites to their literal extermination 
as bugs. 
But Darwinist-Marxist historicism is for Singer some­
thing more than just a modern expression of the doctrine 
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that might makes right. It inspires in him a special re­
vulsion because it joins to this doctrine the principle that 
morality is a consideration not of the present but only of the 
long run, and that the evil of the moment may be justified as 
working the good of the developmental process. This 
principle, too, is a modern version of what is for Singer an 
ancient evil, which has spectacularly manifested itself in 
Jewish history in the form of apocalyptic messianism. 
Satan in Goray is Singer's most elaborate portrait of the 
type of the false Messiah, or rather of the atmosphere from 
which he is engendered. In this novel, and also in the story 
of "The Destruction of Kreshev," Singer shows that in the 
messianic frenzy that existed during the lifetime of 
Sabbatai Zevi in the seventeenth century and even long 
after his apostasy and death, many Jews, convinced of the 
Talmudic precept that the Messiah will come when one 
generation is either wholly innocent or wholly guilty, 
plausibly decided that the way to hasten redemption and 
the coming of the Messiah was to plunge deeper and deeper 
into evil and degradation. This seemed a shorter, less 
winding path, than that of plodding
 virtue. In "Destruction 
of Kreshev" Shloimele, a secret follower of the false 
Messiah, goes so far as to say: " 'I love fire! I love a 
holocaust . .  . I would like the whole world to burn and 
Asmodeus to take over the rule.' " The moral of all such 
stories of impatient attempts to hasten the coming of the 
Messiah is enunciated by the old-fashioned narrator of the 
last two chapters of Satan in Goray at the end ofthat book: 
"LET NONE ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE LORD: TO END 
OUR PAIN WITHIN THE WORLD: THE MESSIAH WILL 
COME IN GOD'S OWN TIME. . . .  " 
When Singer moves to a modern setting, apocalyptic 
messianism becomes historicist activism that expresses 
itself through the by now familiar motto: "Worse is better." 
Precisely by exacerbating the evils, anomalies, and hatred 
within the existing social system, one is preparing the 
liberation from some mysterious region of the impulse that 
will remove anomaly, injustice, and hatred altogether. 
Ironically, however, it is now the religious characters or 
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those who retain nostalgic sympathy for the Jewish 
religion who become the exponents of patience and the 
critics of messianic urgency. In the nineteenth century, the 
Jews who altogether repudiate their religious faith adopt a 
secular faith, whereas it is Ezriel Babad, vacillating 
between the enlightenment of Western Europe and the 
obscurantism of Chassidism, who passes judgment on his 
sister's belief in redemption, redemption through violent 
revolution: "She wanted to free the peasants and the 
proletariat. Like their father [the rabbi], she campaigned 
against the company of Satan. But what would come after 
victory? Not redemption, not saints who benefited from the 
splendor of the Divine glory, but lots of newspapers, 
magazines, theaters, cabarets. More railroads, more 
machines. . . .  " Ezriel's own daughter, Zina, becomes a 
kind of schlemiel-revolutionary who masquerades as a 
pregnant woman and experiences the birth pangs not of the 
Messiah but of a revolutionary arms smuggler whose 
cartridges burst from under her dress in a trolley car. 
Appalled by the results of all these secular attempts to 
realize the millennium, Ezriel resolves that even his own 
pacific ideal of cultural pluralism "could not be brought 
about forcibly, nor could the Messiah be compelled to 
arrive." If Ezriel had survived to experience the Holocaust, 
he would, like his creator Singer, have viewed Hitler as a 
creation of Jewish as much as of German history. "The 
belief in false Messiahs," Singer has said, "is very old and 
very young. What was Stalin if not a false Messiah? And 
what was Hitler if not a false Messiah?"5 
What Ezriel opposes to the future-oriented visions of the 
Darwinists and Marxists who wish to accelerate the 
movement of natural and social history is the wisdom of 
standing still or even moving in reverse that is embodied by 
the Chassidim. "When one gazes at the Talmudic scholars, 
one actually sees eternity. . . . How wonderfully they have 
isolated themselves amidst all this madness! They do not 
even know that they are at the end of the 'Magnificent' and 
bloody nineteenth century. In their Houses of Worship, it is 
always the beginning." For Ezriel, the stationariness of the 
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Chassidim, their entire indifference to the messianic hopes 
of the Darwinians and revolutionists, their contempt for the 
alleged decrees of Nature and History that declare them 
parasitical and obsolete and reactionary, represent a splen­
did affirmation of human freedom and afford a glimpse 
of eternity itself. 
For survivors of the Holocaust, however, the Chassidim 
are no longer distinctly available as a living embodiment of 
resistance to historical inevitabilities, or supposed in­
evitabilities. The characters in Enemies, many of them, live 
with the fear that the Holocaust really did show that the 
nineteenth-century ideologues who claimed that the voices 
of Nature and History were the voices of God were right 
after all. " 'Slaughtering Jews,' " says Masha, " 'is part of 
nature. Jews must be slaughtered—that's what God 
wants.' " One can no longer see eternity in the Chassidim 
because they and eternity itself have been consumed by the 
Holocaust. " 'Everything has already happened,' Herman 
thought. 'The creation, the flood, Sodom, the giving of the 
Torah, the Hitler holocaust. Like the lean cows of Pharaoh's 
dream, the present had swallowed eternity, leaving no 
trace.' " Enemies does not (like Bellow's Mr. Sammler's 
Planet, for example) explore the possibility of recovery from 
the trauma for those Jews who have survived the Holo­
caust, but assumes that for the Jews generally the Holo­
caust was the end of the world. For Herman, the only future 
lies in the past, as it exists not in living anachronisms like 
the Chassidim but in what he calls "Jewish books." For 
Herman, and by implication thousands like him, there is 
no community or homeland to which to return. "These 
writings were home. On these pages dwelt his parents, his 
grandparents, all his ancestors." 
But what of the homeland that did in fact arise after the 
death of European Jewry? To put the question another way, 
does Singer ever countenance a Jewish defiance of history 
that expresses itself as a living social reality rather than 
through nostalgia and literature? For many Jews, especial­
ly young people in the D.P. camps after the war, Zionism 
was precisely that spiritual impulse which alone could both 
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overcome the degradation and defy the absurdity of the 
Holocaust. Singer's treatment of Zionism, although at a 
considerable remove from the center of his imaginative 
world, nevertheless conveys his sense of how far the Jews 
can resist the sentence of death that modern historical 
"laws" appear to have decreed for them by themselves 
taking action within history. 
Singer's most ambitious Holocaust novel, The Family 
Moskat, is also his most Zionist one. The book offers a series 
of parallel scenes intended to demonstrate that neither 
believers nor skeptics are capable of fathoming the 
enormity of Jewish suffering. When, at the outbreak of 
World War I, the Jews are expelled from Tereshpol Minor, 
Rabbi Dan Katzenellenbogen, as he guides the exodus of his 
people, is assailed with the all-expressive "Nu?" by the town 
freethinker and apostle of Western enlightenment, Jeku­
thiel the watchmaker: 
"Nu, rabbi?" he said. 
It was clear that what he meant was: Where is your Lord of the
Universe now? Where are His miracles? Where is your faith in
Torah and prayer? 
"Nu, Jekuthiel," the rabbi answered. What he was saying was:
Where are your worldly remedies? Where is your trust in the
gentiles? What have you accomplished by aping Esau? 
To Jekuthiel it is inescapably clear that the Jewish God has 
been far less faithful to His people than they to Him; and to 
Rabbi Dan it is just as clear that if God cannot help the 
Jews, nothing can, for what salvation can come from 
imitating the ways of the oppressor? Both are right in what 
they deny, but unsupported in what they affirm. In either 
case, as Rabbi Dan says to himself: "The old riddle 
remained: the pure in heart suffered and the wicked 
nourished; the people chosen of God were still ground in the 
dust. . . . " 
A similar parallelism aligns Rabbi Dan with his 
grandson Asa Heshel. Both labor during a lifetime over 
manuscripts grappling with the ultimate questions. The 
grandfather had produced three sackfuls of manuscripts, 
and "there had been a time when he had entertained the 
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idea of publishing some of his commentaries." But a few 
days after the outbreak of World War I, "he crammed his 
manuscripts into the mouth of the stove and then watched 
them burn. 'The world will survive without them,' he 
remarked." Asa Heshel, a few days after the outbreak of 
World War II, repeats Jekuthiel's question, asking Barbara, 
" 'What do you think of God now, tell me.' " But he 
acknowledges the futility of his own hedonistic solution: 
"In the drawer of his desk lay an old version of 'The 
Laboratory of Happiness,' written in Switzerland. Asa 
Heshel unscrewed the door of the stove and thrust it inside." 
If the mystery of Jewish suffering cannot be fathomed by 
the intellectual efforts of either the believers or the skeptics, 
perhaps the best response would be an existential one, in 
which action would cut through the knot that intellect has 
not been able to untie. "Get thee out of thy country" is an 
injunction with deep roots in Jewish consciousness, and one 
that sounds in the ears of several characters in The Family 
Moskat, including Asa Heshel himself, who after his first 
brush with antisemitism in Warsaw says to himself: " 'Yes, 
Abram is right. I've got to get out of Poland. If not to 
Palestine, then to some other country where there's no law 
against Jews going to college.' " 
Since Abram Shapiro, who is something of a Chassid but 
more of a lecher, is the most prominent spokesman for 
Zionism among the novel's major characters, the book can 
hardly be said to be a Zionist tract. Nevertheless, Zionism is 
distinctly set apart from socialism, communism, and other 
left-wing movements that arouse the wrath of the orthodox, 
for the very good reason that only Zionism grasped the 
dimensions of modern antisemitism and understood its 
implications for the future of the Jewish people. 
Abram rails against the Jewish intellectuals who gain 
their university credentials by loudly proclaiming that 
Jews are a religion, not a nation, and that the backward, 
dirty Jews from the east pollute the Western European 
atmosphere. He insists that the Exile alone has made of the 
Jews the " 'cripples, schlemiels, lunatics' " who inhabit 
Warsaw: " 'Just let us be a nation in our own land and we'll 
show what we can do. Ah, the geniuses'll tumble out of their 
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mothers' bellies six at a time—like in Egypt.' " Abram's 
claims for Zionism are expressed with the hyperbole that 
characterizes all his utterances. Yet he sees with lucidity 
what is concealed, by vanity or self-interest or even good 
will, from the eyes of the modernizing, worldly assimila­
tionists, who (like Adele Landau) seek to become indis­
tinguishable from the gentiles: " 'And I suppose if we all 
put on Polish hats and twist our mustaches into points, 
then they'll love us,' Abram rejoined, and twisted at his own 
mustache. 'Let the young lady read the newspapers here. 
They squeal that the modern Jew is worse than the caftaned 
kind. Who do you think the Jew-haters are aiming for? The 
modern Jew, that's who.' " All the subsequent events of the 
novel will bear out what Abram says. 
Apart from the Orthodox Jews, the most active opponents 
of Zionism in the novel are the socialist and communist 
revolutionaries, whose devotion to "humanity" slackens 
only when the Jews come into view. The Family Moskat is 
the first major work by Singer in which the intensity of his 
dislike of leftist political movements makes itself felt. There 
can be no doubt but that Singer views socialism and 
communism as antithetical, first to the interests of the 
Jews, then to the interests of society, and ultimately to those 
of humanity itself. It is significant that Singer endows an 
anti-leftist character named Lapidus with some of the 
memorable utterances of the novel even though he appears 
in but a single scene and has no role whatever in the action. 
Lapidus disturbs the smug humanitarianism of the circle of 
Jewish leftists gathered at Gina Genendel's by pointing out 
that they weep bitter tears over every Ivan, every Slav, 
every oppressed nation of the world, except the Jews. He 
recounts an experience he had in Siberia that epitomized 
the self-deceptive masquerade of Jews who seek a secular 
substitute for the religion they have deserted: "  ' . . . I saw 
a bunch of Jews, with scrawny beards, black eyes—just like 
mine. At first I thought it was a minyan for prayers. But 
when I heard them babbling in Russian and spouting about 
the revolution—the S. R.'s, the S. D.'s, Plekhanov, 
Bogdanov, bombs, assassinations—I started to howl.' " 
Lapidus lashes these Jews who, in strict accordance with 
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socialist doctrine, deny the existence of the Jews as a people. 
Some deep-seated impulse of treachery leads worldly Jews 
to deny only to the people from whom they have sprung 
those human rights that are indivisible from national 
rights. Bernard Lazare once wrote of emancipated French 
Jews: "It isn't enough for them to reject any solidarity with 
their foreign-born brethren; they have also to go charging 
them with all the evils which their own cowardice 
engenders. . . . Like all emancipated Jews everywhere, 
they have also of their own volition broken all ties of 
solidarity."6 Lapidus, for his part, is, like Abram, a Zionist 
who sees no solution to the anomaly of Jewish existence in 
an increasingly antisemitic Europe except " 'a corner of the 
world for our own.' " 
Lapidus and Abram insistently ask the socialists why 
Jews should relinquish their nationality in order to 
assimilate with "humanity." In fact, they argue, if 
assimilation were successful, it would merge the Jewish 
people not with all humanity but only with the Polish people 
(or the German or the Hungarian), so that the division and 
strife of nations would continue just as before, but the 
People Israel would disappear from the earth. The 
Holocaust was to prove that assimilation was impossible in 
any case. For it was just as Hosea had long before predicted 
of the faithless of Israel: "She shall run after her lovers, but 
she shall not overtake them" (Hosea 2:9). 
For the mature characters in The Family Moskat, 
Zionism is, as Theodor Herzl once said, "a return to the 
Jewish people even before it is a return to the Jewish 
homeland." It is not accidental that Asa's first Zionist 
utterances in the novel come on the occasion of his return 
from Switzerland to Tereshpol Minor. Upon entering the 
synagogue, Asa is overcome by "a heavy odor that 
seemed . .  . to be compounded of candle wax, fast days, 
and eternity. He stood silent. Here in the dimness 
everything he had experienced in alien places seemed to be 
without meaning. Time had flown like an illusion. This was 
his true home, this was where he belonged. Here was where 
he would come for refuge when everything else failed." This 
joy in homecoming seems to depend on religion, yet when 
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Asa tries to explain his feelings to his grandfather, what he 
says is that Jews are a people like every other people, and 
are now "demanding that the nations of the world return 
the Holy Land to them." The conjunction of the two 
passages is striking. Very soon there will be no Tereshpol 
Minor synagogue in which to seek refuge and home when 
all else fails—as it does—and the Zionist contention that the 
Jews of Europe are building on sand will be borne out. 
It remains for the generation of Asa's children and their 
friends to translate the desire for a return to the Jewish 
people into "practical" Zionism. Young Shosha Berman 
marries an authentic Zionist pioneer named Simon Bendel, 
who clearly represents the most vital element of the 
youngest generation of Polish Jews in the novel. Singer's 
desire to single out Zionism from among the myriad 
political movements that contend with each other for the 
loyalties of Polish Jews disaffected from traditional religion 
is evident in his treatment of Simon and his beleaguered 
group of Hebrew-speaking agriculturists: "Everyone was 
against them—the orthodox Jews, the Socialist Bundists, 
the Communists. But they were not the kind to be frightened 
off. If the Messiah had not come riding on his ass by now, 
then it was time to take one's destiny into one's own hands." 
It is precisely this desire of Zionism to preempt the tasks 
reserved for Messiah that provokes the wrath of the 
orthodox: " 'What's bothering you, rabbi? We are building a 
Jewish home.' " " 'Except the Lord build the house, they 
labor in vain that build it.' " This is not a debate, such as 
may be found in Satan in Goray, over the desirability of 
hastening the arrival of the Messiah by aggravating the 
evil situation of humanity so that deliverance will come to a 
generation steeped in degradation. Everybody, apart from 
the communists, recognizes that in a world dominated by 
Hitler, this would be a labor of supererogation. Rather, the 
Zionists take upon themselves the task reserved by religious 
tradition for the Messiah because they sense that modern 
antisemitism is not just another form of religious Jew-
hatred but the instrument of a scheme to destroy the Jewish 
people forever. 
The entire novel is animated by a tremendous pressure 
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toward some kind of apocalyptic resolution of the worsen­
ing condition of the Jews of Europe. Early in the book, 
before either of the World Wars has taken place, it seems to 
the orthodox that things cannot get worse than they are: 
Speakers were thundering that Jews should not wait for 
Messiah to come, but build the Jewish homeland with their own 
hands. . . . The truth was that the Jews were being persecuted
more and more. Day by day it became harder to earn a living.
What would be the end of it all? There was only one hope left—
for Messiah to come, to come quickly while there were still a few 
pious Jews left. 
During World War I it seems even more certain to the 
orthodox that the cup must at last be full. What can be the 
meaning of the endless suffering of the Jews but that 
redemption is at hand? " 'Enough! It is time! High time for 
the Messiah!' " Even the fabric of daily life is interwoven 
with messianic expectation, so that Adele's delivery pains 
provoke the remark "Everything is attended by suffer­
ing . . . birth . . . Messiah. . . .  " With the approach of 
Hitler, even many of the pious go off to Palestine, com­
plaining about their elders and their God: " 'The old gener­
ation knows only one thing: Messiah will come. God knows, 
he's taking his time.' " 
The culminating event of the novel would seem to be 
precisely the occasion on which Singer, if he wished, could 
demonstrate the convergence of catastrophe with redemp­
tion, Holocaust with rebirth in the homeland. It is the last 
Passover to be celebrated by the Jews of Warsaw before they 
and their civilization are buried in universal darkness. The 
celebration looks backward to the great holiday occasions 
earlier in the novel, when the spiritually dispersed members 
of what had formerly been the community of Israel are 
briefly united with their people and with their best selves; 
and it also looks forward to the yawning emptiness of the 
Jewish future in Europe. So insistent is Singer on the 
irresistibility of Jewish fate that for this Passover celebra­
tion he goes to the trouble of recalling, from Palestine as 
well as America, those characters who have already 
emigrated, despite the fact that all the Jews still resident in 
Poland "were possessed of the same thought: to be helped to 
get out of Poland while there was still time." 
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The Passover, described in great, loving detail by Singer, 
is the novel's most beautiful and most terrible occasion. Not 
only does it summon up and reenforce the memory of past 
holidays; it is a holiday on which the original redemption of 
the Jews from bondage and deliverance to their promised 
land is commemorated and the hope of their imminent 
salvation and return to the ancestral homeland is more 
immediate than at any other time of the year. In a voice 
broken with weeping, PinnieMoskat recites: " 'Anditisthis 
same promise which has been the support of our ancestors 
and of us, for in every generation our enemies have arisen to 
annihilate us, but the Most Holy, blessed be He, has 
delivered us out of their hands. . . . ' " From the point of 
view of Jewish religion, Hitler is only the latest repetition of 
the Amaleks who have plagued the Jews throughout their 
existence. Yet many at the seder table wonder to 
themselves: "Would a miracle happen this time too? In a 
year from now would Jews be able again to sit down and 
observe the Passover? Or, God forbid, would the new 
Haman finish them off?" 
The Passover service traditionally concludes with the 
exclamation "Next Year in Jerusalem!" If Singer wished to 
see in the qualified triumph of Zionism a kind of redemption 
for which the Holocaust had been a horrible price, or in the 
State of Israel a realization of the messianic expectations of 
so many of his Holocaust victims, here exactly would be the 
point for him to reveal his conviction. But he does nothing of 
the kind. Instead, he pointedly omits any mention of "Next 
Year in Jerusalem!" in his description of the seder and 
concludes with Pinnie's question: " 'These unleavened 
cakes, why do we eat them?' " Even though the novel treats 
Zionism sympathetically, and in this very chapter we are 
told that Asa's son David is observing the holiday in 
Palestine with his fellow pioneers, Singer will not endorse 
historicist views of the Holocaust as the labor pains of 
national rebirth or religious views of it as the price of 
redemption. Rather, he wants above all to convey the sense 
that for the Jews of Europe the end was at hand, and in a 
more absolute sense than any that could have been 
conceived by either orthodox or nationalist Jews. When 
Abram the Zionist tries to console the gloomy Asa by 
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remarking that " 'the end of the world hasn't come yet,' " 
Asa replies that " 'the end of our world has come.' " The 
final scene of the English version of the novel7 allows no 
hint of apocalypse in this disaster, no glimpse of a 
redemption beyond the catastrophe. 
In the deepest sense, then, the Zionists of The Family 
Moskat who flee to Palestine are as homeless, as desperate 
for refuge, as Herman Broder of Enemies in the United 
States. For Singer, the ultimate refuge is in the instruments 
of Jewish spirituality. For him, "the two thousand years of 
exile have not been a dark passage into nowhere but a grand 
experiment in upholding a people only on spiritual values. 
Even though we have attained the land we longed 
for . . . this experiment is far from being concluded."8 At 
the end of The Manor, Caiman Jacoby finds a refuge from 
the acrid dissolvents of Polish Jewry not in the land but in 
the spirit of his ancestors, as embodied in his shelves of 
sacred books that reunite him with past generations. "The 
Hebrew letters were steeped in holiness, in eternity. They 
seemed to unite him with the patriarchs, with Joshua, 
Gamaliel, Eliezer, and with Hillel the Ancient. . . . Among 
these shelves of sacred books, Caiman felt protected." 
Caiman understands, though he cannot conceptualize, the 
truth that all those secularizing and reformist movements 
within the Jewish community that sought to confer upon 
the Jews emancipation and human rights had in fact 
deprived them of their freedom and their humanity. To be 
human was to stand where one's ancestors had stood, 
rooted in the language and laws and customs that were a 
permanent affront to evolutionism and progressivism. 
For the survivors of the Holocaust, Jewish books become 
not only the means of remaining human by returning 
into the buried life of one's ancestors; they become the 
instrument for the resurrection of the dead. As another 
character, Herman Gombiner in the story called "The 
Letter Writer," says: "The spirit cannot be burned, gassed, 
hanged, shot. Six million souls must exist somewhere." 
Gombiner, during an illness, goes in search of his lost 
relatives, and his quest leads him, via Canal Street in New 
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York City, into an underworld charnel-house, where he 
meets a gravedigger tending the bones. " 'How,' "asks Her­
man, " 'can anyone live here?' " " 'Who would want such a 
livelihood?' " The answer, of course, is that this is where 
Singer has chosen to live. 
We can see this very clearly in one of his supernatural 
tales called "The Last Demon." Of the many stories in 
which Singer uses a first-person narrator who bears marked 
resemblances to the author, none comes so close to 
representing the author's inner relationship to his own 
work as this one. The narrator of the tale tells of his plight 
as the last remaining demon, whose occupation is gone 
because man himself has become a demon: to proselytize for 
evil in these times would be carrying coals to Newcastle, 
like Singer himself, the last demon has been deprived of his 
subject, the Jews of Eastern Europe. "I've seen it all," he 
says, "the destruction of Tishevitz, the destruction of 
Poland. There are no more Jews, no more demons. . . . The 
community was slaughtered, the holy books burned, the 
cemetery desecrated." Like Singer, the last demon attempts 
to speak as if history had not destroyed his subject and as if 
he could defy time: "I speak in the present tense as for me 
time stands still." Like Singer, the last demon knows, or 
thinks he knows, that there is no judge and no judgment, 
and that to the generation that has indeed succeeded in 
becoming wholly guilty the only Messiah that will come is 
death: "The generation is already guilty seven times over, 
but Messiah does not come. To whom should he come? 
Messiah did not come for the Jews, so the Jews went to 
Messiah." Like Singer, finally, the demon must sustain 
himself on dust and ashes and Yiddish books. "I found a 
Yiddish storybook between two broken barrels in the house 
which once belonged to Velvel the Barrelmaker. I sit there, 
the last of the demons. I eat dust. . . . The style of the book 
is . .  . Sabbath pudding cooked in pig's fat: blasphemy 
rolled in piety. The moral of the book
 is: neither judge, nor 
judgment. But nevertheless the letters are Jewish. . .  .
suck on the letters and feed myself. . . . Yes, as long as a 
single volume remains, I have something to sustain me." 
 I 
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The attempt to resurrect the shattered remnant of Jewish 
life in Israel, one of the most extraordinary instances of 
national rebirth in history, one of the outstanding examples 
of Jewish defiance of history, ultimately plays but a minor 
part in the great body of Singer's fiction. Rather, he chooses 
to make of literature itself the instrument for preserving the 
memory, and resurrecting the souls, of the dead. The 
literature upon which this massive responsibility devolves 
is no longer a sacred one, nor is it written in Hebrew, the 
traditional sacred tongue but also a language that, in 
Singer's view, is now "becoming more and more worldly."9 
Yet, through an ironic reversal of the traditional 
relationship between Hebrew and Yiddish, the language of 
the majority of the victims of the Holocaust becomes for 
Singer the loshen khoydesh, the holy tongue of the Jewish 
people. "The deader the language," Singer has said, "the 
more alive is the ghost. Ghosts love Yiddish, and, as far as I 
know, they all speak it. . .  . I not only believe in ghosts but 
also in resurrection. I am sure that millions of Yiddish-
speaking corpses will rise from their graves one day, and 
their first question will be: Is there any new book in Yiddish 
read? For them Yiddish will not be dead." And, we are 
implicitly invited to add, because of Yiddish they will not be 
dead. In his literary character, which is to say in his subject 
and language, Singer has made himself into a splendid 
anachronism whose flourishing existence defies the death-
sentence imposed upon the Jewish people in the nineteenth 
century and nearly carried out in the twentieth. 
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The twentieth-century ruins of that world to which so many 
Jews gave their admiration and devotion between, say, 
1789 and 1933 (the date of Hitler's coming to power), has 
grown sick of the ideals Israel asks it to respect. These ideals 
were knocked to the ground by Fascist Italy, by Russia, and 
by Germany. The Holocaust may even be seen as a 
deliberate lesson or project in philosophical redefinition: 
"You religious and enlightened people, you Christians, 
Jews, and Humanists, you believers in freedom, dignity, 
and enlightenment—you think that you know what a 
human being is. We will show you what he is, and what you 
are. Look at our camps and crematoria and see if you can 
bring your hearts to care about these millions. " And it is 
obvious that the humanistic civilized moral imagination is 
inadequate. Confronted with such a "metaphysical" dem­
onstration, it despairs and declines from despair into 
lethargy and sleep.—Saul Bellow, To Jerusalem and Back 
(1976) 
chapter 6 
Saul Bellow: A Jewish Farewell 
To the Enlightenment 
From the beginning of his career as a novelist, Saul Bellow 
has been impelled by a powerful sense of the inadequacy of 
Enlightenment principles and categories to encompass and 
interpret modern experience, particularly the experience of 
the Holocaust. His first novel, Dangling Man (1944), was set 
in 1942-43. Its hero, a young man named Joseph who is 
awaiting his induction into the U.S. Army, has been 
working on a series of biographical essays about the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment. He was "in the midst of 
one on Diderot" when he received his draft notice and 
"began to dangle." That his belief in the dispensation 
according to the gospel of the Rights of Man had already 
begun to wane is evident in his depiction of a Communist 
friend named Jimmy Burns who had dreamt of "becoming 
an American Robespierre" and in his account of his own 
disillusionment with the Communist party, the modern 
expositor of the universal rights of mankind. The Com­
munists, he had believed, were devoted to "the Race, le 
genre humain." But by the time he left the party, he 
"realized that any hospital nurse did more with one bedpan 
for le genre humain than they did with their entire 
organization." Joseph's study of the Enlightenment has 
not prepared him for the carnage that is taking place on the 
continent of Europe, to which he will soon be transported. 
"We do not flinch at seeing all these lives struck out; nor 
would those who were killed have suffered any more for us, 
if
 we, not they, had been the victims. I do not like to think 
what we are governed by. I do not like to think about it. It is 
not easy work, and it is not safe. Its kindest revelation is 
that our senses and our imaginations are somehow in­
competent." 
The hero of Mr. Sammler's Planet (1970) knows con­
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clusively what young Joseph could only guess at—that the 
Holocaust had exploded forever the Enlightenment concep­
tion of man as naturally good, in rational control of his 
mental and physical universe, and potentially able to use 
that control to create a heavenly city on earth. Like Joseph, 
Artur Sammler had once been a child of the Enlightenment 
and had devoted himself to a scholarly work on one of the 
great expositors of Enlightenment principles, H. G. Wells, 
whom he had known very well during his years in 
Bloomsbury. Indeed, before the Holocaust, Wells had been 
the object of his life's work. Wells had based his Utopian 
ideas for a renovated world on the application of scientific 
principles to the enlargement of human life: "the building of 
a planned, orderly, and beautiful world society." But Wells 
himself, basing all his hopes on the naturalism of 
Enlightenment epistemology, was not prepared to reckon 
with those subterranean forces that erupted in modern 
Europe. Thus Sammler, in his post-Holocaust incarnation, 
spends all his time in the Forty-second Street Library 
reading the mystical Meister Eckhardt when everybody 
supposes him to be working on his memoir of Wells. For he 
knows that "poor Wells, the natural teacher, the sex 
emancipator, the explainer, the humane blesser of 
mankind, could in the end only blast and curse everyone." 
Sammler does say, by way of extenuation, that Wells "wrote 
such things in his final sickness, horribly depressed by 
World War II." 
Unless one recognizes the extent to which, in Bellow's 
mind, the Holocaust functions as a metaphysical refutation 
of Enlightenment assumptions, he will not easily find the 
center of this novel. Even so acute an observer of Bellow's 
work as Irving Howe has written of this book: "Lively-odd 
figures, brilliantly managed incidents—but what does 
it all come to? That, until the very last paragraph, is 
the question one keeps asking about Mr. Sammler's 
Planet."1 Much of the book does seem intent on merely 
conveying to us the touch and tone of life in upper 
Manhattan, the way people and things look and sound, the 
kinds of ideas (or what the poverty of the English language 
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compels us to call such) favored by the semi-educated New 
York intelligentsia, whose conversation is "often nothing 
but the repetition of liberal principles" couched in the 
terminology of the New York Times. 
Bellow has, of course, throughout his career studied the 
desperate and highly cerebral forms that personal existence 
takes in large American cities like Chicago and New York. 
But his characters generally have a sense of the relation 
between their own life and that of the old world. Some of 
them suppose this world and its inhabitants to have been 
greater, more heroic, than the shrunken version of mankind 
that inhabits American cities. Others, however, like 
Einhorn in The Adventures of Augie March (1953), have a 
more accurate sense of the relation between Europe and 
America: 
There is some kind of advantage in the roughness of a place like
Chicago, of not having any illusions either. Whereas in all the 
great capitals of the world there's some reason to think 
humanity is very different. All that ancient culture and those
beautiful works of art right out in public, by Michelangelo and
Christopher Wren, and those ceremonies, like trooping the
color at the Horse Guards' parade or burying a great man in the
Pantheon over in Paris. You see those marvelous things and
you think that everything savage belongs to the past. So you
think. And then you have another think, and you see that after
they rescued women from the coal mines, or pulled down the
Bastille and got rid of Star Chambers and lettres de cachet, ran 
out the Jesuits, increased education, and built hospitals and
spread courtesy and politeness, they have five or six years of
war and revolutions and kill off twenty million people. 
This knowledge of death is one of the few certain benefits 
that an experience of Europe gives to those Jews who 
survive it. What separates Artur Sammler from the 
American Jews who surround him in New York (and later 
unites him with the Israeli Jews who are otherwise so 
foreign to him) is a knowledge of what death is. By a kind of 
miracle, he had been saved from the Holocaust that 
engulfed everyone around him, saved not because he had 
any special merit or special knowledge of how to survive— 
"had the war lasted a few months more, he would have died 
like the rest"—but because he has been given a duty, an 
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assignment: namely, to condense for others some essence of 
experience available only to those who have returned from 
the dead. Mr. Sammler's Planet is precisely an attempt to 
imagine and capture this essence. 
The novel begins with an account and discussion of two 
crimes, two criminals, two forms of "explanation" (a 
pejorative word throughout the book) for their acts. Since 
the two crimes, one the massive one of Adolf Eichmann in 
transporting Jews to the gas chambers, the other that of a 
black pickpocket in Manhattan who also assaults Sammler, 
are recalled again and again throughout the book, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that in the relation between them lies 
at least a hint of the novel's significance. 
The subject of the Holocaust is explicitly introduced into 
the novel by means of a fierce attack by the novel's 
protagonist on Hannah Arendt's thesis (set forth in her 
book of 1963)2 that Eichmann was the most ordinary of 
men, a sort of cliché endowed with arms, legs, and a mouth, 
and that the perpetrators of the unspeakable evil of the 
death camps were in general not great criminals but merely 
the petty bureaucrats everywhere produced in modern times 
by the principle of division of labor. Up until this point in 
the novel, we have learned that Mr. Sammler, who is over 
seventy, was in Poland during the war, that in 1940 he had 
lost his wife and lost an eye, and that in 1947 he and his 
daughter Shula had been located by relatives in a D.P. camp 
in Salzburg and brought to the United States by his nephew 
Ely a Grüner, an abiding presence in the novel. Hannah 
Arendt's thesis about the "banality of evil" that prevailed 
in Nazi Germany is proposed to Sammler by his niece, 
Margotte. 
Although Sammler has long since recognized the futility 
of arguing with his niece, his reply is passionate rather than 
perfunctory. Hannah Arendt, he says, has been duped, for 
the banality that she purports to discover in these 
murderers and their evil deeds was merely camouflage. 
" 'What better way to get the curse out of murder than to 
make it look ordinary, boring, or trite?' " Intellectuals with 
literary training expect every wicked hero to be like Richard 
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III, who steps to the front of the stage announcing "I am 
determined to be a villain." The Nazis, Sammler contends, 
never forgot their old, normal knowledge of what is meant 
by murder. " 'That is very old human knowledge. The best 
and purest human beings, from the beginning of time, have 
understood that life is sacred. To defy that old under­
standing is not banality. There was a conspiracy against 
the sacredness of life.' " No one, he maintains, can believe 
that the abolition of conscience is a trivial or banal matter 
unless she believes that human life itself is trivial. Hannah 
Arendt stands accused of " 'making use of a tragic history 
to promote the foolish ideas of Weimar intellectuals.' "3 
To what uses, then, Bellow is asking, should that "tragic 
history" be put? The novel has already raised, in connection 
with a much smaller crime, the question of whether the 
notion that we learn things from suffering is anything more 
than cant. The problem of crime is much in Sammler's mind 
when we first meet him because he has been observing a 
black pickpocket regularly at work on the Riverside Drive 
bus and has made a futile effort to interest police in the 
matter. But in liberal and enlightened New York, interest in 
such criminals, he recognizes, comes mainly from people 
like his young relative, Angela Grüner, who is attracted by 
"the romance of the outlaw" and sends her rich father's 
money to defense funds for black murderers and rapists. 
Angela, like Margotte and Shula and several others in the 
novel, holds the liberal view that everyone is guilty of a 
crime except the person who has actually committed it. 
Their typical concern is not with that abstraction called 
justice or with upholding the honor of the victim, but with 
such "explanatory" questions as: "Who was this black? 
What were his origins, his class or racial attitudes, his 
psychological views, his true emotions, his aesthetic, his 
political ideas?" 
Sammler himself is repelled by the notion that style, art, 
and meaning attach to criminals and inhere in their crimes. 
He recognizes that modern artists, like liberal intellectuals, 
respond to a sense of affinity between themselves and the 
criminal classes. Thus it is no accident that the most 
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memorable moment in Crime and Punishment is the 
instant when Raskolnikov crushes the old woman's head 
with an ax. "Horror, crime, murder, did vivify all the 
phenomena, the most ordinary details of experience. In evil 
as in art there was illumination." His daughter stoutly 
declares, " 'For the creative there are no crimes.' " But was 
there, wonders Sammler, any crime or (significant altera­
tion) sin that was not committed for the highest motives? 
"Was there any sinner who did not sin pro bonopublico? So 
great was the evil of helplessness, and so immense the 
liberal spirit of explanation." Since the Enlightenment, 
there had been a tremendous attention paid to the 
"significance" of prisons, yet (perhaps paradoxically, 
perhaps as the working out of inner logic) "where liberty 
had been promised most, they had the biggest, worst 
prisons." 
The liberalism whose inanities are mocked throughout 
Mr. Sammler's Planet has been for over a century the most 
widely embraced ideology of Western intellectuals. As long 
ago as 1864, John Henry Newman had written that "the 
Liberalism which gives a colour to society now, is very 
different from that character of thought which bore the 
name thirty or forty years ago. Now it is scarcely a party: it 
is the educated lay world."4 But liberalism shares with other 
offspring of the Enlightenment—egalitarianism, socialism, 
communism—certain assumptions about the world, the 
mind, and society that are Bellow's ultimate targets: 
naturalism, monism, relativism, worship of Mankind 
(rather than God), social utopianism, and revolutionism. 
The fact that liberals, socialists, and communists are so 
often at each others' throats does not blind Bellow to the 
fact that they have a common ancestor, for he is keenly 
aware of the implications of the remark of Robespierre's 
henchman St. Just, who, when asked to define the 
Revolution, said that it was the destruction of whatever the 
Revolution was not. Thus a recent critic of the Enlighten­
ment shrewdly observes that "enlighteners have spent the 
past two centuries seeking out what they oppose, and, in 
quiet times, studying ways to turn the instruments of attack 
into philosophies in order to discover what it is they favor."5 
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Mr. Sammler's Manhattan is one of the great modern 
temples of Enlightenment worship. There he is daily 
witness to "the increasing triumph of Enlightenment— 
Liberty, Fraternity, Equality, Adultery! Enlightenment, 
universal education, universal suffrage, the rights of the 
majority acknowledged . . . , the rights of women, the 
rights of children, the rights of criminals. . . ." If the 
Enlightenment is indeed an exploded dream, news of the 
fact has not yet reached to New York, has not reached either 
to the "mental masses" or to "the worst enemies of 
civilization . .  . its petted intellectuals who attacked it at 
its weakest moments—attacked it in the name of 
proletarian revolution, in the name of reason, and in the 
name of irrationality." Having set out to abolish the ancient 
privileges of aristocracy, the Enlightenment succeeded only 
in democratizing and universalizing them, so that now 
virtually nobody was willing to leave the earth unsatiated. 
Carlyle, one of the earliest critics of the Enlightenment 
world-view, had predicted that "the whole Finance 
Ministers and Upholsterers and Confectioners of modern 
Europe" could not contrive to make one shoeblack happy, 
and declared that "the Fraction of Life can be increased in 
value not so much by increasing your Numerator as by 
lessening your Denominator."6 The crises of the modern 
world were proving him right. Everywhere he looks 
Sammler sees "limitless demand—insatiability . . . Non­
negotiable. Recognizing no scarcity of supply in any human 
department. Enlightenment? Marvelous! But out of hand, 
wasn't it?" 
There follows upon these reflections, and by way of 
illustration of their validity, one of the most spectacular 
incidents of the novel, and one in which the athletic energy 
of Bellow's prose and imagination is most intense. Sammler 
has been persuaded by a young friend named Lionel Feffer 
to lecture at Columbia University on his recollections of 
English intellectual life in the thirties, which he had 
experienced firsthand during his residence in Bloomsbury. 
All the students in the audience are humorless, most are 
bored, and some are in an ugly mood to start with because 
Feffer has misled them into thinking they are going to hear 
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a lecture on "Sorel and Modern Violence." (Feffer later 
justifies his chicanery by saying that the occasion was, 
after all, a benefit for black children.) Sammler quickly 
offends the revolutionary pieties of the students by quoting 
George Orwell's remark that British radicals were comfort­
ably protected by the Royal Navy. One member of the 
audience, particularly sensitive to anything that calls into 
question the perfections of Communism, regales Sammler 
with the sexual-excremental rhetoric of left-wing militancy. 
"'That's a lot of shit. . . . Orwell was a fink. He was a sick 
counterrevolutionary. It's a good thing he died when he did. 
And what you are saying is shit.' Turning to the audience, 
extending violent arms and raising his palms like a Greek 
dancer, he said, 'Why do you listen to this effete old shit? 
What has he got to tell you? His balls are dry. He's dead. He 
can't come.' " This, Sammler reflects as he is bundled out 
of the auditorium, is just the way it was in the Weimar 
Republic. The official bastions of sweetness and light 
yielded most eagerly to their seeming
 opposites, irrationali­
ty and barbarism. Instead of routing the demons from their 
entrenched strongholds, Enlightenment and rationalism 
invite them into the sanctuary. It is only later that Sammler 
learns that his assailant was " 'a poor man's Jean Genet' " 
who believed in the achievement of sainthood through 
murder and homosexuality. This, too, is a legacy from 
Voltaire and Rousseau, for " 'the Marquis de Sade in his 
crazy way was an Enlightenment philosophe.' " 
No sooner has Sammler escaped from what Matthew 
Arnold, surveying another university, once called "our 
young barbarians all at play,"7 than he is subjected to 
another version of the argumentum ab genitalibus. The 
pickpocket, noticing that Sammler has observed him, 
follows the old man into the lobby of his building and forces 
him to contemplate his exposed and brandished penis. No 
warning or threat, or indeed speech of any kind, is deemed 
necessary by the black man. He, like the Columbia students, 
has invoked the irrefutable modern argument. "Then it was 
returned to the trousers. Quod erat demonstrandum." When 
he recovers sufficiently from the shock of this experience, 
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Sammler views it as the existential realization of the 
philosophy of naturalism, the philosophical doctrine that 
reached full flowering in the Enlightenment, whose 
luminaries proclaimed that there is only one order of being, 
that nothing in reality has a supernatural significance, and 
that miracles are impossible. To speak, as Spinoza and later 
Voltaire had done, of a God who was indistinguishable from 
nature was to involve oneself in a contradiction and to lead 
others astray in the direction of idolatry. "Make Nature 
your God, elevate creatureliness, and you can count on 
gross results." 
Sammler had not always known this. But since the 
Holocaust, since his return from the grave, he cared only for 
the spirit, for God. He wished to be "a soul released from 
Nature." Naturalism not only gave a false account of the 
world, it was incompatible with Judaism, a religion in 
which the prohibition against idolatry is primary. Sammler 
senses this during his trying conversations with his 
oversexed young relative Angela Grüner, the daughter of 
Elya. Angela is another of the novel's many characters 
caught up by the sexual madness overwhelming the 
Western world. She tirelessly regales poor Sammler with 
tales of her sexual exploits, and succeeds only in reminding 
him that the propensity of numerous Jews for pagan idol-
worship, for playing the harlot, as Jeremiah (3:1) says, with 
many lovers, cannot alter the fact that the Torah forbids 
worship of stocks and stones. "Somewhere he doubted the 
fitness of these Jews for this erotic Roman voodoo 
primitivism. He questioned whether release from long 
Jewish mental discipline, hereditary training in lawful 
control, was obtainable upon individual application." 
Typical of Angela's shallowness is her merely naturalistic 
conception of what it means to be human. She cannot 
understand why Sammler should praise her dying father 
for being aman. " 'I thought everybody was born human,' " 
she says. But Sammler replies, " 'It's not a natural gift at 
all. Only the capacity is natural.' " Sammler recognizes 
clearly that, as his unloved Hannah Arendt liked to point 
out, "man's 'nature' is only 'human' insofar as it opens up to 
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man the possibility of becoming something highly un­
natural, that is, a man."8 
Having barely survived the day's encounters with the 
revolution in its various guises, Sammler returns home to 
find what looks like a providential message in the form of a 
manuscript, niched by his daughter from an Indian 
professor at Columbia, entitled The Future of the Moon. Its 
first sentence leaps out at Sammler: "How long will this 
earth remain the only home of Man?" To what looks very 
like a hint from a realm beyond human experience, 
Sammler responds with alacrity. "How long? Oh, Lord, you 
bet! Wasn't it the time—the very hour to go? For every 
purpose under heaven. A time to gather stones together, a 
time to cast away stones. Considering the earth itself not as 
a stone cast but as something to cast oneself from—to be 
divested of. To blow this great blue, white, green planet, or 
to be blown from it." 
Before Sammler can think very deeply about the 
implications of Dr. Lai's plans for colonizing the moon, his 
visit to his dying nephew Elya carries his mind back to a 
world that had indeed been a different planet: wartime 
Poland. At first he thinks of his period of hiding in the 
mausoleum of a family called Mezvinski. During a whole 
summer and part of autumn, he had sought metaphysical 
meanings—the very meanings that according to natu­
ralism and monism do not exist—in a piece of straw, a 
spider thread, a beetle, or a sparrow. But there was either no 
meaning or else a meaning impossible to live with. Viewed 
in retrospect, his residence in the mausoleum foreshadowed 
a kind of living death that was to be his only future. The 
yellow light of Polish summer that filtered through the 
mausoleum door is no different from the light penetrating 
his Manhattan apartment now; it is a light that does not 
measure growth or change but, rather, accompanies 
"endless literal hours in which one is internally eaten up. 
Eaten because coherence is lacking. Perhaps as a punish­
ment for having failed to find coherence." 
We are nearly a third of the way into the novel before 
Bellow reveals to us the experiences that have made Artur 
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Sammler repudiate both the premises and hopes of the 
Enlightenment. The reason why coherence and sacredness 
have been eluding Sammler since he entered the mauso­
leum, as well as the reason why he continues to pursue 
nothing but them, is revealed in his recollection of the open-
air killing center to which he and his wife had been taken: 
Yes, go and find it [sacredness] when everyone is murdering 
everyone. When Antonina was murdered. When he himself 
underwent murder beside her. When he and sixty or seventy
others, all stripped naked and having dug their own grave, 
were fired upon and fell in. Bodies upon his own body. 
Crushing. His dead wife nearby somewhere. Struggling out
much later from the weight of corpses, crawling out of the loose
soil. Scraping on his belly. Hiding in a shed. Finding a rag to
wear. Lying in the woods many days. 
This is the bedrock of Sammler's experience, the anchor of 
his imagination and intellect. The immediacy of his 
recollection of the death camps restrains him from those 
"fantasies of vaulting into higher states" that are the 
characteristic delusion of Utopians and revolutionaries. 
Having already returned from a different planet, 
Sammler approaches with caution and skepticism schemes 
to transport man to still another one, whether through 
science or revolution. In modern intellectual circles, "if your 
theme was social justice and your ideas were radical you 
were rewarded by wealth, fame, and influence." But 
Sammler cannot forget that Hitler was the century's most 
daring and successful revolutionary, and one whose 
incorporation of the word socialism in his public program 
was no accident. Neither can it be merely coincidental that 
every revolution that followed upon the French model ended 
up in the hands of murderers. This, in fact, was what the 
second term of the Enlightenment triad—equality—meant. 
You redistributed the aristocratic privilege of murder 
among the people and persuaded them (with the help of 
such modern French enlighteners as Jean-Paul Sartre) that 
they could recover or establish their identity by killing and 
thus becoming equal to the greatest. "What did equality 
mean? Did it mean all men were friends and brothers? No, it 
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meant that all belonged to the elite. Killing was an ancient 
privilege. This was why revolutions plunged into blood. 
Guillotines? Terror? Only a beginning—nothing." Under 
the guise of "rights," the privileges of barbarism were doled 
out to the populace. 
It was true that the planet did seem more and more 
intolerable, madness and poison more and more ubiquitous. 
But would escape to other worlds help much? Was it really 
plausible to believe with Dr. Lai that " 'access to central 
data mechanisms may foster a new Adam' "? Sammler has 
learned the folly of supposing that every social shortcoming 
is a sickness capable of remedy. "Nonsense. Change Sin to 
Sickness, a change of words . . . , and then enlightened 
doctors would stamp the sickness out." When this failed, the 
intellectuals who had preempted the privileges once 
reserved for God despaired of man altogether and "their 
man-disappointed minds" sought refuge in madness or in 
Utopias of various kinds. Utopianism, that search for the 
heavenly city on earth that characterized the philosophes, 
is for Sammler and his creator invariably a sign not of love 
but of hatred for humanity. "Always a certain despair 
underlining pleasure, death seated inside the health-
capsule, steering it, and darkness winking at you from the 
golden Utopian sun." Dr. Lai "must have been sick of earth 
to begin with if he had such expectations of the moon." 
Wells, we recall, who envisioned the heavenly city on earth, 
"could in the end only blast and curse everyone." Sammler, 
by no means satisfied with present social arrangements, 
and very much inclined to think that New York is a modern 
re-creation of Sodom and Gomorrah, nevertheless accepts 
the fact that anomalies and inequities are necessary 
accompaniments of the human condition, evils only to be 
removed by a much greater evil. "When he tried to imagine a 
just social order, he could not do it. A noncorrupt society? He 
could not do that either. There were no revolutions that he 
could remember which had not been made for justice, 
freedom, and pure goodness. Their last state was always 
more nihilistic than the first." 
Sammler, unlike the Utopian improvers and friends of the 
species who surround him, recognizes that the human 
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mind, if it is ever to rise into the skies and conquer new 
worlds, must begin with the resolve to stoop to the horrors 
that already have existed, and see the worst of them in their 
stubborn, maniacal permanence. " 'My travels,' he says, 
'are over. . .  . I seem to be a depth man rather than a 
height man.' " This is why, no matter how deeply buried 
within his subconscious life, the experience of the Holocaust 
keeps asserting itself as the chief determinant of what life is 
left to Sammler after twice escaping his doom. Half-way 
through the novel, we learn the details of his journey to the 
underworld of the killing centers and even of his own 
temporary marriage with the god of darkness who ruled 
there. We learn that after he escaped from under the 
mountain of corpses in the mass grave, Sammler had 
become something other than the victim, had shed that role 
to which Jewish history in Europe traditionally assigned 
him. He became a partisan in the Zamosht forest, where he 
and other starving men chewed at roots and grasses
 to stay 
alive, and also exploded bridges, unseated rails, and killed 
German stragglers in the dark of night. In the forest, he had 
discovered a German soldier and twice shot the man 
through the head as he pleaded for mercy and told Sammler 
he had children. Sammler had then stood at the place of last 
resort in the human soul, a place to which the appeal from 
another human being cannot reach. More important, he 
had shut his ears to the tempting voice of Jewish ethical 
"idealism" that congratulated the Jew for two thousand 
years of not picking up the gun (the gun that, of course, he 
had no chance to decline because it was never available to 
him). He admits to himself that he even derived pleasure 
and joy from killing the German. Indeed, his own survival-
spiritual, not merely physical—was contingent on this act 
of violence. "You would call it a dark action? On the 
contrary, it was also a bright one. It was mainly bright. 
When he fired his gun, Sammler, himself nearly a corpse, 
burst into life. Freezing in Zamosht Forest, he had often 
dreamed of being near afire. Well, this was more sumptuous 
than fire. His heart felt lined with brilliant, rapturous 
satin." 
All this must be kept in mind as the necessary 
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background for understanding Sammler's reaction, in May 
1967, to the news that Nasser had closed the Straits of Tiran 
and Arab armies were encircling Israel while announcing 
their intention to reduce the country to sandy wastes. For 
Sammler, this is a historical repetition that confirms the 
permanence of evil and therefore, by logical necessity, the 
precariousness of Jewish life. Sammler has not only seen 
but experienced it all before: "For the second time in twenty-
five years the same people were threatened by extermina­
tion: the so-called powers letting things drift toward 
disaster; men armed for a massacre." In such cir­
cumstances, Sammler could not merely sit in New York 
reading the world press and listening to his young 
relatives—like the pro-Arab Wallace Grüner—of the leftist 
persuasion "explaining" the psychological necessity which 
drove the Arabs to war. He gets himself an assignment as a 
journalist so that he may be there, in Israel, "to send 
reports, to do something, perhaps to die in the massacre." 
This reaction by Sammler, who is no Zionist and has not 
been much of a Jew either, can be explained only by what he 
has learned from the Holocaust. Sammler, twice excused 
from death, was "sent back again to the end of the line" so 
that he might distill for others, "in a Testament," the 
essence of experience. Up until the age of forty, he had been 
"simply an Anglophile intellectual Polish Jew and person 
of culture—relatively useless." But that was before he was 
arrested, struck in the eye by a gun butt, and thrown into a 
mass grave. Forever after, he was a one-eyed man: " 'Of 
course, since Poland, nineteen thirty-nine, my judgments 
are different. Altered. Like my eyesight.' " John Stuart Mill 
once said, figuratively, that he had "a large tolerance for 
one-eyed men, provided their one eye is a penetrating 
one: if they saw more, they probably would not see so 
keenly. . . ."9 Sammler's experience may have blinded him 
to certain possibilities of human life, to visions of new 
worlds and fresh beginnings, but it has enabled him to 
penetrate to a level of reality that will remain forever hidden 
from a new generation of "Bohemian adolescents, nar­
cotized, beflowered, and 'whole.' " Sammler recognizes that 
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cant may lurk in the idea of learning through suffering, and 
is capable of much irony toward the notion that the 
Holocaust was a rich and rewarding educational 
experience—"I did not want to fall into the Grand Canyon. 
Nice not to have died? Nicer not to have fallen in. Too many 
inside things were ruptured. To some people, true enough, 
experience seemed wealth. Misery worth a lot. Horror a 
fortune." Nevertheless, Sammler does believe that he has 
been preserved for the completion of some unfinished 
business, which is connected with what he has experienced 
and learned during the Holocaust. 
It is no accident that at the one point in the book where 
Sammler seems in danger of forgetting this experience and 
its lessons, he is reminded of them by his half-mad Israeli 
son-in-law, Eisen. Late in the novel, Sammler, racing to the 
hospital to see the dying Grüner, sees his old persecutor, the 
black pickpocket, thrashing Lionel Feffer, whose boundless 
liberal curiosity about criminals had led him to the 
imprudent act of photographing the pickpocket at work. A 
large crowd watches the action, but—after the accepted 
fashion of New Yorkers—does nothing to interfere to save 
Feffer. The seventy-two-year-old Sammler, frustrated by his 
feebleness, spots Eisen in the crowd and pleads with this 
powerful man (a foundry worker) to intervene. Finally, after 
some minutes, he stirs Eisen into action, violent and potent 
action. Eisen pounds the black man with blow after blow, 
until Sammler begs him to desist from what a moment 
before he had begged him to do. " 'You'll murder him. Do 
you want to beat out his brains? . . . I didn't say
 to hit him 
at all. You're crazy, Eisen, crazy enough to murder him.' " 
But the retort of this Israeli is devastating to Sammler 
because it wrenches him back to the painful truth he had 
learned in the Holocaust and remembered at the time of the 
Six-Day War. " 'You can't hit a man like this just once. 
When you hit him you must really hit him. Otherwise he'll 
kill you. You know. We both fought in the war. You were a 
Partisan. You had a gun. So don't you know?' " Josephine 
Knopp, in a very intelligent essay on Bellow, argues that 
Sammler's wish to save the pickpocket from Eisen's blows 
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shows his moral evolution since he killed the German 
soldier.101 think that, on the contrary, Eisen's retort recalls 
Sammler to awareness of the hard choices of survival and 
explains why Sammler's identification with Israel extends 
beyond May 1967 when she was the potential victim of a 
massacre to June 1967 when she had won a decisive victory 
over those would have killed her if she had not. 
Ten years after the Six-Day War, Saul Bellow, writing 
from Israel, reminded his readers that "the Jews, because 
they are Jews, have never been able to take the right to live 
as a natural right."11 The reason why Sammler should 
identify himself with Israel at all is that the Holocaust had 
proved to him that the Enlightenment's conception of 
natural, human rights would, in time of crisis, do nothing to 
save those Jews who did not have national rights as well. 
This becomes clear during Sammler's great aria of the 
novel, his confession of faith delivered (after some coaxing) 
to Shula, Margotte, and Dr. Lai, who have insisted on 
hearing his "views" on life in general. Skeptical, as always, 
of "explanations," he prefers to convey his idea of modern 
history through the story—a true one—of Chaim 
Rumkowski, the mad Jewish king of the Lodz ghetto. This 
failed businessman, " 'a noisy individual, corrupt, director 
of an orphanage, . .  . a bad actor, a distasteful fun-figure 
in the Jewish community,' " was installed by the Nazis as 
Judenältester (senior Jew) of the ghetto. While the Nazis 
carried on their customary depredations, Rumkowski was 
enabled to flourish as a king. He had his court, printed 
money and stamps carrying his picture, royal robes, 
pageants and plays in his honor; and he enforced a reign of 
terror over his own people. 
Sammler returns obsessively in his thoughts and conver­
sation to the subject of the theatrical forms that the striving 
for personal definition has taken ever since the Enlighten­
ment and the French Revolution "liberated" men from their 
inherited identities into individuality. The theatricality of 
the French Revolution itself, the subject of a number of 
books,12 was the earliest indication of the desperate, indi­
vidual forms that spiritual striving would take in the 
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new era. No sooner were men freed and enjoined to define 
themselves instead of accepting a preimposed identity than 
they lost themselves and took, in consequence, to play­
acting. The reason why this should have been so was given 
by one of the earliest critics of the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution, Edmund Burke: "We are afraid," he 
wrote, "to put men to live and trade each on his own private 
stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each 
man is small, and that the individuals would do better to 
avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, 
and of ages."13 
The Nazis understood that the well-known desire of 
certain Jews to become distinguished "individuals" in non-
Jewish society could be put to German advantage. 
Sammler's choice of Rumkowski, a Jew, as the extreme 
version of the hopeless search for noble individuality 
affords a striking insight into the link between an­
tisemitism and the psychic development of post-
Enlightenment Europe. Sammler, liberated—though at a 
terrible price—from liberalism and relativism, declares 
that " 'individualism is of no interest whatever if it does not 
extend truth.' " But to many of the Jews of the nineteenth 
century, who no longer believed in truth, individualism 
offered the greater temptation of "emancipation" through 
the granting of equality and human rights. Both proved to 
be illusory and to involve Jews in yet greater dangers than 
those from which their seeming liberators promised to free 
them. 
In her study of antisemitism, Hannah Arendt pointed out 
that once equality is declared individuals and groups 
actually become more unequal than they had ever been 
before because it is more difficult to understand and explain 
why, with equal conditions, differences should exist 
between people. This was especially the case with the Jews, 
who first gained equality with the triumph of the French 
Revolution, and yet continued to be "different" from the rest 
of society. In consequence, those Jews who entered gentile 
society—whether as pariahs or as parvenus—were looked 
upon as actors, admitted and admired, yet denied and 
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feared.14 Enlightened Europe had opened society's doors to 
certain Jews, but by the Nazi era, " 'the door had been shut 
against these Jews: they belonged to the category written 
off.' " 
Why were those "rights," which, as Sammler observes 
frequently, are the most lavishly dispensed gift of the 
enlightened world, of so little use to the Jews of Europe 
when the Germans decided to destroy them? Here again 
Burke offers an explanation. Burke had argued, in Reflec­
tions on the Revolution in France (1790), that the human 
rights "granted" by the French Revolution's Declaration of 
the Rights of Man were a mere abstraction of far less value 
than "the rights of an Englishman" (or, by implication, 
those of a Frenchman or a German.) "It has been the 
uniform policy of our constitution," he wrote, "to claim and 
assert our liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived to us 
from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posteri­
ty."15 According to Hannah Arendt (who may be Sammler's 
aversion but was Bellow's colleague at the University of 
Chicago), the Holocaust confirmed the soundness of 
Burke's critique. "Not only did loss of national rights in all 
instances entail the loss of human rights; the restoration of 
human rights, as the . . . recent example of the State of 
Israel proves, has been achieved so far only through the 
restoration or the establishment of national rights. The 
conception of human rights, based upon the assumed 
existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very 
moment when those who professed to believe in it were for 
the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all 
other qualities and specific relationships—except that they 
were still human. The world found nothing sacred in the 
abstract nakedness of being human."16 It was, moreover, in 
just those countries where the Jews had been most 
determined to ingratiate themselves with their neighbors as 
"men" rather than as "Jews"—"Be a man in the street and 
a Jew at home" was the assimilationist slogan—that the 
population responded most readily to the allegation that the 
Jews were not human beings at all. 
Sammler instinctively identifies his own fate and that of 
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the Jewish people with Israel because he recognizes the 
preferability of national to natural rights. He does so partly 
because of his experience, partly because he has given up 
his naturalism for supernaturalism, which makes him 
mindful, if only in the most nebulous way, of the "entailed 
inheritance" which the Jews derive from their forefathers, 
and transmit to their posterity: namely, their religion built 
on the idea of a covenant between God and man. 
The search for sacredness that began for Sammler only 
after he had been rescued from Europe has certainly not led 
him in a straight line to the Torah. He is more confident of 
what "the main thing" is not than of what it is. It is 
certainly not "the expulsion of . .  . demons and spirits 
from the air, where they had always been, by enlightenment 
and rationalism." His reading, in his seventies, has 
narrowed to Meister Eckhardt and the Bible, because he is 
convinced that a man who has been killed and buried 
should have no other interest but God and the spirit. He is 
"given to praying . . . often addressed God." This God 
is not recognizable as the Jewish one, yet Sammler's 
"religion" has at least two distinctly Jewish charac­
teristics. It is prophetic rather than apocalyptic, and it is 
predicated on the assumption that the very condition of 
virtuous states is that they are not pleasant, for morality is 
essentially made up of "thou shalt note," is a bridle rather 
than a spur. 
Now that most forms of individualism have been 
discredited, says Sammler, people begin to wonder why 
they were born and even long for nonbeing. " 'Why should 
they be human?' " In such a mood, they contemplate 
apocalyptic answers, and yearn toward that leap into chaos 
which they believe the prerequisite to construction of a new 
cosmos. But Sammler " 'always hated people who declared 
that it was the end. What did they know about the end? 
From personal experience, from the grave if I may say so, / 
knew something about it.' " What he knew about it was 
precisely that it was not the end, for he had received, from a 
realm beyond human experience, the message that there is 
in man "something . . . which he feels it important to 
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continue. Something that deserves to go on." If modern 
sensibility indulges in the cheap luxury of apocalyptic 
emotion, thought, and utterance, that is because 
"Humankind had lost its old patience." Although Sammler 
has actually experienced death and rebirth, his "entailed 
inheritance" is a Jewish wisdom that stresses not death and 
rebirth but survival and recovery.17 He is a descendant of 
the beggar who is described at a party in Bellow's early 
novel The Victim (1947): 
"They tell a story about a little town in the old country. It was
out of the way, in a valley, so the Jews were afraid the Messiah
would come and miss them, and they built a high tower and
hired one of the town beggars to sit in it all day long. A friend of 
his meets this beggar and he says, 'How do you like your job,
Baruch?' So he says, 'It doesn't pay much, but I think it's steady 
work.' " 
The idea of the ethical life set forth in Mr. Sammler's 
Planet is not based on reason and is not directed toward 
amelioration of the social order. Since a just social order is 
unattainable, perhaps, muses Sammler, " 'the best is to 
have some order within oneself.' " This is old advice, and 
distinctly unappealing in apocalyptic times. " 'A few may 
comprehend that it is the strength to do one's duty daily and 
promptly that makes saints and heroes. Not many. Most 
have fantasies of vaulting into higher states. . . .' " If 
justice does not reign on this planet, neither movement to 
another nor bloody revolution here will remedy the 
situation, for the failure is one of will and not of ignorance. 
Every man, from Cain to Eichmann, has known the 
difference between a just and an unjust act. If duty is the 
stupidest virtue—Dr. Lai calls it hateful and oppressive—it 
is also the most indispensable. " 'The pain of duty,' replies 
Sammler, 'makes the creature upright, and this uprightness 
is no negligible thing.' " 
The concluding passage of the book is Sammler's prayer 
for the soul of Elya Grüner. Although Elya has participated 
in much of the corruption that characterizes life in the 
modern American city, he has also met the terms of his 
contract, has accepted and fulfilled his "assignment" even 
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though he disliked it. Grüner, the character in the novel 
whose being is most thoroughly entangled in the Jewish 
world of his fathers and their fathers before them, had 
rescued Sammler and Shula after the war, and provided 
them money with which to live. For Sammler, he represents 
the unspectacular but essential virtues of the ordinary life 
lived according to custom, tradition, duty. "He did what he 
disliked. . . . Elya, by sentimental repetition and by for­
mulas . . . has accomplished something good." From the 
"entailed inheritance" of his ancestors—"He knew there 
had been good men before him, and that there were good 
men to come, and he wanted to be one of them."—Grüner 
had received a knowledge of what it means to be human 
that could never be provided by Enlightenment episte­
mology and ontology. With a defiant final nourish, 
Sammler (and Bellow) celebrate in this eulogy over Grüner 
the ancient idea that virtue has a covenantal basis, that 
between man and God there exists a reciprocal agreement 
whose terms have a clarity and irresistibility unimaginable 
in a Social Contract: " 'He was aware that he must meet, 
and he did meet—through all the confusion and degraded 
clowning of this life through which
 we are speeding—he did 
meet the terms of his contract. The terms which, in his 
inmost heart, each man knows. As I know mine. As all 
know. For that is the truth of it—that we all know, God, that 
we know, that we know, we know, we know.' " 
Given the extraordinary attachment of Jews to the 
Enlightenment and its various offspring, the still more 
extraordinary phenomenon of Jewish attempts to prove 
that Judaism is itself the epitome of Enlightenment 
secularism and universalism, Mr. Sammler's Planet gains 
its importance precisely as a Jewish repudiation of the 
Enlightenment. By the end of the novel, we understand so 
fully how the Revolution that promised to the Jews as Jews 
nothing but to the Jews as men everything deprived Jews 
of their humanity and their birthright that we wonder how 
anybody ever missed so obvious a truth. It may at first seem 
odd that, in a novel so overwhelmingly dedicated to 
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showing how untenable, how false, how mischievous are 
the philosophical premises of the Enlightenment after the 
destruction of European Jewry, we should hear relatively 
little of an explicit nature about the special harmfulness of 
Enlightenment premises to Jews and Judaism, and nothing 
at all about the fact that, as Bellow readily remarks in 
another book, "The intellectual leaders of the Enlighten­
ment were decidedly anti-Semitic." Marxism, for example, 
is treated as the most destructive modern offspring of the 
Enlightenment, but no mention is made of Marxism's 
uninterrupted tradition of Jew-hatred or of the fact that 
Sammler and all his ancestors, that is to say, the 
impoverished Polish Jews, were vilified by Marx himself as 
"this filthiest of all races."18 Bellow may have wished to 
protect himself from allegations of ad hominem condemna­
tion and contemptible parochialism. More likely, he wished 
to rest his case on the reader's ability to recognize that if 
monism and naturalism are baneful to mankind as a whole, 
they must be particularly so to that people whose religion 
makes the sharpest distinction between human and divine, 
and most resolutely prohibits worship of the former because 
it knows that an idol cannot respect a covenant with God. 
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If thou will not observe to do all the words of this law that 
are written in this book, that thou may est fear this glorious 
and awful Name, the LORD thy God; then the LORD will 
make thy plagues wonderful, and the plagues of thy 
seed. . . . And ye shall be left few in number, whereas ye 
were as the stars of heaven for multitude; because thou didst 
not hearken unto the voice of the LORD thy God. And it 
shall come to pass, that as the LORD rejoiced over you to do 
you good, and to multiply you; so the LORD will rejoice over 
you to cause you to perish, and to destroy you; and ye shall 
be plucked from off the land whither thougoest in topossess 
it. And the LORD shall scatter thee among all peoples, from 
the one end of the earth even unto the other end of the earth; 
and there thou shalt serve other gods, which thou hast not 
known, thou nor thy fathers, even wood and stone. And 
among these nations shalt thou have no repose, and there 
shall be no rest for the sole of thy foot; but the LORD shall 
give thee there a trembling heart, and failing of eyes, and 
languishing of soul. . . . These are the words of the 
covenant which the LORD commanded Moses to make with 
the children of Israel in the land of Moab.—Deuteronomy 
28:58-69 
A remnant shall return, even the remnant of Jacob, unto 
God the Mighty. For though thy people, O Israel, be as the 
sand of the sea, only a remnant of them shall return; an 
extermination is determined, overflowing with righteous­
ness. For an extermination wholly determined shall the 
LORD, the GOD of hosts, make in the midst of all the 
earth—Isaiah 10:21-23 
You only have I known among all the families of the earth; 
therefore, I will visit upon you all your iniquities.—Amos 3:2 
chapter 7 
The Holocaust and the God of Israel 
In the mind of the believing Jew, the tragic paradox of the 
Holocaust must be that it was not the denial but the 
fulfillment of the divine promise, as set forth in every 
elucidation of the Covenant in the Bible. To the skeptic, the 
destruction of European Jewry makes a mockery of the 
sentences in the Jewish daily prayer book: "With abundant 
love hast Thou loved us, O Lord." "With everlasting love 
hast Thou loved the house of Israel." To the skeptic, 
including the Jewish skeptic, who surveys Jewish life from 
the outside, the contradiction between God's professions of 
love for His Chosen People and the way in which these 
people are tortured and killed must be complete. But the 
believing Jew has accepted a structure of relations between 
the Chosen People and God in which love and chastisement 
are inseparable from each other. He has traditionally 
acknowledged that the Covenant contained a curse as well 
as a blessing. The Jews have been chosen to receive the 
Law, but if they lust instead after idols and so violate the 
Covenant, they will be cursed and exiled and destroyed. But 
the destruction will never be total, for that would constitute 
God's violation of His own Covenant. Despite the endless 
transgressions of the people of Israel, "when they are in the 
land of their enemies, I will not reject them, neither will I 
abhor them, to destroy them utterly, and to break My 
covenant with them. . . ." The Jews' destiny, moreover, is 
in their own control and not in that of the nations of the 
earth. The God of Israel is the god of all mankind, but the 
nations of the world are instruments of the Lord in His 
dramatic struggle with His refractory
 people. In His lawsuit 
against His people, God calls heaven and earth to witness 
against His beloved adversary that "I have set before thee 
life and death, the blessing and the curse. . . ." 
The whole structure of Jewish religious life was 
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predicated on acceptance of responsibility for the Exile and 
its endless humiliations and oppressions. These had been 
brought upon the Jews not by Assyrians or Babylonians or 
Romans or Crusaders or Cossacks but, ultimately, by their 
own transgressions. Regularly, in his festival prayers, the 
Jew acknowledged his responsibility for his condition of 
exile and debasement: "Because of our sins, we were exiled 
from our land and removed far away from our country." 
This very act, moreover, of blaming their fate on their own 
sins tended to reenforce the Jews' belief in their chosenness 
because it enabled them to survive when other peoples, who 
had also suffered expulsion from their homelands and 
oppression in the lands of strangers, were disappearing. 
These peoples came to the outwardly sensible and 
reasonable conclusion that their miserable fate proved the 
inefficacy of their national god, whom they abandoned in 
order to worship the gods of their new neighbors; thus were 
they assimilated, thus did they disappear. The Jews, 
persistently interpreting their misery as divine punishment 
for their sins, clung to their God and to the promise of the 
Covenant, and so survived, albeit in ever diminishing 
numbers. "Except the LORD of hosts / Had left unto us a 
very small remnant, / We should have been as Sodom, / 
We should have been like unto Gomorrah" (Isaiah, 1:9). 
The structure of the covenantal relation between God and 
the Jewish people was so pervasive in Jewish life and in the 
Jewish imagination that it could withstand and accom­
modate a considerable amount of resistance and rebellion 
from within. What is the book of Job but an instance of such 
rebellion and accommodation? It takes the traditional form 
of the lawsuit between the two partners to the Covenant, 
with enumeration of curses, invocation of witnesses, 
professions of innocence, and allegations of guilt. Job 
desires "to reason with God" (13:3), to justify himself. Yet 
even at the height of his rebellion, when he insists "I will 
argue my ways before Him," he submits to the inherited 
structure of faith: "Though He slay me, yet will I trust in 
Him." Death itself, however seemingly undeserved and 
unjust, becomes an aspect of endurance if it is acknowledg­
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ed as a chastisement from God. This covenantal structure 
took such hold of Jewish life that it can still today provide a 
framework for modern Jewish poets and novelists of a 
secular cast of mind whose instinctive reaction to the 
Holocaust is, not to reject God, but to accuse and curse Him. 
The inherited structure of covenantal relations had to 
endure unprecedented strains during the Holocaust. For the 
first time in modern history, the Jews faced an enemy in no 
way respectful of, or leavened by, the Jews' own sacred 
texts. From the point of view of Judaism—though not, to be 
sure, of most emancipated Jews—Christianity was 
preferable to paganism because it had several drops of 
Torah mixed in with all its Greek mystery religion. 
Therefore, it acknowledged that the Jews had once received 
the divine election (even if they no longer had it), and that 
their Scriptures were a true, if partial, revelation of the 
Divine Will. But for the Nazis (as for Voltaire), Judaism 
represented evil incarnate, and Jews had inherited in their 
genes a plague that could not be cured, but only extirpated. 
Modern Jews, for their part, had been trying in every way to 
slough off their covenantal chosenness and all its signs. But 
now they found the ancient doctrine that they were indeed 
the Chosen People spuriously confirmed by their most 
determined enemies. 
Chaim Kaplan: Warsaw Diary 
The paradoxes with which the Holocaust assaulted the 
mind of a religious Jew are conveyed with great immediacy 
in Chaim Kaplan's Warsaw Diary. If we would anchor in 
actuality our discussion of the imaginative literature that 
seeks out the role of God in the Holocaust, we cannot do 
better than to begin with this remarkable book. For it 
foreshadows many of the purely literary treatments of the 
Holocaust we shall examine, from Glatstein to Rawicz, in 
that its search for a principle by which to impose order on a 
phenomenon that is the embodiment of chaos is a literary 
quest that can succeed only through a resort to religious 
beliefs that the author resents but cannot reject. Kaplan 
kept his Warsaw Diary from 1 September 1939, when 
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Germany invaded Poland, until 4 August 1942, when he and 
his wife were transported to the death factory in Treblinka. 
His very first entry expresses doubt that they will survive 
the carnage. He also knows, as the severity of German 
restrictions on Jewish activity increases, that he literally 
risks his life by continuing to write. Yet even as late as 2 
August 1942, when he feels himself overwhelmed as a writer 
by the incoherent horror of events, and as a man by the 
imminence of starvation or deportation, his utmost concern 
is for hiding his diary, so that he may fulfill his "sacred 
task" of recording for future generations the unimaginable 
crimes of the Germans. His last recorded thought was: "If 
my life ends—what will become of my diary?" 
Although Kaplan never speaks condescendingly of the 
literary aspect of his work, and even invites the application 
to it of literary standards, he was moved by transcendent 
reasons to keep his diary. According to the biblical promise, 
the destruction of the Jewish people would never be total; 
there would always be a remnant. It is to bear witness to this 
remnant of the destruction of European Jewry that Kaplan 
devotes himself to his diary. "O earth, cover not thou my 
blood!" he prays. He does not know whether anyone else in 
the ghetto is recording daily events, and is well aware that 
the conditions of life in the ghetto are not conducive to 
"literary labors," yet he senses that if there is such a thing 
as a vocation, a being summoned to one's destiny, then he 
has here received it: "I sense within me the magnitude of 
this hour, and my responsibility toward it, and I have an 
inner awareness that I am fulfilling a national obligation." 
The tragic paradoxes of Jewish survival pervade 
Kaplan's diary. He is well aware that, according to classical 
Jewish tradition, redemption will not come except in 
association with catastrophe. The tenth chapter of the 
Tractate Sanhédrin states, "The Son of David will come 
only in a generation wholly guilty or a generation wholly 
innocent." Since simple observation suggests to Warsaw's 
Jews that few generations seem more likely than the 
generation of Hitler to fulfill the former condition, they give 
themselves over to messianic speculation. On 17 November 
1939, Kaplan remarks, "The soil is ready even for religious 
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Messianism." His own reaction to such messianism is 
ambivalent, and he speaks of it with two voices. Sometimes, 
especially when the Jewish masses imagine that Stalin or 
Roosevelt is in fact the Messiah, Kaplan condemns 
messianic imagination as yet another form of Jewish 
fantasy and wish-fulfillment. Yet he also understands that 
it is precisely this faith in messianic truth and justice, this 
stupid hope, that has enabled the miracle of Jewish 
survival. "In actual reality," he writes in January 1940, 
"there is disappointment upon disappointment, yet hope 
flourishes. A nation which for thousands of years has said 
daily, 'And even if he tarries, I will await the coming of the 
Messiah every day,' will not weaken in its hope, which has 
been a balm of life." 
From the very beginning of the German occupation of 
Warsaw, Kaplan had sought to control the disorder that 
assaulted his imagination by asking what role God was 
playing in this latest and perhaps final tragedy of His 
Chosen People. Month after month, year after year, he 
assails God with seemingly unanswerable questions: 
"Have we indeed sinned more than any other nation?" 
"Will the Eternal break His promise?" "Is this the way the 
Almighty looks after His dear ones?" "Why has a 'day of 
vengeance and retribution' not yet come for the murderers? 
Do not answer me with idle talk—I won't listen to you. Give 
me a logical reply!" Kaplan writes not as a skeptic 
questioning God's existence but as a believer openly 
quarreling with, and directly reproaching, a partner to an 
agreement who has failed to keep his side of the contract. As 
the German barbarities grow more unspeakable, the tone of 
reproach breaks free from mere questioning and becomes 
accusatory: "O Leader of the city, where are you? But he 
Who sits in Heaven laughs." It is not until July 1942, when 
Kaplan at last has full knowledge of the details of the "final 
solution" and watches the mass deportations from the 
ghetto, that he calls into question God's very existence: "In 
these two days the emptiness of the ghetto has been filled 
with cries and wails. If they found no way to the God of 
Israel it is a sign He doesn't exist." 
But skepticism is merely a fleeting impulse in the diary. 
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What is far more difficult for Kaplan to assimilate to his 
imagination than the denial of some of God's promises is 
the confirmation and fulfillment of them, but in counterfeit 
forms. According to the Divine Promise (Deuteronomy 5:3), 
the Covenant was given not only to the Jews who stood at 
Horeb or Sinai but to all their descendants as well, to all 
those generations of Jews who were not physically present 
to receive the Law. This promise, it strikes Kaplan, is 
confirmed in the ghetto, albeit spuriously and with the 
assistance of the Nazis. Since the destruction of Judaism 
entailed, according to Nazi racial ideology, destruction of 
all who could by any stretch of the imagination be thought 
to belong to the Jewish people, the most senseless suffering 
depicted by Kaplan is that of marginal Jews or actual 
apostates or antisémites of Jewish descent. Among the 
diary's most powerful scenes are those showing Jewish 
apostates or their children, "the cream of Polish society, 
people who had always showed their hatred for the Jews," 
being dragged, literally and metaphysically, back into the 
ghetto. Kaplan freely admits that the misery of these 
people, whose suffering lacks even a human meaning for 
them, provides the first occasion in his life when he has
 de­
rived pleasure from the distress of others. The reason why 
Kaplan should deal so harshly with these ex-Jews, half-
Jews, and Jewish antisémites who must now bear the fate 
of real Jews, is not far to seek. It lies in his conviction that 
the Jews are still a covenanted people, with a fate that is col­
lective not individual. "Who of them dreamed that his an­
cestors stood on Mount Sinai?" The ancient promise that all 
Jews, including those not yet born, received the Covenant 
and were not free to relinquish it is thus bizarrely confirmed. 
Another spurious fulfillment of the Divine Promise is to 
be found in the signs of Jewish national rebirth in the 
ghetto. God had promised that only after the Jewish people 
had endured the punishment of its iniquities and nearly 
perished completely in the lands of its enemies would He 
remember his Covenant with them and remember the Land 
from which they had been exiled. For Kaplan, one of the 
most striking instances of the link between the symbols of 
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destruction and restoration is the charade of a "Jewish 
kingdom" that the Nazis have established in the ghetto (for 
the purpose of conserving their manpower and facilitating 
the process of destruction): Jewish tax officials, Jewish 
public utility officials, Jewish housing officials. "In short, a 
Jewish state complete in every detail, but a closed, cramped 
one, imprisoned, mummified within its narrow borders." 
Even the policemen, traditional symbols of gentile oppres­
sion in the Diaspora, have become Jews, to whom one can 
speak Yiddish. "The residents of the ghetto," remarks 
Kaplan, "are beginning to think they are in Tel Aviv." 
Kaplan sees only too clearly that this is all facade, and that 
the very logic of their situation may well make Jewish 
policemen even crueler than their gentile counterparts. Yet 
he perceived in the most visible symbol of Jewish degrada­
tion a sign, from a realm beyond human experience, of 
Jewish national rebirth. The Nazis order all the Jews of 
Warsaw to wear on their bodies and to display on their 
shops the Star of David, in the Jewish national colors of 
blue and white. "In the future," muses Kaplan, "everywhere 
we turn we shall feel as if we were in a Jewish kingdom. The 
national colors will flutter everywhere. From now on 
Jerusalem will not only crown our every joy, but also our 
ordinary weekdays, as we get up and as we lie down. . . ." 
The Ingathering of the Exiles, the dawn of deliverance— 
gifts of the Nazis! Kaplan's tone in such passages is a 
turbulent mixture of genuine emotion and corrosive irony. 
The opposing voices of hope and despair, faith and doubt, 
the conflicting impulses toward belief in redemption and 
resignation to meaningless death, eventually became 
impossible for Kaplan to contain within his own mind and 
breast. In the depths of his agony, therefore, at the end of 
May 1942, he invented an alter ego named Hirsch, whose 
role in the diary is to reject altogether his creator's 
messianic hopes and to express the irredeemable gloom of 
the Jewish predicament. This literary device clarifies, but 
does not remove, the paradox. Thus, on 7 June 1942, Kaplan 
writes: "We were always a nation bound by hope—and so we 
shall remain. Jewish faith is marvelous; it can create states 
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of mind that have nothing to do with reality. Like the 
believing Jewish grandfather who in anticipation of the 
Messiah always wore his Sabbath clothes, so we too await 
him, 'and though he tarry, I will wait daily for his 
coming!' " The belief in the imminent downfall of the Nazis 
and the hope for the physical and spiritual salvation of the 
Jews are shared at this point by everyone in Jewish Warsaw 
except for Kaplan's recently invented "wise friend" Hirsch. 
"He is the only one who sits like a mourner among 
bridegrooms. 'Idiots!' he shouts, and his face becomes red 
with anger. 'Your hope is vain; your trust a broken reed.' " 
Thus, the belief that because the world has grown 
thoroughly wicked and that because the Jews have at last 
been sufficiently punished the Messiah must be at hand, is 
at once embraced and ridiculed. 
In Kaplan's imagination, it is the path of belief rather 
than that of skepticism and despair that requires courage. 
The shockingly intimate relation between the depths of 
Jewish degradation and the heights of Jewish aspiration is 
difficult to accept precisely because it appears to bear out the 
prophetic promise of God's active involvement in Jewish 
history and implicates God in the Holocaust. Yet it seems to 
him that just this belief enables the Jews to cling to life. 
According to the "laws of nature," which in perverted form 
are at the basis of Nazi racial doctrine, the Jews should 
already be dead, yet despite the frightful suffering in the 
ghetto, there are no suicides. Kaplan never ceases to marvel 
at this fact, or indeed at the fact that Jewish cultural and 
religious life continues in the midst of horror and degrada­
tion: "Nursery schools bring their infant charges to the 
gardens, and older children have their lessons 
there. . . . We are schooled in life, schooled in the art of 
living; it is like the words of the prophet: 'When thou walkest 
through the fire thou shalt not be burned; neither shall the 
flame kindle upon thee!' " Here was empirical evidence that 
even if millions of individuals were destroyed the Jewish 
people would survive. For all his resentment toward the God 
of Israel for being indifferent to the suffering of His people, 
Kaplan returns for sustenance to the inherited structure of 
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belief, according to which God visits all their iniquities 
upon the People Israel exactly because He has made His 
Covenant with them alone among all the families of the 
earth. 
Kaplan wrote in 1942 that what would be hardest about 
his impending death was the necessity for leaving the earth 
without knowing the final outcome of the struggle between 
giant adversaries: the Nazis against the Allies; the Nazi 
will to murder against the Jewish will to live; empirical 
despair against messianic hope. Kaplan, hesitatingly, 
bitterly, ironically, casts his lot with the God of Israel, who 
has been anything but loving to His people, but whose 
Covenant with them represents the only possibility of 
meaning in the midst of otherwise unfathomable suffering: 
"In these fateful hours, we long for life. 'Blessed is he who 
hopes, he will live to see the restoration of Israel!' " 
Yiddish Holocaust Poetry 
Just how irresistible was the inherited myth of the 
Covenant between God and his Chosen People may be seen 
in Yiddish Holocaust poetry, one of the most coherent and 
substantial bodies of writing on the subject. From its 
inception, in the nineteenth century, Yiddish poetry had 
been secular in idea and outlook. The idea that literature 
might be a profession suitable to a Jewish male was itself an 
act of defiance, so much so that Isaac Bashevis Singer 
recalls how his father "considered all the secular writers to 
be heretics, all unbelievers—. . .  . To become a literat was 
to them almost as bad as becoming a meshumed, one who 
forsakes the faith. My father used to say that secular writers 
like Peretz were leading the Jews to heresy. He said 
everything they wrote was against God. . . . And from his 
point of view, he was right."1 Although most writers of 
Yiddish literature considered themselves Jews, they were 
devoted to a secularization of Jewish culture. Moreover, 
many who came to prominence in the second and third 
decades of this century sought to reject the traditional 
subject of Yiddish literature, the fate of the Jewish people, 
sought to reject, that is, the chosenness of the Jewish people. 
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For why could not Yiddish writers, like their counterparts 
writing in French or German or English, range freely 
through the world for their subjects instead of being limited 
to the concerns of the collective body from which they had 
sprung? Thus, Jacob Glatstein wrote in 1920 of himself and 
his fellow poets in the Inzikh group: "We are Yiddish poets 
by virtue of the fact that we are Jews and write in Yiddish. 
Whatever a Yiddish poet may write about is ipso facto 
Yiddish. One does not need specifically Jewish 
themes. . . . "2 But the Holocaust proved that the Jewish 
poet no more than the Jews themselves could become 
"normal." After the Holocaust, as Irving Howe has written, 
'Yiddish poetry . . . returns . .  . to its original concern 
with the collective destiny of the Jewish people. . . . In the 
desolation of memory, Yiddish poets find themselves 
turning back to the old Jewish God, . . . a God inseparable 
from Jewish fate, a God with whom one pleads and 
quarrels."3 
In some of these Yiddish poems about the Holocaust, the 
tone of bitterness and reproach is dominant. This is not only 
because the poet has been dragged, kicking and screaming, 
back to the very subject he defiantly abandoned in his 
youth, before the deluge of the Holocaust. It is also because 
of a revulsion from the God who has done the Jews the 
dubious favor of choosing them without allowing them the 
option of surrendering their chosenness and so avoiding the 
sufferings specially reserved for God's servants. Perhaps 
the best-known single expression of outrage and resent­
ment at the imposition of divine election is Kadia Molo­
dowsky's poem "God of Mercy." Here the poet does not deny 
the chosenness of Israel, but declares that it has been 
always a curse, never a blessing: 
O God of Mercy

For the time being

Choose another people.

We are tired of death, tired of corpses,

We have no more prayers.

For the time being

Choose another people.
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If a covenant there must be, let it descend upon some other 
people, for the Jews can no longer afford the price exacted 
by the Law they were chosen to receive: 
God of Mercy
Sanctify another land
Another Sinai. 
We have covered every field and stone
With ashes and holiness. 
With our crones 
With our young
With our infants 
We have paid for each letter in your Commandments.
(Translated by Irving Howe) 
What is still more remarkable about this poem than its 
bitterness and indignation against God is its entire indif­
ference to the worldly aspect of "chosenness." Molodowsky 
writes with a secular animus, yet takes it for granted that 
both Jews and Germans were only puppets of God. She 
ends the poem with a plea to God to "Grant us one more 
blessing— / Take back the gift of our separateness." The 
fact that many Jews had in fact already given back that 
separateness when they were identified by the Nazis as 
Jews does not even enter into her vision of this ghastly 
drama. The poet rebels against God, yet never thinks to 
question either His existence or omnipotence. 
In the poetry of Jacob Glatstein,* the Yiddish tradition of 
intimate quarrel and mutual reproach between the Jew and 
God is continued, but subjected to strains and storms that 
threaten to shatter the old framework. In the wake of the 
Holocaust, the poles of the ancient antithesis between 
suffering and faith, the terms of the paradox whereby the 
unending misery of the Jews is precisely a sign of the 
unending Covenant with God, move so far apart that their 
link is almost ruptured. Glatstein cannot fathom the 
Holocaust without viewing it as part of the ongoing quarrel 
*Except where other names are given, all the translations are by Ruth
Whitman, The Selected Poems of Jacob Glatstein (New York: October 
House, 1972). All other translations of Yiddish verse in this chapter come 
from A Treasury of Yiddish Poetry, ed. Irving Howe and Eliezer
Greenberg (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969). 
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between God and His Chosen People. The Jews cannot be 
themselves without God, for "without our God / we have a 
funny look." Neither can God exist without the Jews, in 
whose post-Holocaust absence He is 
pursued, forsaken,

wandering around,

looking for a Jewish face,

a hand to give you shalom:

Shalom aleichem, Jewish God.

But neither, finally can Glatstein live with the horror of 
believing that the Holocaust was part of God's ongoing 
quarrel with the Jews: 
From the crematory flue
A Jew aspires to the Holy One.
And when the smoke of him is gone,
His wife and children filter through. 
Above us, in the height of sky,
Saintly billows weep and wait.
God, wherever you may be,
There all of us are also not. 
(Translated by Chana Faerstein) 
Any impulse toward locating the source of the unspeakable 
horror in God must mercilessly be squelched. If the God of 
history has indeed been involved in the Holocaust, then 
the Jews must sue for divorce from Him. 
At times Glatstein sounds like the "radical" theologian 
Richard L. Rubenstein insisting that Jews cannot believe 
in a God who acts in history "without regarding Hitler and 
the SS as instruments of God's will."4 But just as often he 
sounds like Emil L. Fackenheim refusing to abandon a God 
who is Lord of actual history and insisting that "in faith­
fulness to Judaism we must refuse to disconnect God from 
the holocaust."5 Glatstein's Holocaust poetry is not in­
formed by a consistent theology. Rather he seeks imagina­
tively to assimilate the Holocaust by perceiving it through 
the inherited myths of Jewish religion. He looks upon this 
religion to some extent as an outsider, one who has become 
alienated from its language and beliefs, and who revisits it 
nostalgically: 
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It's as hard to return to

old-fashioned words

as to sad synagogues,

those thresholds of faith.

You know exactly where they are.

Troubled, you can still hear their undertones.

Sometimes you come close and look longingly

at them through the windowpanes.

The world of his youth provides not so much truth as 
warmth, familiarity, and shelter: "I love you, dead world of 
my youth, / I command you, rise up, let your joy revive, / 
come close, letter by letter, warm, pulsing, meaning 
nothing." The religious myths that once provided the 
shelter of a protective covering have now been hollowed out, 
by intellect and by history. Yet still they seem to the poet the 
only framework within which he can begin to make sense of 
what has happened. Having been disillusioned by Western 
culture, by its "Jesus-Marxes" and "weak-kneed democ­
racy," the poet returns in imagination to his very begin­
nings in the ghetto and implores help from those whose 
lives are still bound by the all-embracing myths of religion: 
"You who still take your ease in the shadow of biblical 
trees / 0 sing me the cool solace / of all you remember, 
all that you know." 
Glatstein conceived of his Holocaust poetry as a safeguar­
ding and even a resurrection of the dead. In a poem called 
"Nightsong," he imagines the post-Holocaust imaginative 
life of the Yiddish poet as a nightly stroll among the graves, 
among the "valleys and hills and hidden twisted paths" 
that have become the landscape of his mind. Here he 
gathers to himself the whole vanished Jewish world, in a 
heroic attempt to "grasp and take in / those destroyed 
millions." If they are to be redeemed, it can henceforward— 
such is the implication of the poem—only be through 
literature. The appropriate language of the literature is 
Yiddish, but its structure can be provided only by the myths 
of religion, that is to say, by the world-view that Yiddish 
literature, at its inception, was intended to erode and 
supplant. Glatstein's work is pervaded by anger, but 
especially by anger directed against himself for failing to 
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perceive, until both Jewry and Yiddish were virtually 
destroyed, that neither Yiddish literature nor Jewish life 
could survive without in some way incorporating the 
religious heritage. Amidst the wreckage of European Jewry, 
the lesson was now brutally clear: Yiddish, once the 
language of militant secularists, had suddenly become a 
"dead" language whose only future was as the sacred 
tongue of martyrdom: "Poet, take the faintest Yiddish 
speech, / fill it with faith, make it holy again." 
A short poem entitled "My Father Isaac"* illustrates 
Glatstein's habit of lending significance—albeit ironic 
significance—to his experience of the Holocaust by casting 
it within the framework of biblical story. The poem gains its 
power at once from the sense of timeless and inescapable 
repetition of a pattern, and from a striking departure from 
it. The Isaac to be sacrificed here by the Nazis is, unlike the 
biblical Isaac, a father (the poet's father) rather than a son, 
an old man rather than a young one. He is thoroughly 
accustomed to the procedure, as if he were the descendant of 
untold Isaacs who have been chosen by God and know that, 
unlike the Isaac of the Bible, they will not be rescued by a 
good angel from the sharpened blade. "Isaac, old, was not 
deceived / as when he'd been that lad from Genesis; / he 
knew that there would be no lamb." Always he speaks in "a 
tired voice," as if wearied of the process of being chosen and 
being sacrificed, and knowing better than to expect rescue 
from a God who has done nothing to rescue his Isaacs since 
the original binding told in Genesis. Indeed, the poem 
implies that the Genesis story is an archetype of Jewish 
experience except for its ending, which is not to be believed. 
But this ancient Isaac, having long ago learned not to 
expect mercy and rescue from this God, submissively goes 
to the altar: 
and as he smelled the searing fumes,

he spoke his mind thus:

"God will not interrupt this slaughter!"

He called out in a tired voice:

"Here I am—prepared to be your ram."

""Translated by Etta Blum. 
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Several of Glatstein's Holocaust poems take the form of a 
dialogue between the poet who presents the accusations of 
his people and the Jewish God who tries to justify His action 
or inaction during the great destruction. In "My Brother 
Refugee," Glatstein appears at first to be sacrificing God's 
power in order to rescue the belief in His goodness. In the 
first part of the poem, God is presented as just another 
powerless, persecuted Jew, in fact a "brother refugee." The 
poet discovers new fellowship with so miserable a 
character, and wonders how he could in olden times have 
expended so much energy in profaning the words and 
blaspheming the person of so helpless and pitiful a creature. 
But is this "human" and lovable God really the God of the 
Jews, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob? Glatstein's mixture of 
skepticism and belief, of aggression and reconciliation, is 
conveyed in the declaration "The God of my unbelief is 
magnificent." 
This God, when His turn comes to speak, is in no mood to 
make great claims for Himself. In fact, He acknowledges 
that the Jews (whose faithfulness to Him has, after all, been 
greater than His to them) have now become, by virtue of 
their unprecedented "wallowing in dust," "godlier than I 
am," and predicts that the nations "will yet bow / to their 
anguish." But here the poet's irony and bitterness overcome 
his newfound affection. Who needed, who requested, such 
exaltation? 
But God, my brother,

why have you exalted my people like this,

constellating their misfortune

across the whole sky?

God comes up with an extraordinary, and perhaps 
desperate answer that says, in effect, that since the 
Christian version of the Messiah—"a childish fable with 
foolish words"—left the world just as it had always been, He 
decided to crucify the whole Jewish people, thus "con­
stellating their misfortune across the whole sky." No sooner 
does Glatstein allow himself to imagine a God with the 
power to act in history, than he imagines a God implicated 
in monstrosity, who confirms the election of His people 
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through eternity by decimating them, and dreams that His 
people "will bloom / crucified forever on a shining tree." 
The poem ends, therefore, with Glatstein's retreat into the 
image of a very small, childlike, helpless God, entirely 
dependent on the few remaining Jews willing to dream Him 
into existence. 
In another poem, Glatstein states boldly yet with 
inescapable logic that "Without Jews there is no Jewish 
God. / If we leave this world / The light will go out in your 
tent." If God's ultimate purposes for the universe required 
the creation and election of the Jewish people, how can God 
condone the extinction of that people? The removal of any 
member of the family of nations is a crime against 
humanity, against human diversity and the nature of 
mankind. The removal of this particular member, however, 
must constitute God's self-destruction. Without Jews, 
Who will dream you?
Who will remember you? 
Who deny you? 
Who yearn for you?
Who, on a lonely bridge,
Will leave you—in order to return? 
(Translated by Nathan Halper) 
These lines are not only an expression of the peculiarly 
intimate relation between the Jews and their God, or a 
skeptic's suggestion that God's existence is merely subjec­
tive, the creation of human minds, but a recognition that 
God had made the Jews the special instrument for the 
achievement of His purposes and their life His chief 
interest. The death of the Jews means the death of God: 
"The Jewish hour is guttering. / Jewish God! / You are 
almost gone." 
More than any other Jewish myth, however, the Cove­
nant between God and the Jewish people is for Glatstein the 
locus for his paradoxical mixture of faith and denial, 
submission and outrage. "Dead Men Don't Praise God," one 
of Glatstein's most ambitious poems, is based entirely on 
the idea that the Jews as a people have been called into 
existence to serve God's purpose in the world, and that they 
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were created by His special act of Covenant. It depends 
especially on the doctrine, whose use we have already noted 
in Kaplan's diary, that Jews of all generations were 
potentially present at Sinai, and were as much recipients of 
the Torah as those physically there. But it treats the 
Holocaust too as an event of more than human significance, 
whose full implications for Jewish existence can be 
fathomed only if it is understood in precisely the way we 
have traditionally understood the Covenant, of which it is 
at once a validation and a denial: 
We received the Torah on Sinai 
and in Lublin we gave it back.
Dead men don't praise God,
the Torah was given to the living.
And just as we all stood together
at the giving of the Torah,
so did we all die together at Lublin. 
If the gift of life at Sinai was a collective one to every 
generation of Jews, then the plague of death at Lublin-
Maidanek (and all the other death factories for which it 
stands) must also implicate every Jew; if all stood at Sinai, 
then all fell in the slaughter at Lublin: 
The souls of those who had lived out their lives, of those who had 
died young,
of those who were tortured, tested in every fire,
of those who were not yet born,
and of all the dead Jews from great grandfather Abraham down. 
That Moses, Aaron, King David, and the multitudes 
already dead should come to die again at Lublin perversely 
confirms the logic of the Covenant. What they were given at 
Sinai was not physical but spiritual life; if they were indeed 
being required to return the Covenant, then their souls must 
be killed as well as their bodies. What better place for such a 
second death than Lublin? 
That the Jews of all generations should congregate for 
death in the Holocaust in the same way that they had 
congregated for life in the Covenant shows the continuity 
between Sinai and Lublin and the unity of the Jewish 
people—in both cases, a kind of arbitrariness visited upon 
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all individual Jews, whether they liked it or not, and 
whether they "deserved" it or not, the collective fate of the 
Chosen People. But this continuity of chosenness is 
threatened by the discontinuity between the old and the 
new covenants. The pain and suffering that devolve upon 
the Chosen People may themselves be a sign of their 
invisible destiny, but the Holocaust, far from bringing a 
voice of redemption, seems to drown out the redeeming voice 
of Sinai. "Above the gas chambers / and the holy dead 
souls, / a forsaken abandoned Mount Sinai veiled itself in 
smoke." The Sinai Covenant makes its presence felt above 
Lublin, but the smoke of the death factories blackens and 
conceals Sinai itself. The new covenant obliterates the 
original one, for if all Jews are present to be killed at Lublin, 
then the new covenant is none other than a covenant for 
death; if all Jews have been done to death at Lublin, then it 
logically follows that the Torah has been returned: "Dead 
men don't praise God, / The Torah was given to the living." 
Whereas Glatstein's anguish moved him, again and 
again, to resort to traditional structures of religious 
meaning only to fill those structures with a body of 
experience that seemed at once to make sense only within 
them and to defy all sense whatever, Aaron Zeitlin stood 
virtually alone among Yiddish poets in viewing the 
Holocaust of the Jewish people not only within the confines 
of, but as a terrifying testimony to, the truths of orthodox 
Jewish religion.* He was among the few who claimed to 
hear a redeeming voice from Auschwitz, and who refused to 
back away from the recognition that God, if He is indeed the 
traditional Jewish God who acts within history, must be the 
God of the Holocaust as well as the God of Sinai. He may 
also be the hidden God of Isaiah, but he cannot be the 
reduced, powerless God sometimes imagined by Glatstein. 
Zeitlin was saved by an accident of fate from perishing in 
the Holocaust. He had written a play about German 
militarism called In Keynems Land (In No Man's Land) 
* All Zeitlin translations are by Robert Friend. 
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that opened in Warsaw in 1938. In the spring of 1939, he was 
invited by Maurice Schwartz to New York for the Yiddish 
Art Theatre's premiere of his play. While he was in New 
York, the war broke out and prevented his return to his 
family, all of whom were murdered by the Nazis. The 
Holocaust came to occupy the center of his emotional, 
poetic, and religious life. Unlike Glatstein, he wrote from 
the compulsion of religious conscience, rather than from the 
impulse to memorialize and resurrect the dead through art. 
In fact, the Holocaust seemed to him to have rendered the 
whole literary enterprise frivolous: "Were Jeremiah to sit by 
the ashes of Israel today, he would not cry out a lamenta­
tion, nor would he drown the desolate places with his tears. 
The Almighty Himself would be powerless to open up his 
well of tears. He would maintain a deep silence. For even an 
outcry is now a lie, even tears are mere literature, even 
prayers are false."6 It was a religious, not a literary, impulse 
that moved Zeitlin to the composition of his two-volume 
justification of the ways of God to men: "I Believe." 
Belief pervades the poem, since for Zeitlin the beginning 
of inquiry is not "If there be a God, how could the Holocaust 
have been permitted to happen?" but "Since there is a God, 
what does the Holocaust mean?" The aggression directed 
toward God in other Yiddish poems on this subject is here 
directed primarily toward competing religions that claim to 
derive from Judaism. "Should I believe in Spinoza's 
geometric god?" he asks. This is a god "without horror or 
miracle," to be sure, but also without relation to men in 
general or Jews in particular. There is an intentional 
ambiguity in Zeitlin's reference to this monistic and 
naturalistic god as "a distant relative / who won't 
acknowledge me as his relation." The "me" refers not only 
to humanity at large but to Zeitlin's Jewish identity; and 
Spinoza's god is a kind of snobbish relative because he was 
conceived by a Dutch Jew yet explicitly rejected the election 
of the Jews acknowledged by Christianity itself. Rather 
than believe in this utterly detached and indifferent god of 
nature Zeitlin would "willingly believe in Satan and 
damnation." 
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Christianity too is objectionable both for its general 
inadequacy to the human condition—its location of human 
guilt and divine mystery in the wrong places—and for its 
need to affirm itself through the denial of Torah, to found its 
life on Jewish death. 
Should I believe in the redeemer who never redeems, 
the dreamed-up god who dangles on all the crosses,
. . . the god of cloister bells
whom the dark dreams 
of sadists bleed and kill 
with the deliberate will 
to torture my truth with his lie? 
Zeitlin here means to call up the centuries-old invocation of 
alleged Jewish guilt for the death of Jesus as a license to kill 
Jesus (over and over again) and the Jews at once. How 
trivial, in any case, does the Christian mystery of a god 
become a man appear when viewed by a generation that has 
experienced the reality, and the mystery, of Hitler, 
a devil who became a man, 
who lived with us here upon earth,
lived and was seen, lived and was heard, 
and—incinerating, gassing—crucified
a people. 
Here are transformations enough to satisfy the most 
voracious appetite for mysteries. Yet it is clear that the 
Christian myth evokes something more than vituperation 
from Zeitlin. Like Glatstein, Zeitlin is ensnared by a certain 
morbid fascination for the very Christian image that he 
excoriates into imagining the whole Jewish nation as a 
crucified people. By so doing, he claims (again like 
Glatstein) to be giving to a literary fable the moral 
significance that always inhered in it, but that was never 
fully realized until the Holocaust. (Neither of these Yiddish 
poets seems aware of the fact that by the very act of 
insisting that the murder of six million Jews is the true 
crucifixion, they are endorsing the very Christian scheme 
that they derogate, which claims that the conformity 
between the Cross and the suffering of all mankind is 
precisely what makes innocent suffering bearable.) 
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Having disposed of the claims of the Spinozistic and 
Christian rivals to Judaism as untenable in the aftermath 
of the Holocaust, Zeitlin dismisses modern secular 
ideologies and man-made religions with a mere wave of the 
hand as "More hollow than ever . . . / After the all-
destroying flames." Whatever cries of rebellion arise from 
the Holocaust can be flung only at the one God who could 
have ordained the Holocaust. What but an orthodox 
structure can make rebellion meaningful? 
Who would rebel against pale Jesuses?

And who would rage

against a Spinozan god,

a nonbeing being?

Zeitlin feels himself and his God to be locked into a pattern 
from which there can be no escape except at the price of 
denying one's principle of being. "One is—what one is. / I 
am Jew as He is God." Zeitlin's must be a living God; and 
since He is living, He is of necessity and unavoidably the 
God of cataclysm, the God of the Holocaust. 
Zeitlin's voice is as a rule far more personal, far less 
representative and collective than that of other Yiddish 
Holocaust poets. He typically uses "I" rather than "we." Yet 
in the most deeply felt passages expressing the irrevoca­
bility of the covenantal relationship between the Divine 
Father and the favored but chastised child, Zeitlin is 
forced to link himself with all the others who are no more, 
and without whose tacit consent he could not with any 
decency accept justification or consolation for their 
suffering. 
Can I then choose not to believe 
in that living God whose purposes
when He destroys, seeming to forsake me,
I cannot conceive; 
choose not to believe in Him 
Who having turned my body to fine ash 
begins once more to wake me? 
The pressure of emotion obliges Zeitlin, without ever 
forsaking the singular pronoun, to join himself with the 
body of the Jewish people whom God has burned in order to 
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reawaken. That "aspiration" to the Holy One through the 
crematory flue which provoked bitter irony in Glatstein 
becomes a declaration of faith—albeit tragic and paradox­
ical faith—in Zeitlin. Although he uses the Yiddish word 
Khurbn, for Zeitlin the idea behind the English word 
Holocaust retains its full, original meaning, derived 
through the Greek holokauston from the Hebrew olah, "an 
offering made by fire unto the Lord."7 
Although Zeitlin does not hesitate to involve God totally 
in the Holocaust and to profess faith that the burning and 
the awakening are part of a single process, he gives no 
indication of where the signs of new life are to be found in 
this world. That so much suffering is even more difficult to 
conceive without God than with Him, that "even my pain 
confirms Him," that without God our cries are like dead 
letters reaching nowhere: all this is convincingly expressed. 
But that there is in truth a divine rationale for what the poet 
has himself labeled the devil's destructiveness remains an 
article of faith, a willed belief sustained by no evidence: 
I believe God gives
His inconceivable hells 
because somewhere else 
His eye surmises
Inconceivable paradises
for his slaughtered fugitives. 
That "somewhere" has, to the mind of anyone but an 
orthodox believer, a fatal vagueness; for Zeitlin, however, it 
is the next world, whose standards are simply incommen­
surable with our own and can therefore hardly be conveyed 
through human language. 
Whereas Glatstein thought that the Covenant granted at 
Sinai was dissolved by the great slaughter at Lublin-
Maidanek, Zeitlin insists that God's presence manifested 
itself in both places: "Who so volcanic as my God? / If He is 
Sinai to me, / He is Maidanek as well." Maidanek too 
confirms the covenantal relationship between God and the 
Jews, who are depicted by Zeitlin as locked into a fatal 
embrace from which there is no escape but through death. 
"We cannot let go / of each other, / not He of me, nor I of 
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Him." A secular poet like Yehuda Amichai can respond to 
such a recognition with the ironic "My God, my God, / Why 
have you not forsaken me!?" But for Zeitlin the death that is 
the price of the Covenant is a death that breaks through the 
limits of this world to a new life. The Holocaust is for him 
nothing less than the biblically promised destruction of the 
world by fire, as well as the catastrophe that according to 
Jewish tradition must precede the messianic deliverance. 
So far is Zeitlin from the view that Auschwitz and 
Maidanek represented a radical evil, wholly divorced from 
God's purposes, that he repeatedly, even compulsively, 
refers to God's "experiments" in the Holocaust, "experi­
ments on me, / experiments in fire." He knows that no 
other word so effectively calls up the obscene, cold cruelty 
of the Germans' treatment of people they had relegated to 
the status of laboratory rats. No other word could serve to 
involve the Jewish God so totally in the depredations 
visited upon His people, and thereby give credence to the 
blasphemous view of the skeptical writer (see, e.g., the 
Israeli novelist Kaniuk) that the God who willingly 
presided over Auschwitz must himself be a Nazi. 
Few readers, whatever their religious convictions, are 
likely to give intellectual assent to Zeitlin's defiant 
affirmations. But they can hardly fail to be awed by so 
passionate a commitment to the biblical promise of 
consolation, and so complete an expression of the ex­
perience of loss and gain, curse and blessing. Far from 
being suppressed, the pattern of violent oscillation between 
love and chastisement in God's tragic relationship with the 
Jews is the cornerstone of Zeitlin's faith: 
He lets no one go under,

as He lets me go under,

lets no one be

so utterly

a paradigm in fire.

There is no one He will equally desire

to find, to lose.

And I for my part find and lose Him, too,

lose Him and find Him,

an interchange of beatitude and law,

lamentations and the Song of Songs.
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"The Last of the Just" and "Blood from the Sky" 
There is no coherent and connected body of fiction about 
the Holocaust that has the weight and impressiveness and 
unity of theme of Holocaust poetry. A poet facing a world 
emptied of his people and his God can make of those very 
absences his subject. This is particularly true of the postwar 
Yiddish poets. For them, as Glatstein wrote, "earth and 
heaven [were] wiped bare"; the Yiddish-speaking world that 
was their subject and their potential audience no longer 
existed. Their poetry became an extended elegy for what 
was no more and a reproach to, and quarrel, with, the God 
who was, whether by inadvertence or design, responsible 
for the disappearance of the Jewish world. 
For a writer of fiction, it is far less easy to find a sufficient 
subject in deploring the absence of his proper subject, or to 
make his art solely a vehicle for accusing God of having 
emptied the world of meaning, of words, of the Covenant 
itself. Yet novelists too, albeit with greater indirection, have 
assaulted the heavens with question and challenge, and 
have sought to define the religious dimensions of the 
Holocaust, sometimes against the background of Jewish 
history, sometimes through an apocalyptic mode that 
makes Jewish experience the instrument for revelation of 
the darkest universal truths. Andre Schwarz-Bart's The 
Last of the Just (1959) provides a representative example of 
the first approach, and Piotr Rawicz's Blood from the Sky 
(1961) of the second. 
For writers whose primary quandaries about the 
Holocaust are religious in nature, the long continuance of 
Jewish suffering over thousands of years appears in a 
double aspect. On the one hand, the endless persecutions 
and hideous massacres seem a blatant contradiction of 
God's love and concern for His Chosen People. As an old 
Eastern European Jewish quip, half-Hebrew, half-Yiddish, 
puts it: 
DOT :o'Dyn ^DO umra 
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Thou hast chosen us from among all the nations; why did you 
have to pick on the Jews?8 
But on the other hand, the endurance of the Jewish people in 
spite of suffering and loss, its ability to survive long after its 
most potent enemies and overlords had disappeared from 
the face of the earth, to survive against all odds, seemed 
inexplicable except by miraculous causes, and specifically 
by a God whose chastisement of the Jews was inseparable 
from the desire to fulfill His purposes through them. The 
very decision to view the Nazis as descendants of Haman 
and Pharaoh, to see the Holocaust as an event of Jewish 
history, the latest and culminating disaster in an ancient 
series, would seem likely to predispose an author to imply 
an element of supernatural design in even the most dismal 
universe, a promise of continuance even after the impen­
ding cataclysm. 
In Schwarz-Bart's The Last of the Just, these opposing 
attitudes (or conflicting emotions) coexist in uneasy tension 
with one another. The book traces the history of a family 
named Levy from the York massacre of 1185, "a minor 
episode in a history overstocked with martyrs," through its 
apparent extinction in the gas chambers of Auschwitz. The 
thread that links the many generations of the family is not 
only persecution and suffering—the "holocaust" that is 
said to have afflicted the Jews "since the beginning of 
time"—but their possession, in every generation, of a 
Lamed-Vovnik, one of the thirty-six Just Men upon whom, 
according to Jewish tradition, the world reposes. It does so 
because the Lamed-Vovnik takes everyone's suffering upon 
himself and " 'raises it to heaven and sets it at the feet of the 
Lord—who forgives.' " Schwarz-Bart's history of the Levy 
family is a dismal record of frightful persecution, but it is 
also a chronicle of noble heroisms and, above all, of 
miraculous survival. The original Just Man of the Levys 
went to his martyr's death convinced that he was the last of 
his line and his generation, the last of the Jews. So too did 
many of his successors through the
 centuries. But they were 
mistaken; always a remnant remained. Consequently, that 
part of the novel which carries us from the twelfth to the 
220 The Resonance of Dust 
twentieth century beautifully celebrates what Simon 
Rawidowicz once called the phenomenon of Israel as the 
ever-dying people: "a phenomenon which has almost no 
parallel in mankind's story: a nation that has been 
disappearing constantly for the last two thousand years, 
exterminated in dozens of lands all over the globe, reduced 
to half or third of its population by tyrants ancient and 
modern—and yet it still exists. . . . "9 
The largest segment of the novel is devoted to the story of 
Ernie Levy, who learns at an early age that he is destined to 
be the Just Man of the Levy tradition in the era of Nazi 
domination over Europe. The fate of the Jews throughout 
history and now under the Nazis moves Ernie to curse and 
blaspheme God, between whom and himself "there was an 
unbreachable wall . .  . of Jewish lamentations." Yet as 
the Nazi net closes upon his people, and he moves to fulfill 
his inherited role of comforter and martyr, finally turning 
himself in voluntarily to the Germans at Drancy, Ernie 
becomes a believer in precisely the God who has been the 
author of Jewish misfortune through millennia. En route to 
the gas chambers with a group of Jewish children who have 
come to think of him as their "rabbi," Ernie prays: " '0 
Lord, we went forth like this thousands of years ago. We 
walked across arid deserts and the blood-red Red Sea in a 
flood of salt, bitter tears. We are very old. We are still 
walking.
 Oh, let us arrive, finally!' " From such passages, in 
which Ernie's experience fits into an assigned place as the 
culmination of a series of like events in Jewish history, one 
could indeed conclude with Rawidowicz: "A nation dying 
for thousands of years means a living nation. Our incessant 
dying means uninterrupted living, rising, standing up, 
beginning anew. . . . If we are the last—let us be the last as 
our fathers and forefathers were. Let us prepare the ground 
for the last Jews who will come after us, and for the last 
Jews who will rise after them, and so on until the end of 
days."10 
But there is another, contrary movement of the novel, in 
which Schwarz-Bart uses Jewish history only to repudiate 
it, and to deny the consolation implicit in the old affirma­
tion, periodically made after Jewish populations were 
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decimated: "the people Israel lives." The segment of the 
novel that describes Ernie's journey into death really does 
insist that he is indeed the last of the Just, that he will be 
survived by none, and that this is final death for him and 
his people. "Ernie realized clearly that he was entering the 
last circle of the Levys' hell." In the camp, he does fulfill his 
historically prescribed role as Just Man by offering to the 
children the consolation of new life to come in the 
"Kingdom of Israel," but it is a false consolation, a lie that 
he dispenses because " 'there is no room for truth here.' " 
Not in his words, but in his face "the death of the Jewish 
people . . . was written clearly." In the moments before 
death, "it seemed to him that an eternal silence was closing 
down upon the Jewish breed marching to slaughter—that 
no heir, no memory would supervene to prolong the silent 
parade of victims." In all these passages, the novelist 
appears to say that the Holocaust was truly the end of the 
Jewish people and even to warn that longevity, which may 
cultivate its own illusions and complacency, is no 
guarantee of permanence. 
The tension between the impulse to see the Holocaust as 
another tragic event within the history of an ever dying and 
therefore eternally Chosen People and the contrary impulse 
to see it as the end of Jewish history and a denial of the 
Jewish God continues to the end of the novel, and beyond it. 
A moment before his death by gas, Ernie recalls the legend 
of a rabbinical ancestor who, martyred by Roman fire while 
wrapped in the scrolls of the Torah, told his people with his 
last breath that although the Torah parchment was 
burning, its letters were taking wing. " lAh, yes, surely, the 
letters are taking wing,' Ernie repeated as the flame blazing 
in his chest rose suddenly to his head." But whatever of 
affirmation is to be found in Ernie's final revelation of 
Jewish continuance is turned to mockery by the blasphe­
mous concluding prayer of the narrator himself: 
And praised. Auschwitz. Be. Maidanek. The Lord. Treblinka. 
And praised. Buchenwald. Be. Mauthausen. The Lord. Belzec. 
And praised. Sobibor. Be. Chelmno. The Lord. Ponary. And 
praised. . . . 
Earlier in the novel, an elderly Jew in Paris had called God 
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to account for His unending punishment of the Jews for 
their iniquities by warning: " ' We Jews will soon sleep in the 
dust, and one day you will seek us . . . and we will no 
longer exist.' " By finally identifying himself with this 
reproach to God, even Schwarz-Bart—a writer with only the 
vaguest idea of the meaning of the Jewish Covenant, and 
with an abundant hostility toward the Jewish God—finds 
himself, like Glatstein and Molodowsky, partner to an 
ancient quarrel that confirms the very attachment it wishes 
to deny. 
Two years after The Last of the Just appeared, another 
French-Jewish writer of East European background, Piotr 
Rawicz, published a novel also in the tradition of the Jewish 
quarrel with God, but much more profoundly aware of the 
paradox of chosenness that is at its base. Blood from the 
Sky (1961) is at once more nihilistic and more mystical than 
Schwarz-Bart's book. Its innumerable "excursions into 
ontology" generally terminate in the conclusion that Being 
is "a foul-smelling dough in a kneading machine" and that 
"the only enemy of beings is Being." After watching the 
Germans, in scenes of unbearable horror, cut out the tongue 
of a Jewish boy and the eyes of a Jewish girl, the narrator 
sees in the monstrosity before him, "the belly of the 
Universe, the belly of Existence . . . gaping open, and its 
filthy intestines invading the room." This is taken as 
irrefutable proof that "God is mad, stark raving 
mad. . . .  " If He exists at all, He should create only 
atheists. But alongside the nausea and cosmic disgust that 
reverberate through the book, there is another impulse, 
which must be responsible for the fact that the book exists 
at all, since one target of its metaphysical fury is literature 
itself, "anti-dignity exalted to a system." The novel's 
narrator and protagonist is a Ukrainian Jew named Boris, 
whose story and reflections and poetic fragments are 
framed by the editorial comments of the author Rawicz, 
who claims he has had to do much cutting and reshaping to 
give some coherence to Boris' outpourings. Boris, in his 
grim and peculiar fashion, is a continuator of the tradition 
of a rabbi among his ancestors who had pleaded on behalf 
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of the Jewish people against God. This rabbi had readily 
acknowledged his own sins and those of his brethren, but 
had challenged God to say what He would do " 'If You were 
the permanent target of every kind of mockery and cruelty 
and yet, in the teeth of it, had to survive? To survive, not 
because You love life . . . but from a sense of duty, so that 
someone survived by whom Your Law would be more or less 
rigorously observed?' " Boris, witness and victim of more 
terrible mockery and cruelty than his grandfather's 
generation had ever known, flings his people's reproach 
against a God who now threatens not only Jewish existence 
but, through His punishment of His wayward people, the 
ground of all being and the meaning of existence itself. 
Jewish history exists in Blood from the Sky primarily as 
an aspect of the mental world of its protagonist, who comes 
to view the Holocaust as both a collapsed history of the 
Jewish people and a test of whether that history had 
ultimate meaning. Boris senses that this long history and 
the ordering it gave to human experience may now be not 
merely ended but rendered absurd by the new barbarism. 
All of Jewish history was now being relived within a few 
years and "was possibly about to be extinguished before our 
eyes, and together with us." Both the horrible events 
recounted in the novel and the concurrent story of the 
narrator's attempt to impose coherence on them by writing 
a "composition on the subject of decomposition" call into 
question the power of Jewish history to provide a 
meaningful background to the Holocaust. One character 
asserts that "both past and future must be destroyed so that 
they may be integrated in the solely existing present." 
Rawicz, unlike Schwarz-Bart, does not believe that the 
destruction of European Jewry can be presented or 
contained within the historical mode because it is an 
apocalyptic event. His postscript to the novel insists that 
"this book is not a historical record." Elsewhere he has 
maintained that in his writing he is less concerned with the 
historical than with the psychological, the metaphysical, 
"above all the ontological aspects" of the Holocaust. "I 
believe that the fate and condition of the Jewish people are 
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the very essence of the human condition—the furthest 
borders of human destiny. And the fate of the 'Holocaust 
Jew,' . .  . is . .  . the ontological essence of that on­
tological essence."11 Yet the ontological revelation toward 
which the novel strives would be meaningless if it did not 
provide an answer to the question of whether Jewish 
history pointed beyond itself to the relation between the 
Jewish God and all mankind. The novel's implicit claim to 
greatness depends upon its ability to demonstrate Emil 
Fackenheim's assertion that, precisely because the Ger­
mans cut off Jews from humanity and denied them the right 
to exist, Jews have since Auschwitz come to "represent all 
humanity when they affirm their Jewishness and deny the 
Nazi denial."12 Boris, in his most desperate moments of 
imprisonment and torture, declares that "the body of 
History [is] attacked by cockroaches . . . but they will not 
devour it. . . . " 
The paradox of chosenness whereby the gift of the 
Covenant that the Jews were singularly privileged to 
receive became the single reason for their persecution and 
murder is the pivot on which the novel's action turns. Boris, 
the hero and narrator, at first speaks ironically of a certain 
unwillingness to escape from the fate of his fellow Jews be­
cause " 'I have the feeling it would be a cheap way out not 
to pay for all that I have received from my God.' " In fact, 
Boris has many traits that would aid his escape from the 
Nazis and their Ukrainian helpers. He is fair-haired, he 
speaks excellent German, he has mastered Ukrainian 
history and literature, and he has managed to obtain a 
Christian birth certificate. Only one thing can keep him 
from passing as a non-Jew: "The sign of the Covenant, 
inscribed in my body long ago, as it had been inscribed in 
the bodies of my forefathers and THEIR forefathers, could 
be made out all too plainly by those taking part in the hunt 
that was going on in our town. It was within the capacity of 
the dimmest oaf from Bavaria to interpret this 
hieroglyph. . . .  " 
It is not too much to say that in this book not only Jewish 
history but the nature of literature and ultimately the whole 
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of the universe converge on the circumcision as sign of the 
Covenant. From the outset of the book the ultimate 
meaning of the Covenant, the question of whether Boris can 
ever become sufficiently attached to life to prefer it to death, 
and the ability of Boris (or anyone else) to compose a work of 
literature about the Holocaust are intertwined. Of the 
novel's three parts, the first and the third make explicit 
reference to the mysterious link between the circumcision 
by which the Jew is distinguished from the gentile and the 
metaphorical habit whereby writers discover surprising 
similarities between things apparently dissimilar: Part One 
is called "The Tool and the Art of Comparison," Part Three, 
"The Tool and the Thwarting of Comparisons." From the 
outset, the novel asks whether the paradigm for the writer's 
act of creation is supplied by God or by the Nazis. There 
seems a deliberate ambiguity in Boris's reference to the 
yellow stars that the Jews must wear in accordance with 
Nazi decree as "yellow stars of the Poet-King." This would 
seem to be a reference to the God of the Covenant, but when 
Boris's madly brilliant friend Leo L. contemplates the 
Germans' impending sweep through the town, he calls them 
"destroying angels" and says that it is they, not the Jewish 
God, who hold the key to the whole cosmic drama, since 
"'this Performance of Nothingness . . . is less misleading 
than everything else. . . . ' " When the Germans, having 
already "chosen" the whole Jewish people to be murdered, 
are contemplating those Jews from whom they will select 
the first group to be murdered, Boris describes the moment 
as one of "vibrant complicity that arises between artist and 
raw material before the act of creation begins." 
Before the town was destroyed, Leo L., though cynical 
about all else, had spoken to Boris of "the vocation to be 
witness," the only vocation that could ever again matter. 
But when, after his survival, Boris turns to the task of 
bearing witness to the saving remnant of the Jewish people, 
he finds that both the town and its memory are dead, that 
the "I" who lived in the town and who then survived prison 
and torture hardly exists in the man who puts pen to paper. 
"When a whirlwind comes along, one must make the most of 
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it, exploit it, start writing at once, lying at once." But the 
difficulty of ascertaining any substantial relationship 
between the events of the Holocaust and the literature that 
describes them is only the beginning of the conundrum. 
After the Holocaust, "the 'literary manner' is an obscenity 
by definition." Rawicz's own dilemma in re-creating and 
interpreting the cosmic catastrophe that he survived is 
made a main subject of the novel itself. Blood from the Sky 
deplores, in every conceivable way, on the suggestive as 
well as the discursive level, the paralysis of language and 
imagination caused by this crime of unprecedented 
magnitude against the Jewish people and the human 
condition itself. "One by one," complains Boris, "words­
all the words of the human language—wilt and grow too 
weak to bear a meaning. And then they fall away, like dead 
scales. All meanings evaporate." If this happens to the 
writer, he must cease to be one. The novel is therefore filled 
with would-be writers searching out ways to continue to 
write in a universe emptied of meaning. One madman 
named David G. keeps a diary that after the war becomes 
the basis for a widely popular novel. Its idea of "construc­
tive action" in modern literature is to "spit on everything." 
At one point when Boris is masquerading as a Ukrainian, 
he is obliged to listen to a story composed by a Nazi second 
lieutenant of literary inclinations while outside the window 
the heads of five Jewish men who have been buried, alive, 
upright in a garden are being licked and chewed by pigs. At 
least this Nazi litterateur remains untroubled by the in­
adequacies of naturalism, for his sole subject is cockroaches 
killing other cockroaches. 
It is this very image of the cockroach, almost compulsive 
in the novel, that invades Boris's thoughts after he is 
arrested and asked to drop his trousers, revealing the penis. 
"On it, the sign of the Covenant is inscribed in indelible 
lettering, all too easy for these bustling men to read. The tool 
and the art of comparison." Henceforward, his "dreams 
could not possibly come under any heading but entomology. 
Cockroaches' dreams." Since their escape from the Ukrai­
nian Jewish town, Boris and his mistress Naomi had 
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attached themselves, however precariously, to life not only 
through guile and luck but through their shared sexual 
passion. Now the tool of passion that had kept alive in Boris 
at least the illusion of meaning in life becomes the means of 
flinging him back among the members of the Jewish 
community covenanted to death. He wishes to pass as a 
Ukrainian among his gentile fellow prisoners, but they 
single him out in the shower by pointing to his circumcised 
tool: 
Boris would stare at the subject of Contention: so this was the 
instrument, the poor instrument, of all his past metaphysics?
Of all his metaphysics which in the past had seemed so 
personal, so exceptional, and which today were no more 
peculiar to him, no more "individual," than are the entrails of 
one squashed cockroach as compared to the entrails of 
another? 
The book's most daring exercise of that "art of com­
parison" with which the "tool" is consistently linked either 
by similarity or contrast comes at the conclusion of part 
one. The Germans have just made an abattoir of a Jewish 
kindergarten, mutilating but not murdering the children. 
Two hours after the Germans leave, Boris manages to 
return to the scene with a nurse, who carries a syringe. 
"Several mutilated children were still suffering. The nurse 
went around distributing death, like portions of ginger­
bread stuffed with darkness. For they do exist, Boris assures 
us, cakes stuffed with darkness. He also compares the nurse 
to the gardener who fulfills the destiny of the flowers and 
the sunshine by picking them." Here the art of comparison 
exemplifies literature's ability to assimilate new realms of 
experience to the imagination by linking disparate sen­
sations through the bond of simile and metaphor. This is 
an artistic triumph of sorts, and yet it fills the author with 
revulsion rather than pride, for either it admits us into a 
world it would be better never to have known or deludes us 
into thinking we can know this world through words. Not 
long afterward, therefore, Boris, about to succumb to the 
temptation to compare each of the millennia that have 
elapsed or are yet to come to a squashed bedbug, resolves "to 
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kill comparisons, to expunge them all, to exterminate the 
whole tribe, the whole pernicious breed." He must reluctant­
ly admit, of course, that if figures of speech are killed 
forever, nothing is left to the writer but "mere recounting, 
mere enumeration, so pullulating, and so ugly . . . worthy 
only of a storekeeper." 
What then is the connection between Boris's revulsion 
from the Covenant and his revulsion from literature? If the 
genocidal extermination of the Jewish people as if they were 
bedbugs or cockroaches has spread its poison even to "the 
Throne of God, who lay in a swoon . . . surrounded by His 
own vomit," then it has also transformed literature into 
"the art, occasionally remunerative, of rummaging in 
vomit." It is absurd and irrational that the sign of the 
Covenant, a mere detail of physiognomy, should, despite all 
one's talents and cleverness and acquirement, make him 
indistinguishable as an individual from all other Jewish 
males and obliterate every distinction except that between 
Jew and gentile. But if it is so, fears Boris, then the German 
aspirant to literature who writes exclusively about 
cockroaches killing other cockroaches is the real master of 
the old art of comparison. Everything hinges on the 
question of whether the Jews have been chosen by God or 
only by the world. 
Finally, Boris's sixty-six days in prison, during which 
time he tries to persuade his captors that, despite his 
circumcision, he is a Ukrainian and not a Jew, reveal to him 
the true connection between the Covenant and creation, 
both literary and biological. Just prior to, and again during, 
his interrogation by the S.S., Boris perceives the Sign of 
Terrestrial Life, "a transverse line giving rise to three 
stems, each surmounted by a small flame." He had first 
learned to recognize this pattern when he was nearing his 
thirteenth year, the age of ritual maturity in Jewish males, 
and was being initiated into the mysteries of the Book of 
Creation. He had been visited by it on three subsequent 
occasions. Now, in its crucial visit to Boris, the Sign of Life 
drives all developments and phenomena "back to their 
point of departure, back to their seed and even to the seed of 
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their seed." The Sign brings Boris to the recognition that 
the Covenant, which has come to him, like life itself, from 
his ancestors, is exactly the Word become flesh. The Sign of 
life brings him to awareness of the implications of the fact 
that his tool, "this factory for producing metaphysics," has 
come through the shipwreck of everything else still alive, 
still responding, still capable of creation. "And there he 
was, unbuttoning his trousers with his manacled hands 
and baring, yet again, the organ on which the sign of the 
Covenant had been inscribed years before. Did this door 
still open onto God? Did it at least open onto the Di­
vine . .  . ? Dull rites, dull symbols, and those which are 
less so: are the Covenant with God and physical passion, 
sharing the same site and founded in the same crucible, the 
same thing . .  . ? Could the Biblical patriarch, that fore­
father clad in the red desert and resonant dust, have fore­
seen this thought of mine? Did he set me a playful riddle, 
one that I am succeeding in solving after thousands of years 
—at the LAST moment?" This is as close as Rawicz and 
Boris will bring us to unraveling the mysterious connection 
between the Jewish Covenant and the creative act that 
underlies not merely literature but the universe itself. Less 
mysterious is the revelation to Boris that from a moral 
point of view there is one fate worse than being circum­
cised: namely, being uncircumcised. For no sooner is Boris 
accepted by his fellow prisoners as (what he is not) a gentile 
than he receives membership in the society of those Czeslaw 
Milosz called the "uncircumcised, the associates of death." 
Blood from the Sky is built upon two enormous paradox­
es. It asserts in a variety of ways that the Holocaust cannot 
be assimilated by the artistic imagination, and that "man 
never so much resembles an insect as when he engages in 
the activity of writing." But its intellectual brilliance 
admits us to a realm beyond grief and so belies the very 
paralysis that it deplores. It gains its unique power from 
Rawicz's ability to "constellate [Jewish] misfortune across 
the whole sky," as Glatstein would say, and to show how the 
destruction of the Jews has permanently disarranged the 
universe and altered the human condition. Yet Rawicz has 
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placed himself firmly within the Jewish tradition that 
pleads on behalf of His people against the God who has 
chosen them. Cynical as he is about the universe and the 
powers alleged to control it, Boris argues that the Jews, "by 
dint of strange and inhumanly systematized medita­
tions, had succeeded in approaching what was godlike in 
the human condition as no one else had ever done. . . .  " 
With bitterness and cynicism, Rawicz reduces the Covenant 
from the spiritual to the merely physical; then, with resent­
ment and grudging respect, he admits that only the Cove­
nant is metaphysically capacious enough to contain the 
storms of his imagination and the meaning of the Holo­
caust. 
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We make out of the quarrel with others, rhetoric, but of the 
quarrel with ourselves, poetry.—William Butler Yeats, Per 
Arnica Silentia Lunae 
chapter 8 
A Dialogue of the Mind with Itself 
Chaim Grade's Quarrel with Hersh Rasseyner 
If we had not long ago grown accustomed to the fact that 
Yiddish literature, apart from the work of I. B. Singer, 
remains terra incognita for most American and English 
readers, it would be a cause of some astonishment that 
Chaim Grade's novella My Quarrel with Hersh Rasseyner 
has not established itself as a minor classic of modern 
literature. It is both a great and a grandly representative 
story because it presents with tremendous dramatic force 
the most terrifying quandaries of our time in the special 
shape and with the compelling urgency that they have 
received from the cataclysms of twentieth-century history 
and particularly from the destruction of European Jewry. If 
we had to select a single work to stand as a paradigm of all 
Holocaust literature, a work of sufficient generalizing power 
to contain within itself not only most of the religious, 
philosophical, and artistic questions that the Holocaust 
raises but also the whole range of conflicting answers to 
them, we could not do better than to rely on Grade's story.1 
My Quarrel with Hersh Rasseyner is told in the first 
person by a character named Chaim, who seems to be the 
author Chaim Grade, thinly disguised for fictional pur­
poses. In the course of describing his quarrel, or rather 
series of quarrels, with his former Mussarist2 schoolmate 
Hersh Rasseyner, Chaim creates a philosophical dialogue 
between the elements of faith and of doubt in his own soul. 
In the novella, Hersh Rasseyner, who never departs from 
orthodoxy, speaks for religious faith, and Chaim, the 
former yeshiva student turned writer, for religious skep­
ticism; but in truth the voices we hear in this dialogue are 
the accusing and self-accusing voices of the author himself. 
In fact, the mental processes underlying the story's 
composition are made transparent toward the end when 
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Chaim says to his philosophical adversary: " 'Reb 
Hersh . .  . as I sat here listening to you, I sometimes 
thought I was listening to myself. And since it's harder to lie 
to yourself than to someone else, I will answer you as 
though you were my own conscience. . . .' " 
Chaim begins his story in 1937 at a point when he had 
already separated himself from the Mussarists and their 
unworldly ways. He is giving a lecture—apparently on a 
literary subject, for he is derisively referred to by Hersh as a 
writer of "godless verses"—in Bialystok near the yeshiva in 
which he had been a student seven years earlier. Some of his 
former schoolmates, in defiance of the yeshiva's prohibition 
against secular learning, attend his lecture, and others visit 
him secretly. But the one former schoolmate whom Chaim 
truly desires to see again does not appear; and that is Hersh 
Rasseyner. Nor is this surprising, for whereas many of the 
other Mussarists chafe under the severe religious discipline 
that binds them, Hersh thrives upon it and seems never to 
be tempted by the lures of secular knowledge or the 
pleasures of the world outside of the shtetl. 
Chaim and Hersh do, however, meet unexpectedly in the 
street and at once discover that they already speak different 
languages. Chaim has so far forgotten his religious 
training that he unthinkingly greets Hersh with the modish 
"How are you?", a question that in the yeshiva means 
"What is the state of your religious life?" Hersh does not lose 
the opportunity to remind his lapsed brother that his 
frivolous social use of what is still for others the most 
compelling of questions reveals the diminution of life that 
attends the lapse from piety: " 'And how are you, Chaim 
Vilner?3 My question, you see, is more important.' " Hersh 
then proceeds, in the middle of the street, with a sublime 
indifference to social decorum that shocks the assimilated 
narrator, to reproach Chaim for having allowed himself to 
be lured from a religious life into the "enlightened" world of 
Western Europe and to warn him that all his successes in 
the secular world will leave him less happy than he would 
have been had he remained in the yeshiva. The life of piety, 
he asserts, is validated by God; the life of letters by literary 
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critics. " 'You write godless verses and they reward you by 
patting you on the cheek. Now they're stuffing you with 
applause as they stuff a goose with grain. But later you'll 
see, when you've begun to go to their school, oh, won't the 
worldly ones beat you! Which of you isn't hurt by criticism? 
Is there one of you really so self-confident that he doesn't go 
around begging for some authority's approval? Is there one 
of you who's prepared to publish his book anonymously?4 
The big thing with you people is that your name should be 
seen and known. You have given up our tranquillity of spirit 
for what? For passions you will never be able to satisfy and 
for doubts you will never be able to answer, no matter how 
much you suffer.' " 
Chaim, for his part, accuses his pious friend of the sin of 
pride, for there is such a thing as pride in one's modesty and 
humility. Whereas Hersh alleges that the appetite for 
pleasure can never be satiated because it grows by what it 
feeds on, Chaim replies that in those people for whom 
pleasure and fame offer no temptation, what looks to the 
world like self-denial is really self-indulgence. Besides, 
Chaim denies that he himself has become a mere pleasure-
seeker; accused of running away from the religious life, he 
maintains that he has actually returned to his proper home 
among the common people who in the shtetl were expected 
to support the very religious scholars (like Hersh) who 
deplored their worldliness and impiety. 
To these arguments Hersh does not condescend to reply. 
But the argument has already proceeded far enough to 
assure the narrator of the correctness of his decision to leave 
the yeshiva. Or was it his decision? Ironically, he wants to 
believe both that the decision was the correct one and that 
he did not make it. "If at the time, I said to myself, I didn't 
know why and where I was going, someone else thought it 
out for me, someone stronger than I. That someone else 
was—my generation and my environment." It is the 
feeblest of faiths, and like all faiths in a generation, 
youthful or decrepit, it does not long survive the test of 
experience. 
The second part of the story commences two years later, 
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when the generation and environment in which the 
emancipated Chaim had put his faith had produced, among 
other things, the two great revolutionary powers of the 
modern European world, the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany. It is 1939, they are carving up Eastern Europe 
between them, and the Soviets are in control of Vilna. 
"Hunger raged in the city. Every face was clouded with fear 
of the arrests carried out at night by NKVD agents. My 
heart was heavy. Once, standing in line for a ration of 
bread, I suddenly saw Hersh Rasseyner." For the Soviet 
domination of Vilna, Hersh (now a married man)5 holds 
Chaim partly responsible. The Soviet Union had, of course, 
been the great, almost messianic, hope of secular 
progressives, and in Hersh's view such idol-worship is the 
logical culmination of the sentimental idolatry of the 
proletariat that Chaim had expressed to him in 1937. But 
Chaim is as little willing to accept responsibility for the 
Soviet occupation of Vilna as he had been for his own 
departure from piety into secularism. He disavows all 
responsibility for secular progressivism gone wrong by 
telling Hersh, " 'I bear no more responsibility for all that 
than you do for me.' " But the analogy is imprudently 
chosen, for it is precisely Hersh's point that under God every 
man is his brother's keeper and that human beings are so 
interconnected that no one may evade responsibility for his 
acts: " 'You're wrong, Chaim. I do bear responsibility for 
you.' He retreated a few steps and motioned with his eyes to 
the Red Army soldiers, as though to say, 'And you for 
them.' " Chaim's willingness to read even in Hersh's 
physical movements a reproach to himself is a reminder 
that although the story is written, literally and figuratively, 
from Chaim's point of view, it is eminently a dialogue of the 
mind with itself. 
The next meeting between the two men takes place on our 
side of the great divide of twentieth-century history, the 
Holocaust in which six million Jews were murdered. The 
scene is Paris, 1948, and the two old friends, who have by 
now become rather old antagonists, meet on the Métro. The 
narrator has spent the war years wandering across Russia, 
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Poland, and Western Europe; Hersh Rasseyner has been in 
a concentration camp in Latvia, and is now the head of a 
yeshiva in Salzheim, Germany. The men greet each other 
affectionately, and when Hersh asks Chaim "How are 
you?" he no longer asks in derision but in the genuine 
Mussarist way, out of concern for the well-being of his 
friend. Soon, however, Chaim senses that Hersh's warmth 
flows from his assumption that no sane man, in the 
aftermath of the Holocaust, can believe in worldly ex­
pedients for human and social redemption. Ironically, each 
man virtually takes it for granted that the Holocaust has 
destroyed the foundations upon which the other's life had 
until then been based. If Hersh assumes that anyone with 
eyes in his head can now see that to depend upon man-made 
ethical systems, works of art, and social machinery to 
transform the human condition is like relying on razor 
blades to hew down giant oak trees, then Chaim for his part 
assumes that no sane man can still believe in a God who 
presides over concentration camps and crematoria. Chaim 
is astounded that anyone can wring some affirmation of 
God's existence out of the concentration camps; and Hersh 
asserts that life is for him, in the post-Holocaust world, 
impossible without God: " 'How could I stand it without 
Him in this murderous world?' " 
For the debate that ensues over the relative merits of faith 
in God and faith in the world in a universe that has been 
harrowed by the Holocaust, the Paris setting is peculiarly 
appropriate. Paris, after all, had once been the scene of the 
most gigantic and conscious attempt of modern times to 
realize a wholly secular faith. It was in Paris that the altar 
was replaced by the scaffold, the priest by the executioner, 
the congregation by a howling mob thirsting for human 
blood, the crucifix that had once been worn on the breasts of 
the citizenry by a miniature replica of the guillotine. The 
Enlightenment's dream of making man the sole idol to 
which he would himself bow down found its existential 
realization in the French Revolution and the Reign of 
Terror. 
Hersh Rasseyner never even participated in this dream, 
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and so it is all the more incredible to him that his friend 
Chaim should continue to cling to it after the Holocaust. He 
looks at the statues in the niches of the walls of the Hôtel de 
Ville representing the great statesmen, heroes, scholars, 
and artists of modern France and pointedly asks his 
emancipated and worldly friend, " 'Who are those idols?' " 
From Hersh's point of view, Chaim has forsaken God only 
to seek objects of worship among these icons of mere human 
beings. In defense of these statues and of his reverence for 
their originals, Chaim praises the power of art to induce 
imaginative sympathy. He singles out from among the 
various statues those of poets and trots out for his benighted 
religious friend the apologia for literature as the great 
instrument of moral imagination that was first articulated 
by Shelley and De Quincey, then given canonical status by 
George Eliot. But is it good enough in the aftermath of the 
Holocaust? Hersh does not think so. Besides, the vaunted 
sympathy of artists and poets with lustful and wicked 
people arises from the fact that they recognize themselves 
in such people; hence what looks like sympathetic tolerance 
is only self-pity. 
The Parisian setting of the argument over the meaning of 
the Holocaust is also used by Grade to emphasize an 
important difference in the personalities of the protagonists 
that was touched on briefly in the opening section of the 
story. As the argument becomes more heated, Hersh 
becomes more emotional and Chaim becomes—more 
embarrassed. A bearded Jew is shaking his finger at the 
sculptures of the Hôtel de Ville, and passing Parisians have 
begun to stop and stare. "Hersh did not so much as notice 
the passers-by. I felt embarrassed in the face of these 
Frenchmen, smiling and looking at us curiously." Ap­
parently the vindication of God is a more engrossing 
activity than the vindication of literature. Later in the 
story, Hersh suggests that the extreme form of the worldly 
man's concern about what other people will think of him is 
the European practice of dueling. " 'Think of it! For a word 
they didn't like they used to fight with swords or shoot one 
another. To keep public opinion from sneering or a fool from 
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calling them coward, though they trembled at the thought 
of dying, they went to their death.' " 
Once he has got over his embarrassment at Hersh's 
shouting and gesticulating and long-beardedness, Chaim 
turns to the question of what, if anything, the Holocaust 
meant. Some of his remarks reenforce our uneasiness over 
the whole enterprise of trying to assign meaning to a moral 
debacle that defies it, for Chaim has a tendency to speak of 
the concentration camps as an educational "experience." 
He asserts that not even the camps could change men from 
what they were; nevertheless " 'in the crisis men saw 
themselves and others undisguised.' " Hersh, for his part, 
wonders why Chaim should even think it worthy of remark 
that suffering produced neither wisdom nor sanctity in men 
who did not possess them before entering the camps. Man is 
indeed capable of transformation, he argues, but only 
through religion. Hersh himself, in espousing asceticism 
and piety, had not been following the path of least 
resistance but of greatest blessedness, for his lusts and 
obstinacies had been, he maintains, as strong as those of 
any man. But he had accepted, as his enlightened friend 
had not, the fact that there are certain human impulses that 
require not mere enlightenment, improving, and per­
fuming, but uprooting; and that rebirth is a painful process 
because its prerequisite is the death of the old self. Rebirth, 
however, can be effected only through religion. If religion 
cannot transform man, nothing can; worldly, human 
instruments—art, politics, science, philosophy—can never 
raise man above himself for the simple reason that they 
originate with man. 
In the face of this argument, Chaim nevertheless clings to 
the rhetoric of enlightenment: " 'You can't banish shadows 
with a broom, only with a lighted lamp.' " His invocation of 
enlightenment and its apostles enshrined in the Hôtel de 
Ville provokes Hersh to a long and moving discourse on the 
impassable gulf between knowledge and goodness, a gulf 
that he had grasped intellectually in his yeshiva study, but 
that was fully revealed to him only in the concentration 
camps. He recalls to Chaim that the Germans, who are 
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always reminding people of the fact, have produced at least 
as many great men worthy of niches in the Hôtel de Ville as 
have the French, and in the realm of moral philosophy have 
produced more than the French. But did those moral 
philosophers influence the German people to become better? 
Or were the philosophers themselves good men? In the 
concentration camps, Hersh had for the first time come in 
contact with men—presumably assimilated Jews—who 
had been trained in the great German universities, and for 
the first time felt the power and even majesty of secular 
knowledge. Yet he was not tempted by it away from piety 
because he concluded from what he saw in the camps that 
the moral philosophers of Western Europe are men who say, 
and do not. " 'Occasionally I found in their writings as 
much talent and depth as in our own Holy Books, if the two 
may be mentioned in one breath. But they are satisfied with 
talk! And I want you to believe me when I say that I concede 
that their poets and scientists wanted to be good. Only-
only they weren't able to. And if some did have good 
qualities, they were exceptions. The masses and even their 
wise men didn't go any farther than fine talk. As far as 
talking is concerned, they talk more beautifully than we 
do.' " A philosophical morality, Hersh implies, looks good 
in fair weather, but in concentration camps sterner stuff is 
required. 
For one schooled in the yeshiva, Hersh shows a 
remarkable familiarity with enlightenment principles and 
rhetoric. He says that the reason why the moral 
philosophers were incapable of becoming better in action 
than they were was that they were committed to the pursuit 
of pleasure. The pursuit of pleasure or joy or happiness has 
been enjoined on Western man in a variety of forms from 
Epicurus (and it is worthy of note that the Yiddish word for 
heretic is apikoyres, derived from Epicurean) through the 
Declaration of Independence (where we are pledged to "the 
pursuit of happiness"). But according to Hersh the most 
enlightened and philosophical nation in Europe failed to 
achieve the goodness of which it wrote so eloquently 
because " 'pleasure is not something that can be had by 
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itself, [therefore] murder arose among them—the pleasure 
of murder.' " The dream that worldly wisdom, as distinct 
from religious piety, could be a guarantee of sanctity, came 
to its end—or should have—in the concentration camps. 
" 'All the days of my youth I kept my eyes on the earth, 
without looking at the world. Then came the German. He 
took me by my Jewish beard, yanked my head up, and told 
me to look him straight in the eyes. So I had to look into his 
evil eyes, and into the eyes of the whole world as well. And I 
saw, Chaim, I saw—you know what I saw. Now I can look at 
all the idols and read all the forbidden impurities and 
contemplate all the pleasures of life, and it won't tempt me 
any more because now I know the true face of the world.' " 
Hersh keeps referring to his own experience to reenforce 
his arguments, but his primary concern is the desire to 
secure the well-being of his friend by persuading him to 
forsake the world and return to the Jewish fold. This is what 
gives the story its dramatic force and makes it much more 
than a Voltairean philosophical dialogue. Feeling responsi­
ble for his secularized friend, Hersh must prove to Chaim 
that the world that he supposed was striving to improve 
itself was striving only for blood, and that it could not 
transform itself for good because its ethical systems were 
worked out by human minds, and no stream can rise higher 
than its source. The secular philosophers of Western Europe 
" 'trusted their reasoned assumptions as men trust the ice of 
a frozen river in winter. Then came Hitler and put his 
weight on the wisdom of the wise men of the nations. The ice 
of their slippery reasoning burst, and all their goodness was 
drowned.' " Centuries of the most highly refined hair­
splitting and logic-chopping on every conceivable moral 
question had their conclusion in this: " 'there came in the 
West a booted ruler with a little mustache, and in the East a 
booted ruler with a big mustache, and both of them together 
struck the wise man to the ground, and he sank into the 
mud.' " 
By this stage in the argument, Hersh is once again excited 
to the point where he is shouting. But now Chaim is less 
concerned about Parisian passersby because he has come to 
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understand that Hersh is shouting in order to reach that 
buried self of his old friend which has retreated into the 
depths of his subconsciousness as into an infinitely distant 
land. "He shouted at me as though I were a dark cellar and 
he was calling to someone hiding in me." Hersh's passion 
does not affect his fluency because, as he now reveals, he 
has during all the long years in the concentration camp 
rehearsed his argument for faith in the hope that he might 
be able one day to use it on his heretical friend, who is fixed 
in his mind's eye as the representative of secularized Jews 
in general. 
Although Hersh's argument, like the story itself, pivots 
on the question of how to respond to the Holocaust, he is also 
trying to demonstrate that the Holocaust is only the most 
devilish of all the human enterprises that engage the 
energies of those who desert the community of God because 
they would become like gods themselves. The enlightened 
Jew, according to Hersh, separated himself from piety 
because he wished to distinguish himself as an individual, 
to be acclaimed in life and remembered after death not as a 
member of the Community of Israel but as a great scientist, 
thinker, or writer. " 'You didn't violate the commandment 
against idolatry. Of course not! You were your own gods. 
You prophesied, "Man will be a god." So naturally he 
became a devil.' " Movements of religious reform, which 
seek to lighten the burden of the Law on the individual, are 
in Hersh's view as futile and unending as the pursuit of 
happiness; for in religious matters the lighter the burden is 
made, the harder is it to bear. The man who fasts twice a 
we, k does so without difficulty; the man who fasts once a 
year finds the task so difficult that he soon ceases to fast 
altogether. And here again the belief that Hersh had long 
entertained as to the folly of the Jew trying to assimilate 
himself into the nations and to become like his oppressors, 
was proved upon his pulses in the concentration camps: 
"I lay on the earth and was trampled by the German in his
hobnailed boots. Well, suppose that an angel of God had come 
to me then, that he had bent down and whispered into my ear,
'Hersh, in the twinkling of an eye I will turn you into the 
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German. I will put his coat on you and give you his murderous
face; and he will be you. Say the word and the miracle will come 
to pass.' If the angel had asked me—do you hear, Chaim?—I
would not have agreed at all. Not for one minute would I have
consented to be the other, the German, my torturer. I want thejustice of law. . . . With the Almighty's help I could stand the
German's boots on my throat, but if I had had to put on his
mask, his murderous face, I would have been smothered as 
though I had been gassed. And when the German shouted at 
me, 'You are a slave of slaves,' I answered through my wounded
lips, 'Thou hast chosen me.' " 
To be murdered and mutilated as the member of a people 
chosen by God is a better, a more sanctified fate than to 
survive as a murderer—and certainly a better fate than to be 
murdered and mutilated in the act of aping the morality and 
the manners of one's murderer. 
Hersh's final plea to his old yeshiva schoolmate is made 
on behalf of the six million who have been murdered. All 
Jews, he admits, mourn the third of their people who have 
been martyred, but not every Jew seems to be aware, of what 
must surely be true, that " 'it was not a third of the House of 
Israel that was destroyed, but a third of himself, of his body, 
his soul.' " From Hersh's point of view, every Jew living in 
the aftermath of the Holocaust lives with a part of his soul 
in the grave; and it is therefore incomprehensible to him 
that Chaim, who is by no means the least sensitive of Jews, 
should eat and sleep and laugh and dress quite as if nothing 
had happened, quite as if the values of the secular world in 
which he had placed his faith had not collapsed in ruins. 
For Hersh, nothing seems more luminously self-evident 
than that after Auschwitz nothing is left to us except God, to 
whom we must cry out, in desperate emulation of those who 
were slaughtered, " 'For Thy sake are we killed all the 
day.' " 
When Hersh concludes his impassioned plea, the sky is 
growing darker and the stone figures around the Hôtel de 
Ville have shrunk, "as though frightened by what Hersh 
Rasseyner had said, and quietly burrowed deeper into the 
walls." Chaim, who has been relatively silent for some time 
apart from an occasional demurrer, now must respond to 
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the challenge thrown down by his quarrelsome friend. 
Grade has given ample opportunity to the spokesman for 
his anti-self to state the best case that could be made for 
faith in the wake of the Holocaust; and it would be hard to 
find a literary work that gave fuller credence to the ancient 
theory that a devil's advocate must be admitted into the 
midst of one's dearest convictions if they are to become 
sufficiently resilient to survive. Only here the devil's 
advocate is the advocate of the angels and at times comes so 
near to speaking with the tongue of an angel that it is not 
easy to resist him. 
That Grade does intend us finally to resist him we can 
hardly doubt, although the question of "intention" in 
literature is always a highly problematical one. If, despite 
Grade's apparent intentions, we find that Hersh gets out of 
his creator's control and moves us far more powerfully than 
does Chaim, we must remember that, as Charlotte Brontë 
said when she was trying to puzzle out how her sister had 
come to create Heathcliff, "the writer who possesses the 
creative gift owns something of which he is not always 
master—something that at times strangely wills and works 
for itself."6 
Chaim is given the last word in the story, and it is a fairly 
lengthy last word, though not as lengthy as the argument 
just delivered by Chaim's adversary. The gist of Chaim's 
rebuttal may be summarized fairly briefly, for it is doctrine 
that is far more familiar in our age than is Hersh 
Rasseyner's. As a liberal, Chaim reiterates the doctrine of 
nineteenth-century liberalism that doubt is not a bad thing, 
that intellectual heroism consists in being able to live with 
it, and that revealed truth, by definition, cannot be true for 
the individual since he has not discovered it but received it 
ready-made. As an enlightened Jew, Chaim takes pride in 
shouldering a double responsibility: toward Jewish tradi­
tion as well as toward secular culture; and he rejects the 
attempt of the pious to declare all the species of those who 
worship man rather than God fundamentally indis­
tinguishable from one another within the vast genus of 
idolators. As free-willed individualist, Chaim refuses to be 
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lumped together with murderers, and insists that there are 
humane secularists and atheists as well as monstrous ones; 
but as sociological determinist he places the blame for his 
abandonment of Jewish tradition on precisians like Hersh 
whose rigid insistence on the narrowest path of piety drove 
those with more worldly inclinations into outright apos­
tasy. " 'If we have abandoned Jewish tradition, it's your 
fault.' " 
But the most terrifying accusation that Hersh has laid 
against secularized Jews is that their distraction from the 
Community of Israel made their suffering and their dying 
in the camps pointless, and that Chaim's continued 
separation from the Community of Israel prevents him 
from ascribing even a posthumous meaning to all that 
suffering. Chaim's indignant reply to this accusation is not, 
it must be admitted, very convincing. He answers that the 
Germans were not mistaken in taking the secularized Jews 
for complete JJWS, and that if the world defines the Jew in 
this liberal and inclusive way, so too must the Master of the 
World. Otherwise, Hersh would have been incorrect to say 
that one third of the Jewish people perished in the 
Holocaust, for large numbers of the victims were, according 
to Hersh's strict definition, merely quarter-Jews or tenth-
Jews, or less. " 'The gist of what you say . .  . is that any­
one who isn't your kind of Jew is not a Jew at all. Doesn't 
that mean that there were more bodies burned than Jews 
murdered?' " Outraged as Chaim is at Hersh's attempt to 
assign a religious meaning to what has happened—" 'Even 
if we were devils,' he shouts, 'we couldn't have sinned 
enough for our just punishment to be a million murdered 
children.' "—it is clear that he himself is absolutely 
resistant to the " 'despairing belief that the world has no 
sense or meaning.' " Yet he refuses the religious meaning 
that Hersh finds in the suffering of those who believed 
themselves to be sanctifying the name of God because it 
would consign the suffering of all the others to the shadowy 
realm of non-meaning. 
Chaim's quarrel with Hersh Rasseyner has now come to 
an end, and in the closing paragraphs of the story, Chaim 
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speaks no longer as an adversary but as a reconciler. In 
other words, the author himself has now directly intervened 
in the attempt to make peace between the two halves of 
himself that have been in conflict. Speaking through the 
mouth of his fictional creation, and speaking explicitly as a 
writer, he prays for a binding together of the religious and 
secular strands of the Jewish tradition and claims that in 
the very cries against God that are uttered by the secular 
Jewish writers there is yet concealed " 'a quiet prayer for 
the Divine Presence, or for the countenance of those 
destroyed in the flames, to rest on the alienated Jews.' " The 
Jewish writer who survived the Holocaust bears the same 
burden of suffering as does the believing Jew who 
communes through God with that segment of the Communi­
ty of Israel and of his own soul that lies in the grave; but the 
writer, lacking Hersh Rasseyner's faith, can commune with 
his people only through the " 'travail of creation.' " 
Chaim Grade's Quarrel with Hersh Rasseyner is one 
remarkable product of such travail. Matthew Arnold, who 
was deeply concerned with the meaning of "adequacy" in 
literature, once said that the most inadequate of all kinds of 
literature was "the dialogue of the mind with itself." It was 
inadequate for purposes of inspiriting and rejoicing readers 
because it dwelt on suffering which finds no vent in action 
and represented a "continuous state of mental dis­
tress . . . unrelieved by incident, hope, or resistance; in 
which there is everything to be endured, nothing to be 
done."7 But Arnold forgot that there may be subjects that 
readers would be loath to see used as occasions for the 
exercise of art's capacity to bring joy out of suffering, and 
quandaries that readers do not want solved but only 
imagined and expressed. That is why Grade's story, which 
is precisely a "dialogue of the mind with itself," is able to 
involve us so deeply. It seems to be the perfect dramatic 
articulation, rather than the philosophic resolution, of 
doubts and difficulties that now beset all of us. 
1. Chaim Grade was born in Vilna, Poland, in 1910 and spent his 
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youthful years in yeshiva study. He published his first book of poems in 
1936, escaped to the Soviet Union in 1941, and reached New York in 1948. 
2. Mussarists are an ascetic Jewish sect, to which Grade himself 
belonged in his youth. In biblical Hebrew musar means "chastisement" 
and hence "instruction" as to right conduct; by extension it may be said
to comprise the ascetic and devotional element of religious ethics. 
3. Since surnames have no functional existence in the shtetl, a man 
may be identified by the place from which he comes, in this case Vilna. 
4. Hersh's acerbity on this point has a foundation in Jewish tradition.
In the world of talmudic scholarship, it is the name of an author's work
and not his personal name that identifies him. 
5. His marriage is not to be interpreted as a concession to the flesh
except insofar as, in the shtetl, boys destined to study the Law were
married early so that their needs would be satisfied and they would be
able to concentrate on their books. 
6. Editor's Preface to Wuthering Heights. Charlotte Bronte wrote this 
preface to the 1850 edition of her sister's novel. 
7. Matthew Arnold, Preface to First Edition of Poems (1853). 
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art to bring order out of chaos. He doubts 
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majesty and noble imperfection. 
To say this, Professor Alexander argues, 
is not to make of the Holocaust a license for 
literary and philosophical "absurdity" or a 
splendid occasion for demonstrating the in­
finite elasticity of the literary image. 
Rather, it is to acknowledge that literary 
works characterized by uncertainty, histor­
ical despair, and ambivalence may provide 
a more adequate response to the Holocaust 
than those controlled by a steady and cer­
tain voice committed to the traditional 
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The recurrent themes of this absorbing 
and impassioned book are the incredibility 
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